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I. INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was applicable to
police interrogation of a suspect in custody and supplied the test for
determining the admissibility of the suspect's confession. 1 In taking this
position, the Court necessarily rejected the view of dissenting Justices Harlan
and White that the admissibility of confessions should be determined not by the
Fifth Amendment's privilege, but by the due process rule that bars involuntary
confessions. Before Miranda, the due process rule had been the principal
constitutional restriction on the admissibility of police-induced confessions. 2
The most influential authority upon which the dissenting opinions rested was
the 1961 revision of Wigmore's Evidence which stated that "[t]he privilege at
common law did not apply to police interrogations, and, in view of the
development of the complementary constitutional doctrine excluding coerced
confessions, it is doubtful that there is sufficient reason today to distort the
[constitutional] privilege to cover this situation." 3 Wigmore's rationale was that
Since police have no legal right to compel answers, there is no legal
obligation to which a privilege in the technical sense can apply. That is, it
makes no sense to say that one is privileged not to disclose-that one is
1 384 U.S. 436, 458-67 (1966).
2 See id. at 510-11 (Harlan, I., dissenting); id. at 526, 528 (White, I., dissenting).
3 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 328-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
[hereinafter 8 WIGMORE] (cross-reference omitted).
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excused from the legal consequences of contumacy-when there are no legal
consequences of contumacy.
4
Although Miranda was controversial, particularly in the late 1960s, the
sticking point was that the Court had interpreted the privilege to require the
police to give advice and obtain a waiver before engaging in custodial
interrogation. Largely as a result of two trenchant articles by Professor Yale
Kamisar,5 even those who disparaged Miranda's advice/waiver approach
seemed to accept that the Court was correct in applying some version of the
privilege to police interrogation. 6 Indeed, while roundly condemning Miranda
and urging that it be overruled, the United States Department of Justice under
Attorney General Edwin Meese III conceded that "[t]he applicability of the
Fifth Amendment at [the police interrogation] stage is in fact consistent with the
historical understanding of the Fifth Amendment right." 7
In recent years, however, some of the the scholarly literature has disclosed
a yearning to return to the days when the due process rule was the only
constitutional law test for determining the admissibility of confessions obtained
by police interrogation.8 The Supreme Court is probably congenial to this
view. Referring to police interrogations that fall outside the scope of Miranda,
Chief Justice Rehnquist said for the Court in Colorado v. Connelly, "The Court
has retained this due process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination applies to the States." 9 Implicit in this statement is the
4 Id. it 329 n.27.
5 Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966)
[hereinafter Kamisar, Dissent]; Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and
Mansions of American Crminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E.
Dick Howard ed., 1965) [article hereinafter Kamisar, Equal Justice]. These articles are
reprinted in YALE KAMIsAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 27, 41 (1980).
6 See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Lav of Confessions, 65 VA.
L. REV. 859, 926-27 (1979).
7 OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLIcy, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION 42 (1986).
8 See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1468,
1473-74 (1985); cf. Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department ofJustice's Office of
Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 397-98 (1989) (approving pre-Miranda cases
that upheld the admissibility of confessions although the police denied the suspect's request
for counsel).
9 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986). This statement jibes with one made
12 years earlier by then-Justice Rehnquist in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), in
which the Court held that the suspect's confession had not been "compelled" by police
interrogators in violation of his Fifth Amendment protection. One of the factors mentioned
by Justice Rehnquist was that "there were no legal sanctions, such as the threat of contempt,
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position that the Fifth Amendment privilege and the due process rule are
separate and distinct, that each has a separate sphere of operations, and that the
sphere of the privilege does not include police interrogation. This position is
explicitly stated in WigmoreYo Consequently, should the Supreme Court ever
decide to dispatch Miranda, it is likely to buttress its opinion with the
scholarship and reputation of Wigmore. 1
But was Wigmore right? Why are there separate rules? Why should one set
of interrogation cases be governed by the Fifth Amendment privilege and
another set (the police interrogation set) by due process standards? These
questions, which jumped off the page when I carefully read Connelly, set me
on the path of trying to ascertain what rules historically governed interrogations
of all sorts in the English and American systems both before and shortly after
the Fifth Amendment was adopted. I wanted to learn whether the privilege and
the involuntary confession rule were really distinct; why, in view of the
existence of the privilege, any other doctrine emerged regarding the
admissibility of confessions; and whether there was reason for applying the
involuntary confession rule, but not the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, to police interrogation.
These questions required close study of the history of both doctrines. This
proved to be more daunting than it sounds because I found no history of the
privilege that was long enough to give a flavor of the crucial events, but short
enough not to overwhelm a researcher for whom history is but one of many
considerations. I found also that although there are many discussions of each
doctrine apart from the other, there is no single source that integrates a history
of both doctrines. In the present Article, I seek to remedy that situation. In Part
II, I divide a historical time-line into eight segments and consider, in
connection with each segment, the history of the privilege and other doctrines
relating to the admissibility of confessions. The focal point of this discussion is
the common law.
In Part Ill, I ask whether there is a relationship between the common law
exclusion of involuntary confessions and the common law protection against
which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent." Id. at 445
(emphasis added). Since there never are legal sanctions, such as contempt, for refusing to
answer a police officer's questions, reliance on this factor implies a rejection of the Fiffh
Amendment as a protection against coercive police interrogation. See supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text.
10 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 328-29; id. § 2266, at 401.
11 At a conference on constitutional law and the decisions of the Supreme Court's 1989
Term, Dean Jesse Choper opined that the Court was more likely to "chip away" at Miranda
than to overrule it. See Constitutional Law Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272, 2273 (Nov. 6,
1990). Professor Yale Kamisar put the matter more bluntly. "In reality, Kamisar said, the
court doesn't have to overrule Miranda or some of the other 'liberal' Warren Court
precedents to achieve a more conservative result 'because these cases have already been so
battered there's not much left to overrule.'" Id. at 2277.
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compulsory self-incrimination. In connection with these matters, I set out
Wigmore's position (Part IMI A) and evaluate it in terms of the operation,
history, and objectives of both common law protections (Part III B). I
conclude, contrary to Wigmore, (1) that there is great similarity between the
common law protections and (2) that the involuntary confession rule appears to
be no more than the exclusionary function of the privilege. Not quite satisfied
with the second conclusion, I pursue the matter further and identify two
situations in which certain action does not violate the privilege but nevertheless
does produce a confession of such dubious reliability as to call for exclusion
under an evidentiary rule independent of the privilege. In these two situations,
the involuntary confession rule serves a unique purpose. In all other situations,
however, it serves no purpose and should be abandoned in favor of the
privilege. In light of this conclusion, I reassess and explain the English and
American cases and treatises that seem to support Wigrnore's view (Part II C).
In Part IV, I reconsider the matters discussed in Part I, but in the
constitutional context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination and the due process rule barring involuntary confessions. I
conclude that, largely as a result of Colorado v. Connelly, the constitutional
protections are even more alike than their common law analogues. This
conclusion leads me to ask (Part IV E 2 and 3) why the Supreme Court wants
to resolve confession cases by using the Due Process Clause in preference to
the Fifth Amendment privilege. My answer is that the Court may perceive the
due process approach as more flexible and malleable, hence more manipulable
in the service of admitting confessions. Finally, in Part V, I confront the
question of the applicability to police interrogation of the common law and
constitutional protections against compulsory self-incrimination. I look at the
logic of the Wigmore position and find it flawed. Then I consider the issue in
terms of the history, operations, and objectives of the privilege, as well as from
a general policy perspective. This discussion reveals that there is no reason for
withholding the privilege from police interrogation and strong reason for
applying it. 12
121 am concerned in this Article only with questions that are anterior to the question of
whether the Court was right in Miranda in interpreting the privilege to require advice and
waiver as a constitutional predicate for custodial police interrogation. One who accepts all
the conclusions of this Article may still take the position that the Court wrongly decided
Miranda.
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II. HISTORY
A. Early History
Some time before the 1100s, separate systems of ecclesiastical and lay
courts developed in England 13 and "the English ecclesiastical courts [became]
branches of an international court system of the Roman Church." 14 Both
systems initially used similar procedures, but eventually followed drastically
different roads. 15 In criminal cases of the late ll00s and early 1200s, lay courts
began to use procedures which developed much later into formal accusation by
a grand jury and adjudication by a trial or petit jury. The procedures were
accusatorial in the sense that there were a definite charge, a known accuser,
and open, rather than secret, proceedings. 16 The accuser was initially an
individual, but later became a representative group of the vicinage, leading to
what we now call the grand jury. 17
In 1215, the Barons forced King John to sign Magna Carta. Chapter 36
provided that a "writ of inquisition of life and limbs" should be given without
charge. 18 This writ was used to transfer a case from a mode of private
accusation, which might be actuated by malice, to a mode of public accusation
(the precursor of the grand jury).19 The fact that Magna Carta made it easier to
obtain the writ shows the importance that was attached to an accusatorial mode
of procedure in the lay courts.
Chapter 38 of Magna Carta provided, "No bailiff for the future shall, upon
his own unsupported complaint put anyone to his law without credible
witnesses brought for this purpose." 20 The word "law" certainly referred to at
least some older modes of adjudication,21 but the meaning of Chapter 38 as a
whole is not clear. Professor McKechnie believes that it includes a stricture
against forcing a person to undergo trial by various forms of ordeal or by oath
13 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT 43 (1968); 8
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 270.
14 Neill H. Alford, The Right of Silence, 79 YALE L.I. 1618, 1623 (1970) (reviewing
LEVY, supra note 13).
15 LEVY, supra note 13, at 4-5.
16 Id. at 7.
17 1d. at5, 10l11.
18 WILLIAM S. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 359 (2d ed. 1958). In discussing Magna
Carta in both the text and footnotes of this Article, I shall follow Professor McKechnie and
use the numbering of the chapters of the 1215 charter. However, the charter was reissued
on several occasions in different versions with different numbering. For a discussion of the
various versions, see McKECHNM, supra, at 138-59.
19 LEVY, supra note 13, at 13-14; McKECHNIE, supra note 18, at 361-62.
2 0 MCKECHNIE, supra note 18, at 369-70.
21 Id. at 370, and 370 n.2. See also James B. Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 4
HARV. L. REV. 147, 157-58 (1890).
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of compurgation 22 based only on vague suspicion or the "unsupported
statement of the royal bailiff."23 Rather, an accusing jury was necessary. 24
Once the formal accusation was made, however, it was appropriate to
"adjudicate" or dispose of the case by using a mechanism such as the oath of
compurgation. In later centuries, Chapter 38 was relied on to resist a different
oath-the oath ex officio (compelled by virtue of the interrogator's office)-to
which it has no reference, and that oath, as we shall see, played a crucial role
in the struggle for protection against compulsory self-incrimination.25
We shall also see reliance on Chapter 39, which provides, "No freeman
shall be taken or imprisoned... nor will we go upon him nor send upon him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." 26
Centuries later, with no greater justification than under Chapter 38, the "law of
the land" provision was conscripted to battle the oath ex officio.27
In the same year that Magna Carta was signed, Catholic clergy worldwide
were forbidden from participating in the administration of ordeals. 28 Since trial
by ordeal was predicated upon religious assumptions and required the clergy's
participation, that mode of disposition died in England and Western Europe in
both ecclesiastical and lay courts, 29 and it became necessary to find a
substitute. In English lay courts, the existing accusatorial system began to move
in the direction of trial by jury. In English ecclesiastical courts and throughout
Western Europe, a system began which crucially involved both "inquisition"
and "oath." 30 Initially used to discover and punish the misdeeds of the clergy,
these devices came to be used against suspected heretics. 31 Professor Levy
describes the process of accusation and proof in ecclesiastical courts as follows:
The remodeled criminal procedures of the canon law, after 1215,
described three modes of prosecution. The first, the accusatio, was the
traditional form. A private person, on the basis of some information or
22 A "compurgator" was "[olne of several neighbors of a person accused of a
crime... who appeared and swore that they believed him on his oath." BLACK's LAW
DIcrIoNARY 288 (6th ed. 1990).
23 McKECHNIE, supra note 18, at 373-74.
24 Id. at 373. See also James B. Thayer, The Older Modes of TDial, 5 HARV. L. REV.
45, 48 (1891).
25 See infra notes 32-39, 100, 103, 116, 161 and accompanying text.26 McKWHNM, supra note 18, at 375.
27 For a discussion of the purposes of Chapter 39, see MCKECHNIE, supra note 18, at
375-95. For reliance on Chapter 39, see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
28 "The most ancient species of trial . . . it being supposed that supernatural
intervention would rescue an innocent person from the danger of physical harm to which he
was exposed .... The ordeal was of two sorts-either fire ordeal or water ordeal ... .
BLACK's LAW DirnONARY 1095-96 (6th ed. 1990).
29 LEVY, supra note 13, at 14.
30 Id. at 14-16, 20.
3 1 1d. at20-22.
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evidence available to him, voluntarily accused another and thereby became a
party to the prosecution, taking upon himself the task of proof. He also took
upon himself the risk of being punished in the event that the prosecution failed.
The second form of prosecution was the denunciatio, which enabled the private
accuser to avoid the danger and burden of the accsatio. Either an individual
or the synodal witnesses played the role of informer, secretly indicting or
denouncing someone before the court. The judge himself then became a party
to the suit cc officio, by virtue of his office, and conducted the prosecution for
the secret accuser. The third form was the inquisitio, by which the judge
combined in his person all roles-that of accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury.
Technically the judge could not institute a suit unless an important preliminary
condition had first been met; he must satisfy himself that there were probable
grounds for the inquisitio. This was the canon law's equivalent of the grand
jury of presentment of the English common law. The canon law required that
an accusation must rest on infamia-infamy or bad reputation-which was
established by the existence of either notorious suspicion (clamosa insinuatio)
or common report (fama), which was some sort of public rumor. But the
inquisitor himself, supposedly a wise and incorruptible man, was the sole
judge of the existence of infamia, and his own suspicions, however based or
baseless, were also adequate for the purpose of imprisoning the suspect and
putting him to an inquisition. The Fourth Lateran Council prescribed no form
for the establishment of infamia if the judge decided to proceed e officio
mero, that is, of his own accord or at his discretion.
One of the "most odious features," as Esmein said, of the whole
inquisitional procedure that was introduced by the Fourth Lateran Council was
the new oath the suspect was required to swear. It was the oath de veritate
dicenda, to tell the truth to all interrogatories that might be administered, a
seemingly innocuous obligation which in reality was an inescapable trap, a
form of spiritual torture, tortura spirtualis, calculated to induce self-
incrimination. Confession of guilt was central to the whole inquisitional
process, and the oath, which was administered at the very outset of the
proceedings, was reckoned as indispensable to the confession. The accused,
knowing neither the charges against him, nor his accusers, nor the evidence,
was immediately placed between hammer and anvil: he must take the oath or
be condenned as guilty, yet if he took the oath he exposed himself to the
nearly certain risk of punishment for perjury-and his lies were evidence of his
guilt-or condemned himself by admissions which his judge regarded as
damaging, perhaps as a confession to the unnamed crime. The oath de veritate
dicenda was thus virtually a self-incriminatory oath. Because it became
associated with the Inquisition, it became known as the inquisitional oath; and
because it originated in connection with a proceeding in which the judge served
et officio as indicator, assailant, and convictor, it was also called the oath t
officio.3 2
32 LEVY, supra note 13, at 22-24 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The internal
quotation is from ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 82 (John Simpson trans., 1914).
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Obtaining the suspect's confession was often the only way of complying with
the canon law's requirement of "perfect or complete" proof.33 Confession,
therefore, became "the name of the game."
Early in the development of the ecclesiastical process, the proceeding ex
officio inero was rarely used and the suspect was therefore ordinarily entitled to
know the charge and the name of his accuser. However, as the battle against
heresy heightened, the ex officio proceeding replaced the others, procedural
protections were removed, and torture was used on the continent to obtain
confessions. 34
The usual course of [an ecclesiastical] trial, which consisted of the secret
examination [by the judge] of the accused under oath, was to confront him
with the mass of surmises and rumors and hearsay against him and demand his
confession.
•ITihe accusation and prosecution rested entirely with the court .... 35
By contrast, the English lay system, once matured, "was based on the
presentment by grand jury, the written indictment, and trial by jury. "36 In this
system, the judge "remained essentially a referee of a private fight, enforcing
the observance of the rules by both parties." 37
The final matter in this brief introduction is that the oath de veritate
dicenda was abolished in canon law in 1725. One of the grounds was that the
confessions produced by it were unreliable. 38 This point will take on greater
importance as we see the close relationship between the oath and the struggle in
England to obtain protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and as we
ask whether there is a distinction between that protection and the rule barring
the admissibility of involuntary confessions.
B. 1246-1368
1. Compelled Seif-Inctimination
The oath ex officio was first used in England in 1246 by Bishop
Grosseteste, who "conducted 'strict Inquisitions' into the sexual misconduct
33 LEVY, supra note 13, at 26-27. See also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE
LAW OF PROOF 4-5 (1976) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, TORTURE].
34 LEVY, supra note 13, at 25-28.
35 Id. at 28-29.
36 Id. at 29.
37Id.
38 Id. at 24 (citing Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1346-47 (1959)).
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and general immorality of the people of his diocese of Lincoln." 39 Their
outrage led Henry III to characterize the oath as contrary to "ancient
Customs... [and] peoples Liberties" and to enjoin Lincolnites from
answering any of the Bishop's questions under oath except in matrimonial or
testamentary matters. 4° Bishop Grosseteste defied the Crown and used the
threat of excommunication to force people to take the oath and answer. Henry
was not amused. In 1252, he directly enjoined Grosseteste. It is not known
whether the injunction was obeyed. 41
The Archbishop of Canterbury revived the oath in 1272, and the Church
suddenly found itself opposed by a new adversary: the common law courts.
These courts, which may have been concerned about encroachment on their
own jurisdiction, apparently attempted to enjoin the church courts from
exercising their jurisdiction. As a result, Parliament in 1285 and again in 1316
ordered common law judges to desist.42
Sometime before 1326, a statute, Prohibitio Formata de Statuto Articuli
Ceri, was enacted. 43 It defined the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law
courts and prohibited ecclesiastical courts from exercising jurisdiction over the
same matters. Moreover, it effectively outlawed the oath ex officio in
ecclesiastical cases other than matrimonial and testamentary. 44  The
ecclesiastical courts ignored the statute, perhaps because the same oath was
used by the King's Council (the Privy Council). The Council, which functioned
sometimes as a court and which later spawned both the Court of Star Chamber
and the Court of High Commission, was influenced by ecclesiastical procedure.
Consequently, it took cases on suggestion of wrongdoing, used an inquisitorial
oath and interrogatories, and withheld from suspects precise information about
the charge. 45
Between 1331 and 1347, Parliament thrice assailed the on-oath
examinations of Privy Council as repugnant to the "law of the land" provision
of Chapter 39 of Magna Carta,46 a position that was without historical
foundation. 47 In 1352, Parliament decreed that Magna Carta was applicable to
39 1d. at 47.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 48.
421d.
43 Prohibitia Formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri, 9 Edw. 2 1315-16 (Eng.); 1 STAT. AT
LARGE (Eng.) 403 (Danby Pickering ed., 1762).
44 LEVY, supra note 13, at 49. Wigmore's view was that both the objections to the
oath and the enactment of De Arficuli Cleri were salvos in a battle over the jurisdiction of
ecclesiastical courts and did not involve any aversion to the oath as such. 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 3, § 2250, at 271-77. Wigmore's position has been attacked by reputable
scholars. See the materials collected in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 267 n.1.
45 LEVY, supra note 13, at 49-51.
46Id. at51.
4 7 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Council. Two years later, it attempted to outlaw the oath in Council
proceedings. 48 Within a decade, Parliament renewed its protests and enacted in
1368 the last of the so-called "Magna Carta statutes." This one sought to
mandate accusatorial procedures in Council. Although the Magna Carta statutes
were failures in their own time, they became important precedents two
centuries later.49
To summarize, during the period 1246-1368, there was objection to a
compulsory oath, but apparently no objection to compulsory self-incrimination
per se. That developed much later out of the objection to the oath. The
objection to the oath occurred in different contexts. One context concerned the
Church inquiring into the conduct of its own adherents. The second, which
dealt with the effort of the legislative branch to assert itself against an agency of
the Crown, involved objection to the use of the oath in a temporal court. The
basis for these objections to on-oath examinations is not clear. It might have
been some substantive religious value that opposed swearing. It might also have
been, as later became the case,50 the principle that a person should not be
subjected to the mental anguish of a compulsory, on-oath examination absent
the substantial justification provided by the open accusation of a known
accuser.51 In the same period, there was the beginning of a conflict between
rival court systems. At first, this conflict involved jurisdiction rather than
objection to an oath. Later, as we shall see, it became a third context for the
battle against the oath and yet another precursor to the protection against
compulsory self-incrimination. 52
2. Admissibility of Confessions
During the same period, there was nothing in English law that even
remotely addressed the subject of the admissibility of confessions. The reason
is simple: there was no law of evidence. Although trial by jury had begun to
replace older modes of proof, jurors were selected because they had knowledge
of the matter in question. It was not until the jury became an uninformed body
that a law of evidence developed. 53
48 LEVY, supra note 13, at 52.
49 Id. at53.
50 See infra notes 61-63, 66, 83-84, 96-97, 99, 113 and accompanying text.
51 For a discussion of the idea of "individual sovereignty" and the role it played in the
development of the protection against compulsory self-incrimination, see infra notes 431-32
and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
53 See generally JAMES B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown 1898).
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C. 1368-1553
1. Compelled Self-Incrimination
The late 1300s saw the beginning of three hundred years of religious strife
in England. The oath ex officio became an important tool of religious
persecution, first of Protestants by Catholics, then of Catholics by Protestants,
and finally of Puritans by Anglicans.
There is little to note about the early days of this period. Walter Brute
attacked oaths as contrary to Christ's admonition "Thou shalt not swear at
all." 54 Some refused to take the oath and others refused to answer questions
after taking the oath. Their very refusal was regarded as evidence against them,
and they were treated as guilty (pro confesso) and excommunicated. 55
Apparently taking no chances with recalcitrants in its battle against heresy, the
Catholic Church enlisted the state. In 1401, Parliament enacted the statute De
Haeretico Comburendo.56 The statute gave the Bishops power to arrest and jail
anyone "defamed or evidently suspected" of heresy. 57 It also put Parliament's
imprimatur on the oath ex officio, and mandated burning for "[o]bstinate or
relapsed heretics." 58 An inquisition against early Protestants had begun which
lasted for almost a century and a half. During that period, thousands of persons
were examined by oath ex officio about their religious beliefs and practices.
Until 1532, none refused to answer. 59
In 1532, the Archbishop of Canterbury conducted an inquiry into the
suspected heresy of John Lambert. Lambert became the first person on record
to claim that the oath was unlawful, saying, "No man is bound to bewray
[accuse] himself," to which, according to Professor Levy, "he appended the
54 LEVY, supra note 13, at 56. The passage from the Bible is found at Matthew 5:33.
55 LEVY, supra note 13, at 55. Professor Levy states that John Ashton, priest, scholar,
and disciple of Wycliffe, "having taken the oath, refused to answer questions about his
religious beliefs; he was therefore taken 'pro confesso '--as if he had confessed-and was
pronounced guilty of heresy." Id. It is interesting that Ashton was willing to take the oath,
but unwilling to answer a certain kind of question. It is foolish to read too much into
history, but Ashton's action suggests the possibility that the antecedents of the protection
against compulsory self-incrimination include more than an aversion to taking an oath. This
may be a relevant datum when we later ask whether the privilege should be viewed as a
protection only against those who have the authority to administer oaths or whether it should
also be viewed as a protection against the police. See infra Part V.
56 De Haeretico Comburendo, 1401, 2 Hen. 4, ch. 15 (Eng.); 2 STAT. AT LARGE
(Eng.) 415 (Danby Pickering ed., 1762).
57 Id.
58 LEVY, supra note 13, at 59.
59 Id. at 58-61. The story is also told in abbreviated form in 8 WIGMORE, supra note
3, § 2250, at 277.
[Vol. 53:101
SELF-INCRIMINATIONAND DUE PROCESS
Latin expression of that maxim, Nemo tenetur prodere seipswn." 60 As the
records of the proceeding indicate, however, Lambert's complaint was quite
narrow. He asserted no absolute right to silence. Rather, his point was that he
could not be made to answer on oath until he had been formally accused and
given notice of the charges. 61 Even this narrow claim added a nail to Lambert's
coffin, and he was eventually executed for obdurate heresy.62
We do not know the source from which Lambert drew his claim, but it
seems within the realm of reasonable conjecture that Lambert, who was a
priest, might have been aware of several fragments of opposition to an oath.
One of these was an ancient objection within canon law which some had made
to the use of the oath as a "fishing expedition" in lieu of other proof.63 Another
was the statute Articuli Cleri which, two hundred years earlier, had sought to
impede the oath.64 In addition, there was a much more recent objection by
William Tyndale, who was the first person to translate the New Testament into
English. Tyndale's objection was based on the same words of Christ that
Walter Brute had cited almost 140 years earlier.65
John Lambert's was not the only voice against the oath. In 1532 and again
a year later, a noted lawyer, Christopher St. Germain, attacked the oath on the
ground that it was inconsistent with accusatorial procedure. 66 Also in 1532,
Parliament made a similar complaint in a petition to Henry VII.67 For reasons
that probably had nothing to do with the merits of the complaint, Henry was
sympathetic. For over five years, Henry had unsuccessfully sought to dissolve
his marriage to Catherine of Aragon. In 1532, Henry's chief adviser, Thomas
Cromwell, proposed that the "English Church should separate from Rome,
becoming effectively a spiritual department of state under the rule of the king
60 LEVY, supra note 13, at 3, 62.
61 Id. at 4, 62.
62 Id. at3.
63 See Silving, supra note 38, at 1346. Dean Wigmore asserted that "[t]he fact is that
the maxim nemo tenetur was an old and established one in ecclesiastical practice." John H.
Wigmore, Nemo tenetur Seipswn Prodere, 5 HARv. L. REv. 71, 83 (1891). However,
other scholars say that the origin of the maxim is unclear and that there is no early canon-
law text containing the maxim. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of
the Sef-Incmi'nation Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1930). Even viewed as an
objection to "fishing" in lieu of other proof, the meaning of the maxim is not clear:
assuming that a proper foundation of "other proof" has been established, what may the
accused be compelled to do? Wigmore's answer is that the accused may be compelled to
answer questions under oath. Wigmore, supra. Silving's answer is that the accused was
permitted (not compelled) to take an oath of compurgation which would clear him. Silving,
supra note 38, at 1366-68.
64 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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as God's deputy on earth." 68 Henry's acceptance of the proposal gave him the
power to terminate his own marriage, and, in 1533, he married Anne Boleyn. 69
In the same year, he approved Parliament's petition, and Parliament responded
by enacting a statute that repealed De Haeretico Comburendo.70 The new
statute provided that "[a]ny person presented or indicted of any heresy, or duly
accused by two lawful witnesses, may be cited, arrested, or taken by an
ordinary [a church official who sat in ecclesiastical court],, or other of the
King's subjects to answer in open court." By requiring presentment,
indictment, or accusation by two lawful witnesses, the statute responded to
contemporary criticism of the oath as a "fishing" device. It did not abolish the
oath; rather, it provided for formal charge as a precursor to the oath in
ecclesiastical courts.
Henry's break with Rome put him on the horns of a dilemma. One horn
was that he incurred the enmity and resistance of those who opposed the break.
The other was that Henry, who remained firmly attached to Catholic doctrine
(except papal supremacy), inadvertently encouraged the burgeoning Protestant
movement. Henry protected both of his flanks with a bloody vengeance that did
not always comport with the statute of 1533.71 Indeed, after Henry became
"head of both church and state, heresy became identified with treason. The ex
officio oath became the major fact-finding tool of a new group of courts, the
[royal] prerogative or 'conciliar' courts [deriving from the King's Council]." 72
Several of the conciliar courts antedated the Tudors. One was the Court of Star
Chamber.73 The battle against even a "fishing" oath was far from won.
Henry's successor, Edward VI, was a Protestant who did not pursue his
religious enemies with zeal. His reign therefore contributed little to the fight
against the oath and nothing to the development of the right against self-
incrimination. 74
2. Admissibility of Confessions
Edward's reign did contribute a morsel to the evidentiary rule (which
developed much later)75 barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions.
During Edward's reign, as before and after, torture was sometimes used to
68 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrANNICA 841 (15th ed. 1986).
69 Id.
70 A Repeal of the Statute of 2 H.4 c. 15 and a Confirmation of the Statutes of 5 R.2
St.2 C.5 and 2 H.5 St.1 C.7 touching the Punishment of Hereticks, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 14
(Eng.); 4 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 278-79 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
71 LEVY, supra note 13, at 69-72.
72 Alford, supra note 14, at 1623.
73 Id.
74 LEVY, supra note 13, at 73-75.
75 See infra notes 256-96 and accompanying text.
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obtain information, particularly in cases of state significance,76 of which
treason was a paradigm. In 1547, a statute was enacted repealing earlier laws
relating to treason.77 Section 22 of the statute provided that no person "shall be
indicted, arraigned, condemned or convicted" for treason unless he be
"accused by two sufficient and lawful witnesses, or shall willingly without
violence confess the same." This statute did not deal with the admissibility of
evidence and thus was not a strand in the immediate development of the
involuntary confession rule. Nonetheless, it was an antecedent. In fashioning a
confessional substitute for the two-witness rule, the drafters required that the
confession be voluntary. Why? The answer must be that they regarded a
voluntary confession as the functional equivalent of the two-witness
requirement. Since the two-witness rule was intended to advance an interest in
reliability,78 the same function may therefore be attributed to the statutory
requirement of voluntariness. As we shall see, this function also underlies the
rule that treats involuntary confessions as inadmissible. 79 Hence, the
Edwardian statute may be regarded as a collateral antecedent of the involuntary
confession rule.80
It is a fair summary of this part of our story to say that, during the period
1368-1553, there was a fitfully recognized aversion to a "fishing" oath in
ecclesiastical proceedings, but neither in the ecclesiastical courts nor in the lay
courts was there any doctrine opposing compulsory self-incrimination per se or
making involuntary confessions inadmissible.81
76 See infra note 130.
77 An Act for the Repeal of Certain Statutes Concerning Treasons and Felonies, 1547,
1 Edw. 6, ch. 12 (Eng.); 5 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 259 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
78 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2037, at 353 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (citing 3
SIR WnIjAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 358 (Dublin,
John Exshaw, 4th ed. 1770)).
79 See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
80 There is a dispute as to whether the word "confess" in the Edwardian statute refers
only to a plea of guilty, or whether it includes an extrajudicial confession. See 3 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter 3 WIGMORE]. That
dispute is irrelevant for present purposes. In either event, the statute did not deal with
admissibility, as does the involuntary confession rule, and, in either event, there was a
concern for reliability which foreshadowed the involuntary confession rule.
81 See 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193-94 (1927); JAMES F.
STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 30-37 (London,
MacMillan, 2d ed. 1890) [hereinafter STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEw]; 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 216-21 (London, MacMillan 1883)
[hereinafter 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY]; 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, §§ 817-18, at 291-94
(confessions); 8 WIGMORE supra note 3, § 2250, at 284-85 (compulsory self-
incrimination).
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D. Mary I and Elizabeth 1: 1553-1603
1. Compelled Self-Incrimination
The throne returned to Catholicism when Mary succeeded Edward, and
Mary set about to earn her sanguinary sobriquet. She disavowed the statute of
1533 and revived De Haeretico Comburendo. She continued the practice of
Henry and Edward by constituting a commission to deal with religious matters.
But in Mary's reign, the commission (which eventually became the Court of
High Commission), regularly exercised judicial jurisdiction, and Mary
conferred on it the authority to use the oath ex officio and to imprison
recalcitrants.82 The resulting inquisition produced "the first widespread
attempt" to refuse to answer questions.8 3 Some people simply refused without
giving reasons. Others objected to "fishing" inquiries. Still others refused to
answer on the then-novel ground that their answers would be incriminating.
These may be the first recorded assertions of a general freedom from
compulsory self-incrimination, but the matter is not clear. Regardless of the
ground, however, refusals availed naught. There was a bloodbath. "Some were
birned on suspicion alone, merely for refusing the oath ex officio."84
With Elizabeth's ascension in 1558, the English Church became doctrinally
Protestant, but remained Catholic in organization and ceremony. Elizabeth's
Religious Settlement of 1559 enforced Protestantism by law, but was relatively
tolerant of Catholicism. Yet, somewhat like her father, Elizabeth was caught in
a trap. On the one hand, English Catholics rued the doctrinal break from
Rome. On the other, the Puritans decried the influence of Catholicism in
organization and ritual. Each of these contending forces was to contribute to
the development of the protection against compulsory self-incrimination.8 5
Elizabeth's concern was initially directed at her Catholic opponents. In
1569-70, pro-Catholic earls rebelled and were defeated. In 1570, Pope Pius V
82 LEVY, supra note 13, at 75-77.
83 Id. at 77.
84 Id. Professor Levy's principal source was JOHN FOXE, THE AcrS AND
MONUMENTS OF JOHN FOXE: A NEW AND CoMPLETE EDMON (London, R.R. Seeley and
W. Burnside, Stephen Reed Cattle ed., 1841). Originally published in 1563, the book
contains excerpts of heresy trials based on "the prisoners' own accounts." LEVY, supra note
13, at 80. A review of the materials cited by Professor Levy discloses scant reference to the
oath ex offido. Rather, the Protestant recalcitrants objected to fishing expeditions or to
being compelled to incriminate themselves in matters of conscience. See 6 FOXE, supra, at
625-28; 7 id. at 290-315. That the focus of objection in this forerunner of the protection
against compulsory self-incrimination was not the oath itself detracts from Wigmore's
argument that the protection should be limited to situations in which an interrogator has the
authority to administer an oath. See generally infra Part V.85 LEVY, supra note 13, at 84-85. See also MARKL. BERGEn, TAKING THE FIFrH 9-
13 (1980).
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excommunicated Elizabeth and her adherents, and released her subjects from
allegiance to her. His action brought all English Catholics under a cloud of
suspicion as potential traitors. A year later, the authorities discovered a
Catholic plot to overthrow Elizabeth in favor of Mary Stuart. In 1580, Pope
Gregory XIII declared that it would not be a sin to kill Elizabeth. All of these
actions produced reactions against Catholics. Between 1575 and 1585, but
primarily in the later years, 117 priests and 64 laypersons were tried and
executed for treasonously adhering to Rome. 86
As Elizabeth gradually repressed the internal and external threat of
Catholicism, she turned her attention to the Puritans. Her engine was John
Whitgift, whom she appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1583. His engines,
already in existence and primed by past use, were the Court of High
Commission and the oath ex officio.87 The contributions of Elizabeth's reign to
the protection against compulsory self-incrimination can be seen in a selection
of cases and other events. Some involved Catholics, some, Puritans. Some
occurred in prerogative courts, some in common law courts.
In 1568, the Court of High Commission inquired into whether Thomas
Leigh, lawyer and devout Catholic, had attended a mass in the Spanish
Ambassador's house. Elizabeth, backed by Parliament, had specifically
conferred the power to administer the oath ex officio. Nevertheless, Leigh, for
unstated reasons, refused to take the oath and answer questions. Jailed for
contempt, he was subsequently released on habeas corpus by the Court of
Common Pleas, a common law court. Later reports of the unpublished opinion,
based on Chief Justice Dyer's unpublished records, state that the Court of
Common Pleas held that the High Commission "ought not in such cases to
examine upon his oath," for "nemo tenetur seipsum prodere."88 The meaning
of the case is uncertain. One cannot tell whether the court was saying that the
High Commission had violated ecclesiastical rules for the administration of the
oath, or whether the court was going beyond that by saying that the High
Commission was bound to, but did not, follow common law rules for
preferring charges. 89 However, three things are clear. The first is that
Common Pleas could not have been endorsing any general freedom from
compulsory self-incrimination, for no such freedom existed in any English
court in 1568. The second is that the case is the first reported instance in which
86 LEVY, supra note 13, at 87-92. See also 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 343-46
(15th ed. 1986).
87 See generally LEVY, supra note 13, at 109-204.
88 See Burrowes v. High Comm'n, 3 Bulst. 48, 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (C.P. 1616). This
case is also discussed at: Of Oaths Before an Ecclesiastical Judge ex officio, 12 Co. Rep.
26, 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (K.B. 1655) and 2 Brownl. 271, 123 Eng. Rep. 937 (C.P. 1609); all
are referred to in LEVY, supra note 13, at 95-96.
89 Dean Wigmore prefers the former interpretation. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3,
§ 2250, at 287 n.90. Professor Levy prefers the latter. LEVY, supra note 13, at 97.
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a common law court even uttered the Latin maxim. The third, and most
important, is that a common law court was willing to enforce its understanding
of the maxim at the expense of a prerogative court and risk incurring the
displeasure of the Queen herself.90
A year later, other lawyers were summoned before the High Commission.
It is not known whether the oath was administered. One refused to answer a
particular question, saying, "he beleveth he is not bound by Lawe to answer to
the same, bycause there is a penall Lawe, for offendinge in matters concemyd
in this Interr." 91 This may be the first recorded objection to self-incrimination
outside the context of an oath, but again the matter is not clear. 92
In 1580, Father Edmund Campion, a Jesuit priest, said under torture that
he had been harbored by Thomas Tresham and other nobles. Those he accused
were brought before the Court of Star Chamber for examination under oath.
They refused to take the oath, were jailed, and later were tried for their refusal.
Lord William Vaux defended his refusal by invoking conscience. Sir Thomas
Tresham took a different tack, saying that self-accusation was "contrary to the
law of nature seipswn prodere."93 Although the court found all defendants
guilty, four of the judges, including three common law judges, were
constrained to reply to Tresham's defense. Going far beyond earlier attacks on
compulsory self-incrimination (perhaps "discovering" a rule to fit the occasion,
as common law courts did), they said that self-incrimination under compulsion
of an oath was impermissible if life or limb was in the balance. However, since
the Court of Star Chamber lacked the authority to impose a punishment of
death or dismemberment, it could impose a lesser punishment on those who
refused to incriminate themselves. Although the nemo tenetur principle thus
had no effect in Star Chamber proceedings, a seed had been planted by some
judges for future harvest in common law proceedings on capital charges of
felony or treason.94
By 1584, the Court of High Commission, now under the stewardship of
Archbishop Whitgift, turned its attention to the Puritans who believed, as
resolutely as Catholics, that the Crown should be subservient to the church. 95
Whitgift was relentless, and the next decade saw a number of attacks on the
90 LEvY, supra note 13, at 96-97.
91 Id. at 97.
92 Professor Levy states, "The record does not reveal that the commissioners required
any of the fourteen lawyers whom they examined to take the oath." Id. If the oath was not
administered, this episode may be another bit of evidence that the antecedents of the
protection against compulsory self-incrimination include more than an aversion to taking an
oath.
93 SOCIETY OF ANTIQUARIES OF LONDON, ARCHAEOLOGIA, OR MISCELLANEOUS
TRACrs RELATING TO ANTIQUIrY 80-110 (London 1844), cited in LEVY, supra note 13,
at 100-03. The quotation is from page 103.9 4 LEVY, supra note 13, at 105-07.
9 5 Id. at 117.
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oath ex officio. Although these attacks were largely unsuccessful, they too were
seeds which came to fruition half a century later.
In 1584, Puritans Wiggenton and Blake refused to answer the questions of
the High Commission. Wiggenton complained, as had Lambert in 1532, that he
had not received a copy of the charges or the names of his accusers. Blake
complained more generally about compulsory self-incrimination. Their
complaints were, of course, rejected.96
Having no success with the High Commission, the Puritans petitioned
Parliament for protection, complaining about the use of an oath without formal
accusation. The House of Commons, which feared a Catholic conspiracy to kill
Elizabeth, was favorably disposed toward the Puritans and sent the petition to a
special committee. The committee then drafted and sent to the House of Lords
its own petition asking that the ecclesiastical courts and High Commission
abandon the oath. The bishops, including Whitgift, rejected the petition, and
Elizabeth asked Commons to drop the matter. Commons was not amused, and
one of its leaders, Beale, attacked the oath. One of his complaints was the
absence of a formal charge. Another complaint was that members of the
Puritan clergy were being required to accuse themselves in "indifferent"
matters. By "indifferent," he meant matters of individual conscience that
should not be mandated by law and about which the state should be indifferent.
In today's terms, Beale was asserting against the oath a substantive interest in
both free exercise and non-establishment of religion.97
Buoyed by Elizabeth's support, Whitgift and the High Commission ran
wild, and "[n]early every case resulted in bitter complaints against compulsory
self-incrimination." 98 These complaints were no more successful than earlier
ones, and recalcitrants were jailed by the High Commission for refusing to take
an oath. Hence, notwithstanding earlier "seeds," the High Commission refused
to recognize a right of silence on any ground.
In 1587, Whitgift discovered a group of Puritan separatists who rejected
the prevailing wisdom of a uniform national church. A separatist leader, Henry
Barrow, refused to take the oath in the High Commission until he knew the
charges. Informed of the charges, he then insisted that witnesses be produced
against him. He was jailed for refusing to take the oath. 99
About a year later, Robert Beale, who earlier had publicly attacked the
oath in Commons, l°° wrote a private memorandum attacking the oath as
contrary to Magna Carta. Although his argument was historically incorrect,101
it became yet another precedent in the battle against the oath.
96 Id. at 142-43.
97 Id. at 140, 141, 143-46..
98 Id. at 149.
99 Id. at 152-59.
100 See supra text accompanying note 97.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
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In 1588, certain Puritan tracts appeared on the scene. Hard-hitting, easy to
read, pseudonymously written (the author, whose identity was never
discovered, called himself "Martin Marprelate"), the tracts were regarded as
seditious. The government began a "search and destroy" mission which
resulted in numerous arrests and High Commission examinations. Wiggenton,
again in trouble, refused to answer on the usual grounds, but also on the
broader ground that, "I account it as unnaturall a thing for me to answer
against my selfe, as to thrust a knife into my thigh." Others also relied on the
broader ground. 102
In 1590, John Udall was arrested in connection with the Martin Marprelate
tracts and was brought (apparently for a preliminary examination) before a
special commission that was assisting the Privy Council. He denied being
Martin Marprelate, but, relying on the last of the "Magna Carta statutes," 0 3
claimed a legal right not to say whether he had written other books. His
inquisitor, Edmond Anderson, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas,
said, "[tihat is true, if it concerned the loss of your life," 104 thus giving
currency to the similar statement made a decade earlier by four judges in
Tresham's case.10 5 Anderson's statement was put to the ultimate test when
Udall was brought to trial six months later. 106 He was tried not before the High
Commission, but in a common law proceeding for the felony (capitally
punished, of course) of seditious libel. Although defendants in common law
proceedings of that time were never heard under oath, 10 7 the court urged Udall
to take an oath and be examined about authorship. Udall refused to take an oath
and also refused to give unsworn informationl1s He reminded the court of
Chief Justice Anders6n's statement during the preliminary examination. The
court's response was: "Though the judges had not then concluded it, yet it was
law before, or else it could not so be determined. after; the violent course of
others since, hath caused your case to be more narrowly sifted." 10 9 Udall may
have been the first person to claim a right of silence in a common law
proceeding. 110 For his pains, his silence was called to the jury's attention by
102 LEvY, supra note 13, at 158-59, 162-63. The quoted words are at 159.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
104 LEVY, supra note 13, at 164. Udall's preliminary examination is "reported" in 1
Cobbett's State Trials 1271-77 (1590). The report was written by Udall himself.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. One of the four judges was Anderson's
predecessor, Chief Justice James Dyer. LEVY, supra note 13, at 105.
106 The trial is reported in 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1277-1306 (1590).
107 LEVY, supra note 13, at 283-84; see also 2 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 575, at 806-07, 809 (Chadbourne rev. 1979).
108 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1282 (1590).
109 Id. at 1289.
110 LEVY, supra note 13, at 168.
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the judge as evidence of guilt, and he was convicted.111 Sentenced to the
gallows, he died in prison. 112
In 1590, Thomas Cartwright, one of the architects of Puritanism, was
arrested and brought before the High Commission. He refused to take the oath
without knowing the charges. After he was informed of the charges, he still
refused. He was then given a set of charges to be answered by him privately in
his cell. He was willing to deny some under oath, but refused to respond to
others. Consequently, he remained in jail where he and fellow prisoners wrote
two tracts attacking the oath ex officio. One tract, essentially religious, dealt
with the sacredness of an oath. The second tract attacked the oath on many
fronts: (1) it was worse than a compurgation oath because it did not end the
matter; (2) an oath to answer all questions was simply too broad; (3)
accusations should be proved by witnesses rather than by going through secrets
of the heart which should be private until discovered by God (might we call
this an interest in mental privacy?); (4) the oath resulted in people becoming
informers, thus destroying relationships in both church and family; and (5) the
use of oaths in ecclesiastical cases in prerogative courts would become a
slippery slope leading to the use of an oath in purely penal matters in violation
of the early writ of Henry Il limiting the oath to matrimonial and testamentary
cases. 113 Ultimately, Cartwright and his fellow prisoners relied on freedom of
belief or conscience, and that argument and Beale's Magna Carta argument
became the twin pillars of Puritan resistance to the oath.
Although the High Commission sent Cartwright to jail for not taking the
oath, it apparently had no "hard" evidence against him. As a result,
Cartwright's refusal to confess blocked further proceedings. In frustration, the
High Commission recommended, and the Privy Council ordered, that
Cartwright be tried in Star Chamber where he would have the procedural
protections of definite charges and known accusers. 114 It was hoped that
Cartwright would then answer questions under oath. The Star Chamber
proceeding was held, but Cartwright refused to take the oath notwithstanding
procedural protections. The evidence against him was inconclusive and he was
eventually released. 115 Cartwright had beaten the system by asserting a right to
silence that seems identical to today's understanding of the right.
James Morice was a Puritan lawyer who wrote a book in the early 1590s
attacking the High Commission and the oath e officio. He gave further
111 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1282, 1290 (1590).
112 LEVY, supra note 13, at 169-70. That Udall refused to give unsworn information
demonstrates that the real objection was not to the oath but to the inquiry itself. Indeed, in
reading the stories of Wiggenton, Blake, Beale and others, one is forced to conclude that
objecting to an oath was merely an indirect way of avoiding an opprobrious interrogation.1 13 Id. at 174-78. The writ of Henry III is discussed supra note 40.
114 LEVY, supra note 13, at 179, 181, 183.
115 Id. at 186-88.
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expression to the erroneous argument that the nemo tenetur doctrine was a
creature of Magna Carta, and claimed that a compulsory oath was contrary to
the common law. He continued his attack in 1593 by introducing a bill in
Commons against the oath, assailing it on the specific ground that it compelled
self-incrimination. Elizabeth was miffed and remonstrated with the Speaker of
Commons, Sir Edward Coke. The Privy Council placed Morice under a form
of house arrest. Morice lost the contest with the Crown, but succeeded in
planting yet another seed.' 16
Elizabeth's victory resulted in the 1593 enactment of repressive legislation
against both Catholics and Puritan separatists. The anti-Catholic legislation
required those suspected of being Catholic priests either to answer questions
under oath or to be jailed for refusal. The last decade of Elizabeth's reign was
not significant. 117
The cases discussed above, with the exception of John Udall's, occurred in
prerogative courts. They show that during the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth
there were increasing objections to the use of the oath. The objections were
numerous. Some objectors merely repeated the past by asserting that an oath
was improper until the suspect had been informed of the charges and the
accusers. Others tracked new ground by demanding that the accusers be
produced in court. Still others made it clear that they would not take an oath
even if the accusers were produced. Some of these objectors relied on an
interest in freedom of religion. Others asserted potentially far-reaching
arguments that struck at the very heart of compulsory self-incrimination: that
government should not intrude into the recesses of mind and heart (a privacy
concern), and that self-accusation was as unnatural as self-wounding (a dignity
concern).
The prerogative courts consistently rejected these arguments and punished
their authors. As Leigh's case demonstrates, however, the common law courts
were sometimes more sympathetic and occasionally used the writ of habeas
corpus to release someone who had been jailed by a prerogative court for
refusing to take the oath. The story of this period would therefore be
incomplete if we did not ask what was happening in the common law courts.
The answer to -this question involves the preliminary examination and trial in
criminal cases; it also involves certain civil proceedings.
Insofar as criminal cases are concerned, two important events occurred
during Mary's reign. The events were unrelated to the inquisition, but bear on
the general matter of interrogation. In 1554, a statute was enacted that
restricted the authority of justices of the peace to release suspects on bail. The
statute provided that, before releasing a felony or manslaughter suspect on bail,
the justices
116 Id. at 193-200.
117 Id. at 202-03.
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shall take the examination of the said prisoner, and information of them that
bring him, of the fact and circumstances thereof, and the same, or so much
thereof as shall be material to prove the felony shall be put in writing before
they make the same bailment; which said examination, together with the said
bailment, the said justices shall certify at the next general gaol-
delivery .... 118
A year later, Parliament enacted a companion statute which asserted that an
examination of the prisoner was even more necessary if the justices were going
to commit the prisoner. Consequently, the justices were directed to examine the
prisoner and witnesses and to put the examination in writing within two
days." 9
In his fascinating study of renaissance criminal procedure, Professor John
Langbein advances and masterfully defends the thesis "that the Marian statutes
represent the decisive step in the crystallization of the public prosecutorial
function for cases of serious crime and its allocation to the justices of the
peace."120 He states that "[t]he most fundamental, and worst articulated, goal
was to induce the JP to take an active role in the investigation of serious crime
in cases which required it," 121 much like today's detective does. 122 Although
an effort was probably made to examine the accused, his confession was not
essential in the English scheme of proof.123 The accused was not examined
under oath. 124 It is not clear whether the administration of an oath to the
accused was regarded as incompatible with a slowly emerging right of silence,
118 An Act Touching Bailment of Persons, 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 13 (Eng.); 6
STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 57, 58 § 4 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
119 An Act to Take Examination of Persons Suspected of any Manslaughter or Felony,
1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10 (Eng.); 6 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 74 (Danby Pickering
ed., 1763). The Marian statutes were repealed in 1848 by Sir John Jervis's Act, 1848, 11 &
12 Vict., ch. 42, § 18 (Eng.); 88 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 204, 215. Jervis's Act is
discussed in 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY supra note 81, at 220, 441.
120 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRME IN THE RENAISSANCE 34 (1974)
[hereinafter LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE].
121 Id. at 35.
122 For a discussion of the history of the Marian statutes and a confirmation of the
detective-like role of the justice, see 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 219-25, 325
ff., 376-77; Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Tird
Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1232-33 (1932); see also LEVY, supra note 13, at 325.
123 LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 205.
124 MICHAEL DALTON, COUNTREY JUSTICE 273 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1973) (1619);
LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 11, 17, 25; LEVY, supra note 13, at 107,
458 n.33.
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as some early commentators asserted, 125 or was merely believed to be
inconsistent with the absence of an oath at trial. 26
There was no requirement that justices advise suspects of a right of silence
or of the consequences of speaking, 127 and suspects were sometimes induced to
confess by the relentless pressure of the examination. 128 On the other hand,
confession was not required, some suspects remained silent, justices did not
punish silent suspects by sending them to jail, 129 and torture was not ordinarily
used in criminal cases that lacked state significance. 130 The "sanctions" for
refusal to speak were ordinarily no more than denial of bail131 or calling the
suspect's silence to the attention of the ultimate trier of fact. 132 As a result,
there is no evidence of the sort of resistance to examination under the Marian
statutes that one finds associated with the oath ex officio in prerogative
125 DALTON, supra note 124; SIR ANTHONY F1rZHERBERT & RICHARD CROMPrON,
L'OFFICE Er AUCoRIE DE JUSTICE DE PEACE 128 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1972) (1584).
This view is accepted by Judge Stephen. See 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 440.
126 See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 107, at 809.
127 See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 848, at 510-11; E.M. Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1949).
128 1 1. CHrTY, CRIMINAL LAW 73 (London, A.J. Valpy 1816) [hereinafter
CHr'rIIY; LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 51; LEVY, supra note 13, at 325;
Kauper, supra note 122.
129 CHIITY, supra note 128, at 84-85; LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at
48, 52-53. One may infer from Udall's case, see supra notes 103-12 and accompanying
text, that the suspect's refusal to speak was brought to the attention of the trier of fact. It
also seems reasonable to infer, as Professor Langbein does, that "it would have been
improper to bail a suspect who refused to attempt to exculpate himself." LANGBEIN,
RENAISSANCE, supra at 11.
130 See generally, DAVID JARDINE, A READING ON THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (London, Baldwin & Craddock 1837) [hereinafter JARDINE,
TORTURE]; LANGBEIN, TORTURE, supra note 33 (discussing torture in both Europe and
England). Professor Langbein notes that torture in England was "exclusively central
business," id. at 136, in the sense that only the Privy Council or the Crown had the
authority to authorize torture. "[N]o law enforcement officer, no law court acquired the
power to use torture without special warrant." Id. at 137. Torture was used in felony cases
that
did not involve crimes of state. They were hardly ordinary criminal proceedings,
however, precisely because the Privy Council did intervene in the investigations.
Sometimes the initiative for the use of torture seems to have come from the local law
enforcement officers, who procured the Council's warrant. More often it appears that
the Council intervened at the behest of some well-placed complainant ....
Id. See also LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 205-07 & n. 155.
131 LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 11.
132 The suspect's silence at trial was called to the jury's attention, see supra note 111,
and infra note 143 and accompanying text, so it seems reasonable to infer that the suspect's
pretrial silence was dealt with similarly.
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proceedings. Indeed, I have found no reported case during the reigns of Mary
and Elizabeth in which the accused asserted the nemo tenetur doctrine to fend
off a magistrate's examination.
Yet, the examination may have contributed in a small and very indirect
way to the eventual recognition by the common law courts of a right of silence.
During the reign of Elizabeth, manuals for justices of the peace referred to both
the nemo tenetur principle and the examination of the accused authorized by the
Marian statutes. Sir Anthony Fitzherbert's 1583 manual urged the nemo tenetur
principle as an explanation for not examining the suspect on oath. 133 Five years
later, William Lambard, whose manual was quite influential, 134 put the point
differently and with seemingly greater breadth. Referring to the Marian statutes
and citing no authority for his position, he said,
Here you may see (if I be not deceived) when the examination of a felon
began first to be warranted amongst us. For at the common law, nemo
tenebatur prodere seipsum, and then his fault was not to be wrung out of
himself, but rather to be discovered by other means and men. 135
This passage is perplexing for several reasons. First, it is not confined to the
bete noire of examination on oath. Rather, it refers simply to examination.
Second, it seems to assert that, by 1554-1555, the years in which the Marian
statutes were enacted, the common law already recognized the nemo tenetur
doctrine. In fact, however, the doctrine was not then recognized by any court.
Indeed, the strongest statements of the doctrine by common law judges (those
made by Chief Justice Dyer in Thomas Leigh's habeas case in 1568 and by
three judges in Thomas Tresham's case in 1580) were decades away.
Moreover, the statement in Tresham's case was obiter dictun, and the
statements in both cases referred to examinations under the oath ex officio. If
Lambard intended to address unswom examinations as well as examinations on
oath, he went far beyond precedent. If he intended to confine his statement to
133 FIrzHERBERT & CROMpTON, supra note 125. Fitzherbert did not explicitly use the
words "nemo tenetur." He did, however, attribute the stricture against on-oath examination
to a principle that the law does not intend that a person discredit or accuse himself ("car le
ley intend home ne boile luy mesme discrediter or accuser in tiel case"). It is not clear why
Fitzherbert believed that neno tenetur was offended by examining on oath a suspect who
was not punished for refusing to answer. The answer may be that the oath had the practical
effect of compelling people to incriminate themselves and that the objection was to the fact
of compulsion.134 See STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW, supra note 81, at 36-37.
135 2 WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA, OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE 213 (London, R. Newbery 1588) [hereinafter LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA].
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on-oath examinations, he attributed to the nemo tenetur principle a firmness
which it did not really have at the time in any common law court.136
These deficiencies notwithstanding, Lambard persuaded others. Professor
Levy states that Lambard popularized the nemo tenetur maxim "for every petty
magistrate and lawyer in England." 137 A statement similar to Lambard's
appears in a 1619 treatise, 138 Lambard was quoted by Blackstone almost two
centuries later, 139 and a statement virtually identical to Lambard's is in an early
nineteenth century work. 140 Consequently, it appears that, rightly or wrongly,
Lambard led people to believe that the common law recognized nemo tenetur in
the middle-to-late 1500s, 141 although we cannot tell from Lambard's writing
what he believed the doctrine meant.
We move now from the preliminary examination to the trial of criminal
cases in the common law courts. The defendant played an active role in his
own trial. Although he was unswom, he replied to the arguments and
assertions of the prosecutor and answered the court's questions. 142 He was not
forced to answer, but his silence occurred in the jury's presence, and, as
Udall's case shows, the judge might tell the jury to infer guilt.143 Under these
circumstances, it is hard to regard the right of silence as more than a fledgling
136 Lambard's statement is perplexing for a third reason. It implies that, but for the
Marian statutes, the examination of an unsworn suspect would offend the nemo tenetur
principle. However, it is far from obvious that every unsworn examination of a suspect by a
JP would violate nemo tenetur. This is particularly so in light of the matters discussed supra
in the text accompanying notes 105-10. Lambard gives no justification for his contrary
implication.
137 LEVY, supra note 13, at 107.
13 8 DALTON, supra note 124, at 273.
139 4 WfLfiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *296-97
(Philadelphia, Rees Welsh & Co., 1st Am. ed. 1772).
140 CHInTY, supra note 128, at 83-84.
141 Indeed, a statement similar to Lambard's may be found in a late nineteenth century
treatise. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 224, at 364 (Wigmore rev.) (Boston, Uttle,
Brown & Co. 16th ed. 1899). Wigmore, however, claimed that the statement was wrong.
Id. at n.3.
142 See generally, 2 THOMAS SMrTH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 100 (L. Alston ed.
1906) (1565); LEVY, supra note 13, at 264, 282-84; 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81,
at 324-31; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 286. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note
81, at 325, discusses state trials rather than ordinary criminal trials, for those are the cases
for which reports remain, and the discussions of both Stephen and Levy deal principally
with the post-Elizabethan period. Nevertheless, the practice of questioning the accused at his
trial was of long duration, and certainly existed during the period in question. Smith, who
wrote during the Elizabethan period, characterized an ordinary criminal trial as an
"altercation." See also 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 349-50. For a very early
illustration of questioning the accused, see the Case of William, 4 Selden Society 62 (1891)
(reporting a horse-stealing case of the mid-to-late 13th century). Udall's trial, discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 103-12, is an example from the Elizabethan period.
143 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1271, 1282 (1590).
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in criminal trials, if that. On the other hand, it is important to note that during
the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth, there was no right to counsel in cases of
treason and felony. The right to representation by retained counsel was almost
a century away in treason cases, and full participation by counsel in felony
trials was not permitted until 1836.144 As a result, the accused had to represent
himself, and his active participation was inevitable. Given the incompatibility
of a right of total silence with a duty of self-representation, the fact that the
accused was not forced to answer questions may be some evidence that the
common law courts were not wholly indifferent to the value of silence.145
There was also some evidence in civil cases. The release of Leigh on
habeas in 1568 has already been noted.146 In 1590, in the case of Cullier and
Cullier,147 the defendant was tried in an ecclesiastical court for fornication. The
judge wanted him to answer under oath whether he had committed the offense.
Represented by Edward Coke, later to become a major figure in the struggle
against compulsory self-incrimination, Cullier sought a writ of prohibition from
the Court of Common Pleas. It was granted "because nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum in such cases of defamation, but only in causes testamentary and
matrimonial, where no discredit can be to the party by his oath." 148 The brief
opinion does not reveal the precise ground on which Coke attacked the oath or
on which the writ was granted. A year later, the Court of Queen's Bench held
that an ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction over a layman on a fornication
charge and could compel the taking of an oath ex officio as long as the offense
was first presented by two witnesses. 149 This holding by a common law court
apparently accepts compulsory self-incrimination in church courts as long as
proper accusatorial procedures are used. Consequently, it is reminiscent of
earlier attacks on the oath.' 50
144 See LAWRENCE HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT
52(1973).
145 The dictum of the common law judges in Tresham's case, supra text
accompanying notes 93-94, is additional evidence. On the other hand, the attempt of a
common law judge to bully Udall into taking an oath or answering without an oath
demonstrates that the nemo tenetur principle had not gained a firm hold in common law
proceedings; see supra notes 103-08.146 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
147 1 Cro. Eliz. 201, 78 Eng. Rep. 457 (C.P. 1590). Other versions of the case are
reported in 72 Eng. Rep. 987 (C.P. 1590) and 74 Eng. Rep. 816 (C.P. 1590).
148 Id. The version of the case reprinted in 74 Eng. Rep. 816 (C.P. 1590) states that
the request for a writ of prohibition was taken under advisement.
149 Dr. Hunt's Case, 1 Cro. Eliz. 262, 78 Eng. Rep. 518 (Q.B. 1591). It is of passing
interest that the grand jurors were so incensed by Dr. Hunt's attempt to compel an oath that
they indicted him; see LEVY, supra note 13, at 222.
15 0 See, e.g., supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
I have omitted from the discussion of common law cases certain chancery court
decisions that decline to force defendants to reveal self-incriminating information. These
decisions are discussed in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 288. What these cases
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It is hard to know what to make of the common law cases of the Marian
and Elizabethan periods. The criminal cases seem to be a wash. On the one
hand, the accused was under pressure to speak. On the other, he was not jailed
for silence, as he was in the prerogative courts. In civil cases, extraordinary
relief was sometimes granted to persons who sought to avoid compulsory self-
incrimination in prerogative or ecclesiastical courts, but the opinions are brief
and generalization is dangerous. Viewing the matter cautiously, one sees signs,
but no firm recognition, of a right to remain silent. Perhaps the strongest sign
appears in Lambard's treatise which, rightly or wrongly, insisted that the
common law recognized the nemo tenetur principle.
2. Admissibility of Confessions
What of the rule that today bars the admissibility of an involuntary
confession? Did it exist in any form in the Marian and Elizabethan eras? The
answer is that there was no rule barring the admissibility of any confession, but
there were some signs of a concern about the reliability of confessional
evidence in cases tried during both eras. In the Duke of Somerset's Trial for
treason,151 the prosecutor, in offering an accomplice's confession into evidence
against the defendant, said that the confession had been sworn to "without any
kind of compulsion, force, or envy, or displeasure." 152 A similar statement
was made about an accomplice's confession in the Duke of Norfolk's Trial,
which occurred two decades later. 153 In the Trial of Sir Christopher Blunt, the
concern was that the defendants' own confessions "came voluntarily... no
man being racked or tormented." 154 In these cases, however, there is not a hint
that voluntariness was a condition of admissibility. Rather, one may infer that
the assertion of voluntariness was intended only to bolster the weight of the
evidence. Yet, the same concern for reliability later emerged as the cornerstone
of the rule that makes involuntary confessions inadmissible.
stand for is not clear. Wigmore, who flatly claims that the right of silence was not
recognized in common law courts before the early 1600s, id. at 284-85, asserts that these
cases merely exemplify the doctrine that equity will not enforce a forfeiture. His discussion
of some of the cases, however, is speculative, labored, and unpersuasive. The only thing
that can be said with assurance is that none of the cases explicitly relies on the nemwo tenetur
doctrine.
151 1 Cobbett's State Trials 515 (1551).
152 Id.'at 517.
153 1 Cobbett's State Trials 957, 978 (1571).
154 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1409, 1419 (1600). This is the earliest English case that I
have found referring to the voluntariness of the defendant's own confession. The earliest
English reference of any sort is'the Edwardian treason statute, discussed supra in the text
accompanying note 77.
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E. James I. 1603-1625
1. Compelled Self-Incrimination
With Elizabeth's death in 1603, the crown passed to James I and the House
of Stuart, which, in Professor Neill Alford's colorful phrase, had a "talent for
fanning fire from smouldering embers." 155 With no intention of doing so,
James, by word and deed, galvanized both parliament and the common law
courts into action against the oath ex officio, the prerogative and ecclesiastical
courts, and even the royal prerogative. 156
At a conference called by him in 1604 to consider a Puritan petition, James
supported the use of the oath by ecclesiastical courts if there was suspicion or
public fame, and he ridiculed Puritan leaders, thus offending Commons which
was sympathetic to Puritan concerns. When he opened Parliament, James
demanded religious conformity. He renewed his demand while approving
certain recently adopted canons of church governance which retained the oath
ex officio even though Parliament had specifically objected to the canons on the
ground that they were contrary to Magna Carta. 157
Unable to obtain relief from the mandated conformity, Puritans turned to
the common law courts for help in resisting the jurisdiction and procedures of
the High Commission, including the oath. They found a ready ally, one which
had been concerned for three centuries about the existence and scope of
ecclesiastical court jurisdiction. As the High Commission gained prominence
under Whitgift in Elizabethan England, common law writs in opposition
became more frequent. When James ascended to the throne, writs of
prohibition increased. In 1606, the High Commission fought back by
petitioning the Privy Council for protection. The common law judges
responded by saying that the High Commission had to disclose the charges
before examining on oath. 158
In 1606, Sir Edward Coke was made Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas. He became the very personification of the history and
traditions of the court, fanatically devoted to common law processes and hostile
to rival systems. In the same year, Coke and his colleagues "resolved," outside
the context of any pending litigation, that, in the absence of statutory
authorization, the High Commission could not fine or imprison people even if
permitted to do so by royal letters patent (the document constituting the High
Commission). 159 Commons then launched its own attack by asking the Privy
155 Alford, supra note 14, at 1626.
156 See generally, LEVY, supra note 13, at 205-65.
157 Id. at 210-14.
158 Id. at 216-28.
159 12 Co. Rep. 19, 77 Eng. Rep. 1301 (1606). This resolution was based in part on
Simpson's Case (1599), reported in 4 Co. Inst. 333 (1644), in which the Court of Assizes in
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Council to get an advisory opinion on whether an ecclesiastical judge could
examine on oath ex officio. The answer of Coke and Sir John Popham, who
was Chief Justice of King's Bench, was that (1) the ecclesiastical judge had to
make known the charges before examining either lay or churchperson; (2) the
examiner could inquire into the accused's words or acts, but not thoughts; and
(3) no layperson could be examined on oath e officio except in a marital or
testamentary matter. 160
However, the common law judges were not yet ready for an all-out
struggle with the Crown and High Commission, as was demonstrated in 1607
by Nicholas Fuller's case. Fuller, a lawyer who frequently represented
Puritans, sought from King's Bench a writ of habeas corpus to release two
clients who had been jailed for refusing to take the oath in High Commission
Proceedings. His argument in support of the writ was an intemperate
indictment of church, crown, and High Commission. It was also a carefully
analyzed attack on the oath, on the authority of the High Commission to
administer the oath and to imprison, and on the royal prerogative to confer
such authority on the High Commission. In support of his argument, Fuller
invoked Magna Carta, centuries of statutes, and the common law of England.
For making the argument, Fuller was committed by the High Commission to
await trial on many charges, including slander and contempt. Fuller retaliated
by obtaining from King's Bench an interlocutory writ of prohibition. After
consulting with the other common law judges, including Coke, the judges of
King's Bench dissolved the writ, but on narrow grounds. The High
Commission was left with authority to try Fuller only for certain relatively
minor religious charges. The King's Bench did not address the issue of royal
prerogative, thus keeping the issue alive. It also observed that it was not
reaching certain "scandals, contempts, and other matters which by the
Common law and statutes of our Realm of England should be punished and
determined." In this fashion, a common law court claimed for itself the
authority to determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of a prerogative court. 161
The common law judges continued to issue writs of prohibition, and James
summoned them for an explanation. Accounts of the meeting vary. In one oft-
told version, Coke claimed that James was "under God and the law," James
lost his temper, and Coke abjectly apologized. 162 It was becoming clear that
Northamptonshire held that the High Commission could institute proceedings only by
citation, not by arrest warrant. It is clear that the common law judges were trying to
interfere with the exercise of High Commission jurisdiction at both the intake and outgo
stages.16 0 LEVy, supra note 13, at 231.
161 Nicholas Fuller's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 41, 77 Eng. Rep. 1322 (1607), cited in LEVY,
supra note 13, at 232-40. The quotation is from 239.
162 LEVY, supra note 13, at 242-44.
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Fuller's case and the writs had drawn into question the absolute authority of the
king. The battle against the oath thus assumed a new dimension.
Abjectly apologetic or not, Coke persisted in issuing writs of prohibition
against High Commission proceedings. His grounds included the oath ex officio
which he regarded as contravening the nemo tenetur doctrine.163 Coke was
constantly on the carpet, constantly debating with agents of the crown, and
constantly relying on Magna Carta to support his actions. Puritan pamphleteers
took up the cause, and Commons presented to James in 1610 a petition of
grievances which attacked the High Commission on many fronts, including the
oath. The petition praised the issuance of writs of prohibition, and complained
that James was attempting to create new crimes by royal proclamation. 164
James asked for an advisory opinion on proclamations from the chief
justices of the common law courts. They told him that the "law" of England
comprised statutes, common law, and customs, but not royal proclamations.
James then stopped using proclamations to create new offenses, but his
antagonism toward Coke and his colleagues increased. 165
After various debates in the Privy Council, James promised to issue new
letters patent reforming the High Commission. The new letters, however,
issued in 1611, repeated the old by continuing the oath ex officio, explicitly
punishing refusal with jail, and implicitly permitting a conviction for the
charged offense. James also appointed Coke and other common law judges to
the High Commission, but they refused to serve and continued to issue writs of
prohibition, thus encouraging further Puritan resistance. 166
In 1613, James, hoping to neutralize Coke, made him Chief Justice of the
Court of King's Bench and appointed him to the Privy Council. Coke
continued to vex James and the High Commission by attacking the oath, thus
casting doubt on the new letters patent. The basis for his attack was the nemo
tenetur doctrine. 167 In 1615, Coke and his colleagues decided the case of
Burrowes,168 in which a writ of habeas corpus was sought by Puritan
163 Id. at 244-45. Coke did not oppose the oath in marital or testamentary cases. Id. at
245. Coke's reliance on neno tenetur is detailed. Id. at 479 n.27. In Wigmore's view, the
real objection of the common law judges, including Coke, to the oath was not that it
involved compulsory self-incrimination, but that it was being used in cases other than
matrimonial and testamentary. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 280-81. Some of the
cited cases, however, show a broader objection. See, e.g., Huntley v. Cage, 2 Brownl. 14,
123 Eng. Rep. 787 (C.P. 1610) (The High Commission "ought not to examine any man
upon his oath, to make him to betray himself, and to incur any penalty pecuniary or
corporal.").164 LEVY, supra note 13, at 247-48.
165 Id. at 249.
166 Id. at 249-52.
167 I. at 252-53.
168 3 Bulst. 48, 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (C.P. 1615).
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separatists who had been jailed for refusing to take the oath in High
Commission proceedings. The petitioners were ultimately denied relief, the
confinement being justified on other grounds. However, Coke held that the
initial ground for confinement was unacceptable. In the first place, the accused
were entitled to a copy of the charges. As a second and independent objection,
the accused could not be compelled to take a self-incriminatory oath. 169
Coke's judicial days were numbered. In 1616, James dismissed him as
Chief Justice. For the next seventeen years, there was no ferment regarding the
oath, and no writs of prohibition were grounded on the oath. 170 "Yet Coke,
along with common law judges and members of Parliament, as well as the
Puritan victims of the High Commission, had contributed to the greater
acceptance of the Latin maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, that no one was
bound to accuse himself." 171
The "greater acceptance" was, however, far from total. In the Court of
Star Chamber (also a prerogative court, but not an ecclesiastical court) the oath
ex officio was frequently used even in cases in which Coke sat.172 The accused,
however, was given notice of the charges, and could refuse to answer in capital
cases.
173
In common law proceedings, past practices were continued. The
magistrate's preliminary examination of the accused occurred as it had
before, 174 and the trial remained an altercation between accused and accuser in
which the accused was "pressed and bullied to answer." 175 The standard
sources disclose no case in which an accused even tried to invoke the nemo
tenetur maxim to resist a preliminary or trial examination. Consequently, there
is no case addressing the question of whether nemo tenetur was regarded as
applicable to such proceedings.
Yet there was at least one sign that neno tenetur was taking hold outside
the contest between the High Commission and the extraordinary writ. In 1620,
a committee of the House of Lords inquired into various corrupt acts alleged
169 Burrowes is discussed in LEVY, supra note 13, at 254-56. Wigmore's discussion is
at 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 280. Wigmore asserts that Coke's real objection
was that a layperson had been charged ex officio in a cause that was neither marital nor
testamentary. Although Coke's opinion is not crystal clear, it supports a broader
interpretation than Wigmore's.
170 LEVY, supra note 13, at 257, 260.
17 1 MARKL. BERGER, TAKING TH FIFrH 14 (1980).
172 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 281-82.
173 LEVY, supra note 13, at 257.
174 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 350.
175 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 286; see also 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra
note 81, at 332-37, and the cases cited therein which leave no doubt that the trial was an
altercation in which the accused played an active role. In some of these cases, Coke himself
played a role that was far from benign. Id. at 332, 333.
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against Sir Giles Mompesson. Functioning as would an examining magistrate,
the committee questioned co-conspirators and victims. Reporting its activities to
Commons, the committee said that it had "urged none to accuse himself, and
admonished every man not to accuse another out of passion." 176 Professor
Levy sees this statement as evidence that the nemo tenetur doctrine was
beginning to express an aversion to compulsory self-incrimination per se, not
just to incrimination under compulsion of an oath. 177
2. Admissibility of Confessions
Insofar as the involuntary confession rule is concerned, the Jacobean era
was similar to the Edwardian, Marian, and Elizabethan. There was certainly no
rule in any court that an involuntary confession was inadmissible. 178 However,
we may presume a continuation of the emerging doctrine of the Marian and
Elizabethan eras that an involuntary confession was entitled to less weight. 179
Moreover, the concern reflected in the Edwardian statute that a plea of guilty
(or, perhaps, any confession) to treason be voluntary' 80 was voiced in broader
terms during the reign of James. In Les Plees del Corone, an important treatise
of the time,' 8' William Staundiford addressed the general subject of guilty
pleas:
If one is indicted or appealed of felony, and on his arraignment he
confesses it, this is the best and surest answer that can be in our law for
quieting the conscience of the judge and for making it a good and firm
condemnation; provided, however, that the said confession did not proceed
from fear, menace, or duress; which if it was the case, and the judge has
become aware of it, he ought not to receive or record this confession, but cause
him to plead not guilty and take an inquest to try the matter. 182
176 Proceedings against Sir Giles Mompesson, 2 Cobbett's State Trials 1119, 1123
(1620).
177 LEvY, supra note 13, at 263. Wigmore views the statement as evidence that the
nemo tenetur doctrine was beginning to take hold in common law proceedings. 8
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 289. At the same time, and without any explanation or
citation, he says that Parliament was probably following ecclesiastical rules. Id. at 289 n.97.
178 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 817, at 291-94. A treatise of the era, written for
justices of the peace, makes no mention of any rule that a confession is inadmissible if
involuntary. DALTON, supra note 124.
179 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 819, at 296 n.1.
180 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
181 See STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW, supra note 81, at 36.
182 2 WLIAM STAUNDIFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORONE, 142-43 (London, Ex
Typographia Societatis Stationari 1607).
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This passage is significant for three reasons. First, Staundiford was addressing
all felonies, not just the offense of treason. Second, he was concerned with the
acceptability or admissibility of a plea of guilty, not just with whether the plea
might displace some special rule of proof such as the two-witness requirement
in treason cases. Third, the obvious implication of the passage is that an
involuntary guilty plea is unreliable. All of this links Staundiford to the
involuntary confession rule. That rule, which was articulated much later, is
concerned with the exclusion of putatively unreliable confessions. 183
F. England 1625-1700
1. Compelled Self-Incrimination
Charles I became king in 1625. He and his Archbishop of Canterbury,
William Laud, pursued Puritans with renewed vigor, energizing the High
Commission into ubiquitous action. 184 One of the tactics now used by the High
Commission was to treat the refusal to take the oath as a confession justifying a
guilty verdict.18 5
The High Commission proceedings of the day show renewed objection to
the oath. The basis for objection increasingly seemed to be compulsory self-
incrimination per se, rather than being kept ignorant of the charges. 186
However, writs of prohibition were seldom sought in the common law courts,
perhaps because of a perception that the courts had been packed. Moreover,
Parliament, which in earlier times had joined the struggle against the oath, was
kept out of session for eleven years.' 87 The story of the Carolinian era,
therefore, is the story of courts other than the High Commission.
The first chapter of the story occurred in 1628. John Felton, the admitted
murderer of the Duke of Buckingham, was examined by the Privy Council
before being tried in the Court of King's Bench. When he denied that he had
had co-conspirators, he was threatened with torture by the Bishop of London.
Felton replied, if it must be so he could not tell whom he might nominate in
the extremity of torture, and if what he should say then must go for truth, he
could not tell whether his lordship (meaning the bishop of London) or which of
183 It is also worth observing that, unlike Lambard, whose treatise was discussed supra
in the text accompanying note 135, Staundiford does not explicitly base his position on the
nemo tenetur doctrine. Indeed, I have found nothing from any of the eras under discussion
that relies on nemo tenetur as a basis for rejecting involuntary pleas of guilty. On the other
hand, I have found nothing that denies a connection.
184 LEVY, supra note 13, at 266-67.
185 Id. at 269.
186 See id. at 258-59, 269-70.
187 Id. at 266-67.
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their lordships he might name, for torture might draw unexpected things from
him: after this he was asked no more questions, but sent back to prison.18 8
What happened thereafter is not clear. 189 As commonly reported, King
Charles, reluctant to order torture by royal prerogative, asked the common law
judges whether torture might be ordered under the common law. They
unanimously replied that "no such punishment is known or allowed by our
law," 190 thus making it clear that common law processes did not include this
expeditious form of compulsory self-incrimination.
The second chapter took place a year later when Charles sought an
advisory opinion from the judges as to whether it was high contempt for a
person to refuse to be examined regarding treason. The judges replied that it
was high contempt as long as "this do not concern himself, but another, nor
draw him to danger of treason or contempt by his answer." 191 The answer
appears to be a rather broad statement of the nemo tenetur maxim, a statement
not limited to the context of an oath or knowledge of the charges.
The third chapter involved a truly remarkable person, John Lilburne.
Lilburne, a clothier's apprentice, was involved in many proceedings, four of
which were capital. With doggedness bordering on fanaticism, he breathed still
more vitality into the nemo tenetur maxim. 192
Lilburne was first tried in 1637 in the Star Chamber for shipping seditious
books from Holland into England. Prior to the trial, he was examined by the
Attorney General's chief clerk in much the fashion that a magistrate might have
examined an accused in an ordinary felony case. Lilburne knew the charge and
the specifics of affidavits against him. He denied the charge, was willing to
answer questions about it, but refused to answer questions that he viewed as
raising new matters. As to these matters, he insisted on confronting his
accusers before answering questions. He was placed in jail. 193 His justification
was "the law of God" and "the law of the land," 194 the latter apparently
another misguided reference to Magna Carta.
18 8 Proceedings against John Felton, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 367, 371 (1628).
189 See JARDINE, TORTURE, supra note 130, at 11-12, 59-62. Jardine disputes the
version commonly reported.
190 Proceedings Against John Felton, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 367, 371 (1628).
191 Proceedings Against William Stroud and Others, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 235, 237
(1629).
192 One simply cannot read the story of Lilburne without constructing an image of the
man. As I imagine the story, the role of Lilbume is played, with appropriate English accent,
by the French actor Gerard Depardieu.
193 LEVY, supra note 13, at 273.
194 Trial of John Lilburne, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 1315, 1318 (1637). The account
was written by Lilburne himself. Lilburne makes no mention of being put under oath at the
beginning of the examination. Whether or not he was, however, his objection was to the
substance of the questions.
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The proceedings then moved into the Star Chamber for trial. Contrary to
its ordinary practice, the court followed High Commission procedure in
Lilburne's case by denying him a copy of the charges and insisting on an oath.
Lilburne refused to take the oath on the ground that he did not know the
charges. Eventually the Attorney General gave him some notice by reading a
co-conspirator's affidavit of accusation. Lilburne denied the accusation, but still
refused to take the oath. 195 One of his reasons was that he would not swear to
answer all questions when he had previously been asked irrelevant
questions. 196 Another reason was that he believed that there was no other
evidence against him. 197 Lilburne challenged the prosecution to produce
witnesses, and he promised to reply to them. 198 Again, he was put in jail.
When he was brought back to Star Chamber, he was read a more detailed
affidavit from the same accuser. Again, he denied the charge, but refused to
take an oath, denouncing it as a High Commission oath even though he knew
the charge. 199 Lilburne was clearly going after bigger game than notice of the
charges. He was held in contempt and was pilloried, whipped, fined, and
jailed. In the pillory, he said to onlookers that an oath and self-accusation were
against God's law which required two or three witnesses to establish guilt.200
He added that self-accusation was against the self-protective law of nature.20 1
While in jail, he managed to smuggle out writings saying that he had been
imprisoned for refusing to accuse himself.20 2
In 1640, the smell of civil war was in the air, and Charles was forced to
reconvene Parliament in order to get an appropriation of money. Dominated by
Puritans and those learned in the common law, Parliament freed Lilburne and
others and then turned its attention to reform. Recognizing that it was easy to
establish or contrive the public disrepute that triggered the oath in High
Commission proceedings, Parliament performed radical surgery by abolishing
both the High Commission and Star Chamber in 1641. Common law courts
and procedures were thereafter to be used when life, liberty, or property was at
stake. In addition, Parliament abolished the oath a officio in church courts and
made it a crime to administer the oath or to impose penalties on those who
refused to take it. Yet Parliament did nothing about the procedure in criminal
cases in common law courts. 20 3 Although neither an oath nor torture was used,
suspects were under considerable pressure to incriminate themselves both at the
195 LEVY, supra note 13, at 275.
196 Lilburne, 3 Cobbett's State Trials at 1321.
197 Id. at 1322.
198 Id.
199 LEVY, supra note 13, at 275-76.
200 Id. at 277.
2 0 1 Lilburne, 3 State Trials at 1332.
202 LEVY, supra note 13, at 277-78.
203 Id. at 278-82.
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preliminary examination and at trial.2°4 Thus, despite the dramatic action of
Parliament, a truly protective right against compulsory self-incrimination did
not really exist throughout English law.
During the next few years, Parliament gave conflicting signals regarding a
right of silence. In Proceedings Against the Twelve Bishops,20 5 an
impeachment for high treason, the accused refused to answer whether they had
signed a petition attacking Parliament. "[I]t was not charged in the
impeachment; neither were they bound to accuse themselves." °6 Even though
the accused had not been placed under oath, an answer was not compelled. On
the other hand, in another proceeding involving Lilburne, Parliament showed
no respect for silence. Having risen in the Parliamentary army, Lilburne
became disillusioned with the Parliamentary program and resigned in 1645.
Parliament was controlled by Presbyterians who were intolerant of other
Puritan sects, including the Levellers, of which Lilbume was a member.
Parliament imposed censorship, and Lilburne, whose concern for civil liberties
was broad, began to write in support of freedom of speech and religion. An
investigative committee of the House of Commons twice summoned him to
answer for his tracts, but he fought the summons and was released. Then he
was arrested for libelling the Speaker of the House. He appeared and refused to
answer questions against himself, relying again on Magna Carta's "law of the
land" provision. He demanded that a legislative investigating committee follow
common law procedure. He was jailed for refusing to answer. In jail, he wrote
another tract in which he asserted broadly a right not to answer incriminating
questions. In one of the more interesting turns in the history of the right of
silence, Lilburne also attacked the practice of questioning defendants in
common law criminal proceedings. 207
Lilburne was eventually released, but was in trouble again in less than a
year. Summoned for examination for criticizing a member of the House of
Lords, he refused to respond. He stuck his fingers in his ears to avoid hearing
the charge against him. While he served another jail term, others took up the
cause, writing tracts accusing the House of Lords of using High Commission
and Star Chamber tactics. One of the writers, Richard Overton, was jailed for
refusing to answer interrogatories in the House of Lords. He protested that no
one should be forced by any governmental authority to take an oath or to
answer incriminating questions. Others followed the example of Lilburne and
Overton, refusing to answer in various criminal proceedings. 20 8 The argument
204 The procedure in common law cases is discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 103, 128, 132 and infra in the text accompanying notes 225-31.
205 4 Cobbett's State Trials 63 (1641).
20 6 Id. at 76.
207 LEVY, supra note 13, at 288-91.
208 Id. at 292-94.
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in favor of a right of silence was beginning to take on a life of its own apart
from the oath ex officio.
In 1647, a Leveller petition was addressed to the House of Commons. It
specifically recommended that "no authority whatsoever" should have the
power to compel self-incriminating information. The recommendation was tied
neither to oath nor to notice of charges. A call for a right of silence appeared as
well in subsequent Leveller documents over the next several years, as did a call
for a written constitution, proportioned unicameral legislature, freedom of press
and religion, equality, and trial by jury. "The right against self-incrimination
which had begun as a protest against the coercion of conscience was growing
as part of. . . 'the first great outburst of democratic thought in history, with
John Lilburne and Richard Overton leading the way.'" 209
The events described above occurred during the period of the English Civil
War. One of the first major battles occurred in October 1642. The last battle
took place in August 1648.210 With the overthrow of Charles by Cromwell's
Parliamentary forces, Lilburne was released from confinement and almost
immediately began to complain that Cromwell's military court was trying to
compel people to incriminate themselves. He inveighed against substituting one
form of tyranny for another. In March 1649, Lilburne and three others were
arrested. Brought before the Council of State (then the governing body of
England) for a preliminary, evidence-gathering examination, they refused to
answer questions and were jailed on suspicion of high treason. In October,
Lilburne was indicted by a grand jury and capitally tried for high treason.211
Lilburne was tried by jury. Presiding over the trial was an extraordinary
commission of forty judges. Lilburne challenged everything. He lectured the
throng on the right against compulsory self-incrimination as a part of fair play
and fair trial. He ran roughshod over the court, insisting that he had a right to
counsel and to a copy of the indictment-rights that were half a century away.
When he was asked to enter a plea, he invoked a right of silence. This
prompted Lord Keble to assure Lilburne that he would not be compelled to
answer questions during the trial, but that he was legally required to plead.
When he was questioned during the trial, he refused to answer whether a tract
was in his handwriting. The prosecutor said that this was an admission, but
Lilburne was not forced to answer. The prosecution presented some proof of
209 Id. at 296 (quoting MARGARET JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTrUTION 381
(1949)).
It is interesting to note that the Talmudic protection against compulsory self-
incrimination also developed as part of a libertarian package. See Irene M. Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmu'dic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 955, 1027-30 (1988).
210 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrANNICA 113 (15th ed. 1986).
211 LEVY, supra note 13, at 298-300. The proceedings are reported in Trial of
Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, 4 Cobbett's State Trials 1269 (1649).
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authorship which Lilburne denigrated as insufficient. Lilburne turned the trial
into a forum for his political speeches, and the jury found him not guilty.2 12
Two years later, Lilburne was tried again. This time the proceedings took
place in the House of Commons on a charge of defaming a member of
Parliament. Lilburne was summarily tried, convicted, and sentenced to
banishment. He fled to Holland.2 13 Violation of the banishment order was a
capital offense. In 1653, Lilburne returned to England and was again tried for
his life. He demanded and got a copy of the indictment and the assistance of
counsel to challenge it. During the trial, Lilburne refused to admit that he was
the person named in the banishment order. He was again acquitted. Cromwell's
response was to jail and later exile Lilburne. Lilburne died in exile in 1657.
Parliament's response to the acquittal was to order that the jury be examined by
the Council of State. Several jurors refused to answer questions.214 Lilburne's
insistence on a right against compulsory self-incrimination had trickled down.
John Lilburne lost the very last battle, but he won the war. Even before his
final trial, a protection against compulsory self-incrimination had received
strong recognition. In the Trial of Charles 1,215 in 1649, Holder, a prosecution
witness, was reluctant to testify. "Whereupon, the Commissioners finding him
already a Prisoner, and perceiving that the Questions intended to be asked him,
tended to accuse himself, thought fit to wave [sic] his Examination. .".. 216 It
is not clear that Holder was even asserting a right of silence. Nor is it clear that
the court felt itself bound to recognize such a right. It is clear, however, that
the court's ruling was based on it. Moreover, the case appears to be the first in
which a witness, as opposed to a party, was protected.
In the decades after Lilburne's death, a right of silence was clearly
recognized, even during the troubled time of the Restoration.217 It is not
necessary to consider the cases individually, but it is worth noting that on no
fewer than nine occasions during 1660-1696, courts protected witnesses by
gratuitously invoking a right of silence for them. These courts did not merely
wait for the witness to object and then sustain the objection.218 One
2 12 LEVY, supra note 13, at 302-09.
213 Id. at 309-10.
2 14 Id. at 310-12.
215 4 Cobbett's State Trials 993 (1649).
216 Id. at 1101.
217 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 289-90 & nn.105-06; LEvY, supra note 13,
at 313-19.
218 In chronological order, the cases are Trial of Adrian Scroop, 5 Cobbett's State
Trials, 1034, 1039 (1660); Trial of Nathanael Reading, 7 Cobbett's State Trials 259, 296-
97 (1679); Trial of Thomas White, 7 Cobbett's State Trials 311, 361 (1679); Trial of
Richard Langhorne, 7 Cobbett's State Trials 418, 435 (1679); Trial of Roger Palmer, 7
Cobbett's State Trials 1067, 1096 (1680); Trial of Dr. Oliver Plunket, 8 Cobbett's State
Trials 447, 481 (1681); Trial of Thomas Rosewell, 10 Cobbett's State Trials 147, 169
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interpretation of these cases is that the courts regarded it as improper even to
ask a question calling for an incriminating answer. Another interpretation is
that the courts simply assumed that the witness did not want to give self-
incriminating information and made the witness's objection for him.219 Which
interpretation accurately reflects the motivation of the courts in these cases
cannot be determined from the records.
It is also worth noting that, in the Trial of Nathanael Reading, one of the
cases under discussion, the court knew that the witness had already received a
pardon and ran no risk of criminal liability. Hence, the court's gratuitous
intervention served only to protect the reputation of the witness.220 All of these
cases demonstrate that during the period when the protection against
compulsory self-incrimination first became fixed in English law, the courts
gave it a generous interpretation. There was less generosity, however, in
"ordinary" criminal cases.
In criminal trials, the defendant still had to represent himself, and the trial
remained an altercation between prosecution and defendant. As before, the
defendant participated actively, and was questioned by the court.221 Indeed, in
the Trial of Nathanael Reading, in which the court gratuitously protected a
witness, it frequently questioned the defendant.222 In none of these cases,
however, did the defendant object to the questioning or did the court threaten
the defendant with jail for refusing to answer. Lilburne's 1649 trial seemed to
(1684); Trial of Titus Oates, 10 Cobbett's State Trials 1079, 1099-1100 (1685); Trial of Sir
John Freind, 13 Howell's State Trials 1, 16-18 (1696). In Palmer's case, the judicial
remonstrance occurred after the witness had already answered the question. In Freind's
case, judicial action may have been triggered by the fact that the Solicitor General advised
the witness as soon as the question was asked.
I hasten to add that later practice came to require, and still requires, that the right be
affirmatively claimed by a party in a civil case or by a nonparty witness in any case. See 8
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2268. On the other hand, it is improper in a criminal case for
the prosecutor even to call the defendant as a witness. Id. at 406-08.
Professor Levy has characterized the right against self-incrimination as a "fighting
right." LEVY, supra note 13, at 375. This accurately describes the protection given to a
witness or civil party. It does not accurately describe the protection given to the defendant
in a criminal trial. Nor does it accurately describe the protection given to the witness in the
early cases cited above. Professor Levy, however, regards these cases as exceptional, id.,
and so they proved to be.
219 In Rosewell, 10 Cobbett's State Trials at 168, the witness had been reluctant to
answer an earlier question that sought incriminating information. Hence, there was a factual
basis for assuming that she would not want to answer similar questions. Any assumption in
the other cases would be intuitive.
220 This too is contrary to modem practice. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2255.
221 See Trial of Sarah Baynton, 14 Howell's State Trials 598, 620 ff. (1702); Trial of
John Twyn, 6 Cobbett's State Trials 513, 531 ff. (1663); see also 1 STEHEN, HISTORY,
supra note 81, at 337.
222 7 Cobbett's State Trials at 302 ff.
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settle that the defendant had a right to refuse.223 Indeed, as the seventeenth
century drew to a close, so to a large extent did judicial efforts to interrogate
defendants at trial.224
In preliminary hearings, justices of the peace continued to use their
statutory authority to examine the accused, and sometimes acted in an
"exceedingly zealous and by no means scrupulous" manner. 225 There is no
evidence that answers were compelled by force. Torture, seldom used in
ordinary criminal cases, 226 virtually ceased to exist for all purposes after
1640.227 However, there is some evidence that justices tried to induce
confessions by threatening to withhold bail 228 and by using tricks. For
example, the report of the Trial of Colonel James Turner,229 discloses that the
justice may have "managed matters so as to induce [the burglary suspect] to
admit to [the victim], upon the [victim's] engaging not to prosecute, that he
knew where the property was." 23 0 Professor Levy concludes that "[flor all
practical purposes... the right against self-incrimination scarcely existed in
the pre-trial stages of a criminal proceeding." 23 1
Professor Levy may have overstated his case. Records of JP examinations
are sparse,23 2 and one ought not assume that.the examination in Turner was
typical. 23 3 Although trial proceedings were open to the public, preliminary
examinations were not.234 Rights, like plants, grow better in the light, and it is
possible that some magistrates simply got away with whatever they could.
A less cynical possibility is that magistrates might have believed that they
were not disregarding the protection against compulsory self-incrimination.
After all, defendants were still questioned at trial, so the right was in an
223 See 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 358.
2 24 LEVY, supra note 13, at 323; 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 440.
225 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 223.
226 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
227 JARDINE, TORTURE, supra note 130, at 57-58. In Trial of Thomas Tonge, 6
Cobbett's State Trials 225, 259 (1662), the defendant claimed that he had made a pretrial
confession after being threatened with torture.
228 Trial of Colonel James Turner, 6 Cobbett's State Trials 565, 572-73 (1664).
229 Id.
230 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 223. The pages cited by Stephen do not
disclose that the Justice of the Peace [JPI] induced the victim to make a false promise not to
prosecute. Rather, they suggest that the victim made a true promise which the JP induced
him to break. Turner, 6 Cobbett's State Trials at 574. They also show that the JP said, "I
will do you all the favour I can," in an effort to induce a confession. Id. at 573.
231 LEVY, supra note 13, at 325.
232 See LANGBEIN, RENAISSANCE, supra note 120, at 45.
233 There is some evidence that magistrates did honor a suspect's denial of the crime
or refusal to answer at preliminary examination. See id. at 53.
234 See authorities collected in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-90
(1979); id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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evolutionary state. It is certainly not clear that a broken promise, especially one
made by a private person, is offensive to the privilege.23 5 Nor is it clear that
threatening to withhold bail from a capitally charged suspect who refuses to
cooperate is the equivalent of threatening a recalcitrant witness with jail for
contempt. Even at trial, the defendant's refusal to answer might be called to the
jury's attention as evidence of guilt, so it is understandable that a JP might take
account of it in deciding whether to release on bail. Since the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was not omni-protective, a magistrate who
adverted to it might rationally have resolved any doubts in favor of using the
techniques disclosed by the Turner case. Finally, it must be remembered that
the JP's examination was authorized by statute. In a country without a written
constitution, statutes trump judicial decisions. 236 Even if there were a clear
conflict between the examination statutes and the right of silence, the statutes
would prevail. Whether any of these explanations is correct cannot be known.
There is no case that explores the applicability of the right of silence to the JP's
examination during the period in question, and the few treatises that existed are
unilluminating. 23 7 All that can safely be said is that some justices used tactics
that are inconsistent with a broad protection against compulsory self-
235 Later in this Article, I shall discuss whether the common law privilege is offended
when a confession is induced by promises, both governmental and private. See infra notes
458-63 and accompanying text.
236 See Reg. v. Scott, 1 Dears. & Bell 47, 59, 169 Eng. Rep. 909, 914 (Cr. Cas. Res.
1856).
237 As mentioned supra at note 135, Lambard's Eirenarcha, a treatise for justices of
the peace, contained the following statement:
Here you may see (if I be not deceived) when the examination of a felon first
began to be warranted amongst us. For at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere
se4;swn, and then his fault was not to be wrung out of himself, but was to be
discovered by other means and men.
2 LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA, supra note 135, at 213. The statement appeared in subsequent
editions as well. See id. at 211 (1607). Lambard's unembellished statement suggests that the
Marian statutes prevailed over the common law doctrine, but he really does not discuss the
matter.
Another leading treatise of the era contains a variation of Lambard's statement:
The offender himself shall not be examined upon oath; for by the common law,
nulfus tenetur seiswn prodere; neither was a man's fault to be wrung out of himself
(no not by examination only) but to be proved by others, until the statute of 2.& 3. P.&
M. c.10 gave authority to the justice of the peace to examine the felon himself.
DALTON, supra note 124, at 273 (1619). Dalton's statement is even less to the point than
Lambard's, for it involves an additional matter-examination upon oath-which is irrelevant
to our present concern.
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incrimination. However, there is nothing intrinsic to even a narrow protection
that would make it wholly inapplicable to preliminary examinations. 23 8
2. Admissibility of Confessions
The rules regarding admissibility of confessions were generally the same as
in preceding eras. Neither the cases nor the treatises refer to any rule that an
involuntary confession is inadmissible. 23 9 There was a continuation of the
provision, first seen in the Edwardian statutes, that a plea of guilty (or,
perhaps, a confession) to treason be made willingly and without violence in
order to displace the requirement that guilt be proved by two witnesses,2 40 and
we are justified in assuming a continuation of the position, apparently first
voiced by Staundiford in 1607,241 that an involuntary plea of guilty should not
be received by the court in any case. Moreover, the suggestion in cases of the
Marian and Elizabethan eras that the credibility of a confession is lessened if
the confession is involuntary, was repeated in a case decided in 1645.242
During the period under consideration, there were two noteworthy
developments. The first was a treatise on the Court of Star Chamber written by
23 8 Notwithstanding the generality of their discussions, both Lambard and Dalton treat
the protection as intrinsically applicable to preliminary examinations. See supra notes 134-
38 and accompanying text. It is perfectly understandable that Dalton limited his discussion
to examination under oath. At the time he wrote, the compulsory oath was a core concern
of those who were trying to establish the right. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying
text. Indeed, given that fact, it is Lambard's broader statement that is the perplexing one.
239 Had such a rule existed, one would have expected to find a reference to it in the
Trial of Colonel lames Turner, 6 Cobbett's State Trials 565, but there is nothing. SIR
MATrHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 264 (London, Atkyns & Atkins 1682), states that
an accused's confession, obtained at preliminary examination, is admissible. There is no
qualification that the confession must be voluntary. In the Trial of Thomas Tonge, the
defendant's confession was considered against him even though he claimed that he had
confessed only after being threatened with the rack. 6 Cobbett's State Trials 225, 259
(1682).
240 The concern was seen both in statute and in case law. See An Act for the
Regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1695, 7 Will. 3, ch.3,
§ 2 (Eng.), 9 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 390 (Danby Pickering ed., 1764); Tong's Case,
Kelyng's Rep. 20 (1664). Section 1 of the statute is noteworthy in the history of civil
liberties for giving the person accused of treason the right to make a full defense by counsel
(including court-assigned counsel on request), the right to a copy of the indictment, and the
right to present sworn witnesses for the defense.
241 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
242 Trial of Lord Macguire, 4 Cobbett's State Trials 654, 675 (1645) (defendant's
confession taken at preliminary examination).
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William Hudson, a lawyer who practiced before the court.243 The court had
two forms of proceedings, plenary and summary. Plenary proceedings involved
written pleadings and the examination of witnesses. Summary proceedings
were oral and were referred to as ore tenus. For the court to use ore tenus, the
defendant's confession was essential.
For when some dangerous persons attempt some unusual, and perhaps
desperate inventions... these persons are apprehended by a pursuivant or
messenger, and privately examined without oath, or any compulsory means,
concerning the fact. If he shall deny the accusation, then cannot the court
proceed against him ore tenus; but if he confess the offense freely and
voluntarily, without constraint, then may he be brought to the bar; at which
time his confession is shewed him; and if he acknowledge it, then who can
doubt but that the court may justly proceed cc ore suo and give a judgment
against him .... 244
The confession to which this passage refers is an ordinary confession, not a
guilty plea. That is apparent from the phrase "privately examined without
oath." On the other hand, the confession functions as a plea. If the accused
acknowledges the confession in open court, the court may use a summary, oral
procedure "and give a judgment against him." If the confession is not
voluntary or not acknowledged, the court must use the plenary procedure. 245
Thus, although the passage from Hudson speaks to a requirement of
voluntariness, the reference does not relate to admissibility of confessions.
Rather, the reference relates to Staundiford's concern about the acceptability of
guilty pleas. 246
243 W.LIAM HUDSON, A TREATISE ON THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (ante 1635),
in 2 FRANCIS HARGRAVE, COLLECANEA JURIDICA, at B (London, Bel Yard, Temple Bar
1792). See LEVY, supra note 13, at 106.
244 HUDSON, supra note 243, at 127.
245 Id.
246 But see Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 77 n.73 (1989)
("Hudson's reference is to the rule of evidence known as the voluntariness doctrine.., and
not to the privilege against self-incrimination .... "). Professor Benner's only explanation is
that the privilege "had not yet entered its second stage of development." Id. However, the
rule of evidence known as the voluntariness doctrine is an exclisionary rule. It did not exist
in English law at the time Hudson wrote. Thus, Hudson could not have been referring to it.
Moreover, the privilege was then well enough developed for Hudson to make explicit
reference to it in a subsequent passage. See infra text accompanying note 248.
Consequently, if one assumes that the passage must refer to either the involuntariness rule
or the privilege, it is plausible to read it as referring to the privilege. The significance of this
reading is that it may make the privilege applicable to unswom examinations conducted by
persons who were performing duties quite similar to those performed today by police
officers, although only in the context of deciding whether the confession may function as a
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Of potentially greater significance is a passage which discusses both
confessions and the nemo tenetur doctrine. As noted earlier, some members of
the court said in Tresham's case that nemo tenetur could be asserted by the
defendant in a capital matter, but that since Star Chamber did not have
jurisdiction to impose capital punishment, nemo tenetur was not available in a
Star Chamber proceeding.247 However, some of the noncapital cases heard in
Star Chamber involved potential capital liability if tried elsewhere, and the
court therefore had to take care not to compel a confession. Alluding to this,
Hudson said: "But I observe that the court, in all these cases which trench to
felony, never examined it further than the party's confession; for in these cases
nemo teneturprodere seipsum, but upon voluntary confession without oath." 248
The words "examined" and "without oath" suggest that the confession to
which the passage refers is, once again, an ordinary confession, not a guilty
plea. The passage also links voluntariness to nemo tenetur by suggesting that
nemo tenetur means that a confession has to be voluntary. The passage,
however, is distressingly ambiguous in that it neither says that an involuntary
confession is inadmissible nor attributes any other function to voluntariness.
Thus, although the linkage of voluntariness to nemo tenetur is interesting and
provocative, ultimately we do not know what to make of it.
Hudson's is the first reference I have found linking the words "voluntary
confession" to nemo tenetur. It was not the last, however, as we shall see from
the second development that occurred during this era, the 1658 case of Attorney
General v. Mico.249 The defendant was charged in the Court of Exchequer
with evading taxes on imported goods by bribing two tax collectors. A civil
action for discovery was brought, apparently for the purpose of making the
defendant reveal the details of the transaction. One of the defendant's lawyers
argued that the defendant could not be compelled to answer the equity bill
because "it is against Law and Reason . . . to accuse himself."250 The
defendant's other lawyer claimed that the bill for discovery was against the law
of nature:
hence the Rule nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, vel accusare; and upon that
Rule it is, That if a Man will prefer a Bill to compel me to answer what
Trespasses I have committed upon his Land, or what other Injury I have done
him; I shall not be compelled to answer to such a Bill, as the Common Rule in
all Courts is, because it is a matter of Crime and Tort; for which I am finable
and punishable in another Court, over and above what Damages the Party is to
guilty plea. I say may because it is not clear from Hudson's passage that the royal
messengers also interrogated those whom they arrested. It is possible that the interrogation
was conducted by other officials.
247 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
248 HUDSON, supra note 243, at 64.
249 Hadres 137, 145 Eng. Rep. 419 (Ex. 1658).
250 Id. at 137, 145 Eng. Rep. at 419.
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recover against me. Upon this ground, though the Parties own Confession of a
Crime be the clearest Proof in the Law, yet if such a Confession proceed from
Dread, or be extorted by any Compulsion, it ought not to be received against
him. A Woman was indicted for the stealing of Bread to the value of 2s. who
said that she had done it by the command of her husband; and the Justices out
of compassion to the Prisoner would not Record her Confession, but gave her
leave to plead not guilty, which she did, and was acquitted. If a Prisoner
disclose any thing to the Court which makes him a felon, yet the Court will not
take advantage of it, but suffer him to plead not guilty; and these Cases depend
upon the formed Rule, viz. That a Man is not obliged to condemn himself.25 1
The report does not disclose the court's action, so we are left with the
arguments of counsel as one indicium of the thinking of the times. 25 2 It is clear
from the examples that counsel was using the word "confession" in the sense
of guilty plea rather than extrajudicial confession. Hence, it would be wrong to
assert that the rule barring the admissibility of involuntary, extrajudicial
confessions was recognized in 1658. On the other hand, it is equally clear that
251 Id. at 139-40, 145 Eng. Rep. at 420-21 (citations omitted).
252 Several scholars have attributed the material quoted in the text to Chief Justice
Widdrington. See LEVY, supra note 13, at 494-95 n.41; Benner, supra note 246, at 95-97.
I believe that they are wrong. Six paragraphs earlier, one finds the argument of "Shaftoe
pro defendente." Attorney Gen. v. Mico, Hardres at 138, 145 Eng. Rep. at 420. In the next
paragraph, Widdrington replied, "It was usual in the Court of Wards, to compel a
Discovery of a Tenure in Capite. Et Adjonatur." Id. at 139, 145 Eng. Rep. at 420. The
next paragraph appears to contain the reporter's note about a precedent. The next two
paragraphs are as follows:
At another day, in the same Term, it was argued by Hardres pro defendente. In
the argument of this Case (it being of great weight and consequence) I shall insist 1st.
upon Law. 2. Upon Reason. 3. Upon Authorities. 4. I shall give Answer to some
Objections.
1. 1 conceive the Demurrer consistent with, and agreeable to all manner of Laws,
viz. To the Law of God, the Law of Nature, and the Law of the Land.
Id. at 139, 145 Eng. Rep. at 420. Two paragraphs later, under the heading "For the law of
Nature," appears the paragraph quoted in the text.
From the sequence and content of the paragraphs, it is clear that defense lawyer
Hardres made the quoted statement. Any doubt on this score is put to rest by the final
paragraph of the report which states, "He concluded, and pray'd Judgment pro
Defendente." Id. at 147, 145 Eng. Rep. at 424. This paragraph could hardly refer to Chief
Justice Widdrington.
The willingness of the reporter to report in detail the argument of defense counsel
Hardres may be explained by the fact that the reporter's name was Hardres. From the
suspicious fact that no result is reported, one may infer that the defendant lost.
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counsel linked the unacceptability of involuntary guilty pleas to nemo tenetur.
Indeed, the latter is said to be the justification for the former.
Counsel's argument has logical appeal. If it is offensive to the nemo tenetur
doctrine to compel the accused or even a witness to answer incriminating
questions during the course of a trial, it should be all the more offensive to
compel a guilty plea and abort the trial.
The unacceptability of involuntary guilty pleas has been regarded as a
precursor of the rule barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions. 253
Consequently, the argument in Mico affords a foundation, albeit small, for
saying that the involuntary confession rule itself is based (at least in part) on
nemo tenetur,25 4 and for questioning the position, most forcefully advocated by
Wigmore, and adopted by some of the critics of Miranda, that the two
doctrines are wholly distinct.255
G. England 1700-1850
After the beginning of the eighteenth century, the protection against
compulsory self-incrimination was well entrenched in English law and broadly
interpreted by the courts.256 Our story therefore shifts to the development and
rationale of the rule barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions, and to
the relationship, if any, between that rule and the right against compulsory self-
incrimination. In the latter part of the period in question, we find the
development of police forces and the emergence of police interrogation in lieu
of judicial examination. Hence, we must also ask whether the nemo tenetur
principle is applicable to police interrogation.
The collateral or remote antecedents in English law of the rule barring the
admissibility of an involuntary confession are: (1) the statutes which required
that a guilty plea (or, perhaps, any confession) be made willingly and without
253 3 WIGMoRE, supra note 80, § 819, at 296 ("MThere must have been some
extension, in the minds of Bar and Bench, to the usage for extrajudicial confessions, of the
phrases and notions originally peculiar to confessions at bar upon arraignment."). Another
precursor may have been the doctrine that an involuntary confession was less believable
than a voluntary one. See discussion of cases supra at notes 151-54, 242 and accompanying
text.
254 The ambiguous passages from Hudson seem to point uncertainly in the same
direction. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
255 See 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823(c) (3d. ed. 1940).
256 See, e.g., Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 242, 244, 28 Eng. Rep. 157, 159
(Ch. 1750) (defendant not required to make discovery in real property case because
disclosure might subject her to punishment in an ecclesiastical court for marrying her dead
sister's husband); Trial of Thomas Earl of Macclesfield, 16 Howell's State Trials 767, 920-
23, 1146-50 (1725) (court holds in effect that witness need not give information that tends
to incriminate him or that would be a link in a chain leading to incrimination).
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violence in order to displace the two-witness rule in treason cases;257 (2) cases
from various eras which suggested that a confession's voluntariness bore on its
credibility;258 (3) Staundiford's 1607 treatise which insisted that a guilty plea
should not be accepted in any case if motivated by fear, menace or duress;259
(4) ambiguous references in Hudson's treatise on Star Chamber which seem to
link a requirement of voluntariness to the nemo tenetur doctrine;260 and (5)
defense counsel's argument in Mico which used the same doctrine to justify the
involuntary-plea rule.2 6 1 These antecedents arose in the 16th and 17th
centuries.
The 18th century saw additional strands in the development of the rule.
The first strand was a passage that appeared in the 1736 edition of Sir Matthew
Hale's Historia Placitorum Coronae. The passage was undoubtedly added by
the editor, Sollom Emlyn.262 The passage is part of a chapter on written
evidence obtained by a justice of the peace under the Marian examination
statutes. It states:
By the statute of 1 & 2 P. & M. cap. 13. and 2 & 3 P. & M. cap. 10.
Justices of peace and coroners have power to take examinations of the party
accused, and informations of the accusers and witnesses.., and are to put the
same in writing, and are to certify the same to the [court of trial jurisdiction].
These examinations and informations thus taken and returned may be read
in evidence against the prisoner, if the informer be dead, or so sick, that he is
not able to travel, and oath thereof made; otherwise not.
But then, 1. Oath must be made either by the justice or coroner, that took
them, or the clerk that wrote them, that they are the true substance of what the
informer gave in upon oath, and what the prisoner confessed upon his
examination. 2. As to the examination of the prisoner, it must be testified, that
he did it freely without any menace, or undue terror imposed upon him; for I
257 An act for the repeal of certain statutes concerning treasons and felonies, 1547, 1
Edw. 6, Ch. 12 (Eng.); 5 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 259 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
258 Trial of Lord Maeguire, 4 Cobbett's State Trials 654 (1645); Trial of Sir
Christopher Blunt, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1409 (1600); Duke of Norfolk's Trial, 1
Cobbett's State Trials 957 (1571); Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 515
(1551).
259 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
260 supra note 243 and accompanying text.
261 Attorney Gen. v. Mico, Hardres 137, 139-40, 145 Eng. Rep. 419, 420-21 (Ex.
1658).
262 SIR MAiTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE (Sollom Emlyn ed.
1730) (London, E. Rider, Little-Britain 1800). Hale died in 1676, and his.work was first
published in 1678. I have not seen the 1678 edition, but the passage does not appear in the
1682 edition, which I have seen. I have been informed by the Reference Department of the
Law Library of The Ohio State University College of Law that the passage first appears in
the 1736 edition, which Emlyn edited. Emlyn was a law reformer and barrister of great
reputation. See 6 DICIIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 773 (1908).
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have often known the prisoner disown his confession upon his examination,
and hath sometimes been acquitted against such his confession; and the reason
why these examinations and informations are allowable in evidence (under the
cautions above premised,) is, because they are judges of record, and the
informations before them upon oath are authorized and required by act of
parliament, and they are judges of the crimes upon which the informations are
taken. 263
This passage is clear in one respect: it deals with the written record of a
confession made during pretrial examination rather than with a guilty plea
made on arraignment in trial court. On other important questions, however, the
passage is ambiguous.
The first question is whether the passage deals with the admissibility of
confessions or only with their credibility. Emlyn does not squarely answer this
question, and different parts of the passage cut in different directions. On the
one hand, the words "acquitted against such his [disowned] confession"
suggest a scenario in which the confession is admitted by the judge, but is
disregarded by the trier of fact, perhaps as lacking credibility. On the other
hand, the words "examinations... allowable in evidence (under the cautions
above premised,)" suggest that a confession is inadmissible (not "allowable")
unless it meets previously stated criteria. Although the matter is not free from
doubt, there is a way of reconciling these conflicting interpretations. The
quoted passage is a part of chapter 38. After the passage, the rest of the chapter
discusses three situations in which, in a particular proceeding, a party offers
written evidence that was obtained in another proceeding. The issue in all three
cases is clearly whether the evidence is admissible, rather than whether
admissible evidence is entitled to weight.264 These situations and Emlyn's
earlier use of the word "allowable" establish that the concern of chapter 38 is
the admissibility of written evidence including the transcript of a confession
made at a preliminary examination. Thus, Emlyn is probably saying that a
confession is inadmissible unless it meets the criteria of admissibility, and that
one of the benefits of the rule is that it will effectively keep defendants from
attacking their own confessions. 26 5
263 2 HALE, supra note 262, at 284-85.
264 In the first situation, a motion "that the examination of Mrs. Puckring might be
read in evidence" was denied. 2 HALE supra note 262, at 285. In the second situation, it
was held that the examination of the accused and certain witnesses might be read in
evidence at trial. Id. In the third situation, it was held that the recorded statements of
witnesses could not be read in a prosecution for treason. Id. at 286.
265 The conclusion that chapter 38 deals solely with admissibility is supported by
chapter 37. The latter chapter introduces the subject of evidence and witnesses and lists five
sub-topics. The third, entitled "Those evidences and examinations, that are in writing, what,
and when allowable, and what not," 2 HALE, supra note 262, at 276, surely deals with
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The second question concerns the criteria for determining whether the
defendant's confession is admissible. Again, Emlyn does not squarely answer
the question. Rather, he says that the examination of the accused is admissible
"under the cautions above premised." Immediately preceding this statement is
the admonition that there must be testimony that the accused confessed "freely
without any menace, or undue terror imposed upon him." Preceding the
admonition are requirements that the examination be without oath, that it be put
in writing, that it be certified, and that an official testify that the written
statement is an accurate record of the oral confession. Given the construction of
the paragraph, it is plausible that "the cautions above premised" were intended
to include all of the stated conditions. At the very least, however, the
"cautions" should include the immediately preceding requirement of testimony
that the accused confessed without "menace" or "terror." Thus, it is reasonable
to infer from the passage that a confession is inadmissible if obtained by
coercion at the Marian examination.
The third question is why a confession is inadmissible if made under
menace or terror. Although Emlyn does not explicitly answer the question, he
gives us a clue by using the words "acquitted against such his confession."
There are only two honest grounds for acquitting the defendant despite a
confession that is attributed to him: either the confession was not made at all or
it was false. Since the passage presupposes that a confession was made, the
inference has to be that a confession made under the influence of menace or
terror is inadmissible because it is likely to be false. In other words, screening
out putatively unreliable evidence is the object of exclusion. 266
The fourth and final question is whether the passage refers to a practice
that had gained some acceptance in the case law (albeit unreported) or merely
to one that some people thought should be adopted. It is hard to answer this
question. Although the surrounding pages are replete with authority, the
passage in question is unreferenced. Moreover, no other treatise of the era
refers to an emerging requirement of voluntariness as a condition of
admissibility. 267 A cautious guess, therefore, is that some persons, Emlyn
admissibility. Chapter 37 itself contains the discussion of the first two sub-topics only. The
third is addressed by chapter 38.
266 In the passage under consideration, Emlyn did not try to link the inadmissibility of
extorted confessions to the nemo tenetur maxim. Six years earlier, however, in his preface
to the 1730 edition of the State Trials, he said, "In other countries, Racks and Instruments
of Torture are applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession, sometimes of more than is
true; but this is a practice which Englishmen are happily unacquainted with, enjoying the
benefit of that just and reasonable Maxim, Nemo tenetur accusare seipswn . . . ." 1
Cobbett's State Trials xxv (1730). I do not know why he did not refer to the nemo tenetur
maxim in the present context. However, nothing in the passage quoted in the text rejects the
maxim as a basis for excluding a confession obtained by menace or threat.
267 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 818, at 295-96 & nn.10-12.
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included, believed that the rule should be adopted, perhaps as a logical
extension of the antecedent developments noted above. Moreover, at the time
Emlyn wrote, there was a special reason for wanting to extend the earlier
developments so to condition the admissibility of a confession on a showing of
voluntariness: the defendant was an incompetent witness in his own behalf. 268
If a false confession had been obtained from him by coercion, the defendant
could not by his own testimony point that out to the jury. His words, therefore,
could be used against him, but notfor him. Conditioning the admissibility of a
confession on a showing of voluntariness might have been regarded as a
method of ameliorating the harshness and unfairness of the incompetency
rule.269
Emlyn's passage appears to be the first statement in English law that an
involuntary confession, as opposed to a guilty plea, is inadmissible.
The second strand in the development of the involuntary confession rule
occurred not in a treatise, but in a case that was tried in 1741-the Trial of
Charles White.270 After the prosecutor offered the confession that the defendant
had made at a preliminary examination, the following occurred:
Mr. Frederick, counsel for the prisoner. It is opened by Mr. Vernon [the
prosecutor], that this Examination contains the prisoner's confession of the
fact. I would ask Mr. Britten [the witness who had just authenticated the
confession], Was the confession voluntarily made or not? For if it was not
voluntarily [sic], it ought not to be read.27 1
Although he did not refer to Emlyn's edition of Hale, Frederick was certainly
making the same point: that a confession obtained at a magistrate's examination
was inadmissible if involuntary. That this argument must have reflected a
doctrine that had gained some acceptibility, rather than being merely an
advocate's figment, may be inferred from the response of the recorder-a
barrister who performed judicial functions such as ruling on the admissibility of
evidence:
That is an improper question, unless the prisoner had insisted, and made it
part of his case, that his confession was extorted by threats, or drawn from him
268 The incompetecy of the defendant as a witness in a criminal case arose in the late
1600s, 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 80, at 440, as an offshoot of the incompetency of
parties in a civil case. LEVY, supra note 13, at 324; 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 575, at 809 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter 2 WIGMORE]. In England, the
incompetency remained until 1898. LEVY, supra note 13, at 324; 2 WIGMoRE, supra,
§ 575, at 817. In the United States, it was abolished in the mid-1800s. Id.
26 9 See Reg. v. Harz, [196613 W.L.R. 1241, 1271 (Eng. Crim. App.), afid sub nom.
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, 1967 App. Cas. 760.
270 17 Howell's State Trials 1079 (1741).
271 Id. at 1085.
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by promises; in that case, indeed, it would have been proper for us to enquire
by what means the confession was procured: but as the prisoner alleges nothing
of that kind, I will not suffer a question to be asked the clerk, which carries in
it a reflection on the magistrate before whom the Examination was taken. Let it
be read.2 7 2
The recorder did not deny Frederick's assertion that an involuntary confession
is inadmissible. To the contrary, he seemed to concede the point. Indeed, his
very reference to threats and promises anticipated what was later to be a
common statement of the confession rule.273 Hence, we are justified in
concluding that, as early as 1741, involuntary confessions were regarded as
inadmissible by at least a segment of the judiciary. 274 However, we have no
idea of the rationale underlying inadmissibility for neither Frederick nor the
recorder tendered any.
What may have been the third strand in the development of the rule barring
the admissibility of involuntary confessions occurred in 1742 during a debate in
the House of Lords on a proposal to grant witnesses immunity in order to
obtain their testimony at a legislative inquiry into the suspected malfeasance of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As part of an elaborate argument against the
proposal, Lord Carteret said,
It is an established maxim, that no man can be obliged to accuse himself,
or to answer any questions which may have any tendency to discover what the
nature of his defence requires to be concealed. His guilt must appear either by
a voluntary and unconstrained confession, which the terrors of conscience have
sometimes extorted, and the notoriety of the crime has at other times produced,
or by the deposition of such witnesses as the jury shall think worthy of
belief.275
It is not clear whether the word "confession" refers to a confession made
outside the trial court or to a guilty plea made upon arraignment in the trial
court. If Lord Carteret intended to refer to an extrajudicial confession, his
272 ld.
273 See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 825.
274 The recorder was quick to seize upon a procedural ground for rejecting
Frederick's argument, but one should not treat this as an aspersion upon the argument.
There may have been another explanation. The confession was taken before "Mr. Mayor."
White, 17 Howell's State Trials at 1085. Now, it is possible that the magistrate's surname
was "Mayor," but it seems more likely that the confession was taken before the Mayor of
the City of Bristol. That person, however, was also one of the judges at White's trial. Id. at
1003. Consequently, the recorder's riposte may have had only the purpose of protecting a
colleague.
275 2 DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT 123 (London, J. Stockdale, Samuel Johnson ed.,
1787).
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statement is the third strand in the development of the involuntariness rule. If
he intended to refer to a guilty plea, his statement is merely a latter-day version
of Staundiford's, and thus only an indirect antecedent of the involuntariness
rule. In either event, however, Carteret, in common with Hudson and the
defense lawyer in Mico, did not regard nemo tenetur as separate from the
requirement that a "confession" be voluntary. To the contrary, the doctrine that
"no man can be obliged to accuse himself" meant that a confession had to be
"voluntary and unconstrained." Nemo tenetur was, therefore, the source of the
requirement of voluntariness.
The fourth strand in the development of the involuntary confession rule is a
section editorially added to a treatise on the law of evidence written by Lord
Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, and published posthumously in 1754.276 While
discussing the disqualification of witnesses for interest, the author wrote the
following:
5thly, As Persons interested are utterly removed from being Evidence for
want of Integrity, so on the other Side the voluntary Confession of the Party in
Interest is reckoned the best Evidence; for if a Man's swearing for his Interest
can give no Credit, he must certainly give most Credit when he swears against
it; but then this Confession must be voluntary and without Compulsion; for
our Law differs from the Civil Law, that it will not force any Man to accuse
himself; and in this we do certainly follow the' Law of Nature, which
commands every Man to endeavor his own Preservation; and therefore Pain
and Force may compel Men to confess what is not the Truth of Facts, and
consequently such extorted confessions are not to be depended upon.277
This passage raises two principal questions. The first is whether the author
was addressing confessions made outside the trial court or whether he was
referring to guilty pleas only. Wignore, who insisted that the involuntary
confession rule did not arise until the late 1700s, 278 says that this passage "was
apparently intended to apply only to 'confessions' in the old pleading sense
276 SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 121-47 (London, His Majesty's
Law Printers 1769). The earliest complete edition available to me for hands-on use was the
1769 edition. However, I have been informed by the Reference Department of the Law
Library of The Ohio State University College of Law that the crucial passage relating to
confessions appears for the first time in the 1754 edition. That information was backed up
by facsimile pages from the 1754 edition. The passage does not appear in the 1717 edition,
which is the only one that was published before Gilbert's death in 1726. Hence, as with
Hale, the passage was apparently added by an editor. I say "apparently" because the title
page of the 1754 edition says, "And now first Publlsh'd from an Exact Copy taken from the
Original Manuscript." If the crucial passage was really written by Baron Gilbert, it is the
first strand in the development of the involuntariness rule.
2 77 Id. at 139-40.
278 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 818, at 294.
1992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
already described," 279 that is, guilty pleas. However, Wigmore gives no
reasons, and the text hardly supports him. Moreover, the passage appears in an
evidence treatise, not in a book on procedure; it is part of a discussion of the
admissibility of testimony of interested witnesses, not a discussion of pleading;
immediately preceding the passage is a discussion of the admissibility of the
testimony of an uncharged co-conspirator; 280 and immediately following it is a
discussion of the evidentiary effect of a confession obtained by a JP's
examination and the admissibility at trial of written statements obtained from
witnesses at preliminary proceedings. 281 Hence, it is completely inconsistent
with context to say that the passage in question deals with guilty pleas rather
than confessions. Considered in context, it is more likely that the passage was
intended to deal generally with the admissibility of confessions made outside
the trial court.282
The second question is why the author regarded an involuntary confession
as inadmissible. His opaque writing suggests two reasons. The first, which is
quite different from Emlyn's edition of Hale, is that an involuntary confession
contravenes the nemo tenetur maxim. This reason links the two doctrines
(nemo tenetur is the justification for excluding involuntary confessions) and
thus confers on the exclusion of involuntary confessions the values underlying
the protection against compulsory self-incrimination. The second reason, which
is closer to Emlyn, seems to be that both nemo tenetur and the exclusion of
involuntary confessions serve an additional function: guarding against
unreliable confessions.
Linking the exclusion of involuntary confessions to nemo tenetur is
reminiscent of the ambiguous statements in Hudson's treatise28 3 and the
argument made in Mico in which the defense counsel linked the involuntary-
plea rule to nemo.284 As noted above, the Mico argument appeals to logic. 285
279 Id. at 296.
280 GILBERT, supra note 276, at 139.
281 Id. at 140-41.
282 Wigmore himself seems to recognize this in a subsequent section of his work.
Ignoring his earlier statement that Gilbert had written about guilty pleas rather than
confessions, supra text accompanying note 279, he stated, "Probably... early in historical
usage and more common in modem judicial opinions, is the phrase 'voluntary,' as
indicating that quality in a confession which sanctions its reception." 3 WIGMORE, supra
note 80, § 826, at 347-48 n.1. In support of this statement, he cites the passage from
Gilbert quoted in the text of this Article. Id.-
283 See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
284 At page 139 of the 1769 edition of Gilbert's treatise, there are a number of
citations in the margin, most of which pertain to the disqualification of an interested witness.
One of the citations, however, concerns nemo tenetur. "Hard. 139, 140" refers to cases
collected by Sir Thomas Hardres. At pages 139 and 140 of his collection appears the Mico
case. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text. It is clear from this reference that the
author of the passage in Gilbert intended to rely on nemo tenetur as a justification for
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So does the linkage in Gilbert. If nemo prohibits trying to obtain incriminating
statements from the accused or a witness by jailing or threatening to jail the
person or by using or threatening to use some other coercive measure such as
force, then nemo should also prohibit actually obtaining the statement by
coercion and using it.28 6
The fifth strand in the development of the rule barring the admissibility of
involuntary confessions occurred in 1775 in Rudd's Case,28 7 a complicated
matter in which references to the admissibility of a confession were obiter
dicta. Ms. Rudd filed a complaint charging the brothers Perreau with forcing
her to forge a bond. She sought to take advantage of a discretionary practice in
which an accomplice might receive a pardon after making a full confession that
led to the conviction of the principal. Subsequently charged herself, she sought
bail, apparently to facilitate applying for the pardon.
A third ground which has been urged in support of the present application [for
bail] is this; that the prisoner has been drawn in by promises and assurances
[from Justices of the Peace] to answer to an examination, and to swear to it on
oath, which she would not have done, but from a confidence that those
promises and assurances would have been kept and performed. The instance
hasfrequently happened, of persons having made confessions under threats or
promises: the consequence asfrequently has been, that such examinations and
confessions have not been made use of against them on their trial.2 88
Later in his opinion, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield said:
I agree with [defense counsel], that if she had made a fair and full disclosure of
all that she knew, and the Justices had deceived her, under a promise or
excluding involuntary confessions, just as counsel in Mico relied on nemo tenetur to attack
involuntary pleas.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
286 In his recent article, Professor Benner says, and decries, that the sole effect of the
passage from Gilbert is to limit the rationale of nemo tenetur to the concern for reliability
that underlies the involuntary confession rule. See Benner, supra note 246, at 95-97.
Although this interpretation is not implausible, it certainly is not compelled by the
ambiguous words of the passage. Moreover, the nemo tenetur doctrine was firmly
embedded in English law and interpreted generously long before the passage was written.
Nothing in Gilbert's treatise indicates an aversion to the doctrine or its interpretation.
Consequently, it is more plausible to read the passage as conferring on the confession rule
the broader values underlying the privilege. Alternatively, we might read the passage as
conferring on nemo tenetur a concern for reliability in addition to the other values served by
the privilege. Later in this article, I shall shall try to develop the point that the privilege
serves a complex of values indcluding reliability. See infra notes 440-47 and accompanying
text.
287 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775).
288 Id. at 117-18, 168 Eng. Rep. at 161 (emphasis added).
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assurance or hope of a pardon from them, she would be entitled to a
recommendation of mercy: and in that case I should have been of opinion to
bail her, though the Justices had in strictness no right to make such a promise,
or give her such assurance. If any evidence or confession has been etorted
from her, it will be of no prejudice to her on the trial.289
These passages intimate, without explicitly saying, that involuntary confessions
were regarded in 1775 as inadmissible, and that such confessions had in fact
been excluded. They do not state why involuntary confessions are inadmissible,
and they certainly do not attribute inadmissibility to the nemo tenetur doctrine.
Moreover, in common with the recorder's statement in White,290 they refer to
promises, as well as threats, as a source of inadmissibility. However, a concern
that a confession not be induced by promises does not neatly correspond to
one's intuitive notion of what a stricture against compulsory self-incrimination
is supposed to prohibit. Hence, both Rudd and White may in part impliedly
contradict Gilbert's notion of a relationship between the inadmissibility of
involuntary confessions and the nemo tenetur doctrine. On the other hand,
neither Rudd nor White explicitly addresses the relationship between nemo and
the exclusion of confessions, and nothing in either opinion indicates that nemo
is intrinsically inapplicable to confessions that are made outside the trial court.
Consequently, Rudd and White cannot be taken as having settled any of the
matters with which we are concerned, and they remain open for further
inquiry.
2 9 1
The sixth and final strand in the development of the rule barring
involuntary confessions occurred eight years later in the case of Rex v.
Warickshall.292 Suspected of having received stolen property, Warickshall
confessed after receiving "promises of favour." 293 Her confession led the
authorities to the property, which was hidden in her bed. After the court
refused to admit Warickshall's confession against her, the prosecutor offered
the derivative evidence-the property and the fact that it had been found in her
bed. Warickshall's lawyer argued that unless the fruits of the confession were
also excluded, "the faith which the prosecutor had pledged would be violated,
2 89 Id. at 122-23, 168 Eng. Rep. at 164 (emphasis added).
290 Trial of Charles White, 17 Howell's State Trials 1079 (1741).
291 Whether the exclusion of involuntary confessions is attributable to the nemo tenetur
doctrine or is independent of it is discussed infra at notes 453-66 and accompanying text.
Whether the protection against compulsory self-incrimination is offended when a confession
is induced by a promise that is subsequently broken is discussed infra at notes 454-63 and
accompanying text.
292 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
293 Id. at 263, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234. The promises were apparently made by the
victim. Although the opinion does not disclose what was promised, I infer that the victim
promised not to prosecute Warickshall if she returned the stolen property.
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and the prisoner made the deluded instrument of her own conviction." 294 The
court, however, admitted the derivative evidence.
It is a mistaken notion, that the evidence of confessions and facts which
have been obtained from prisoners by promises or threats, is to be rejected
from a regard to publicfafth: no such rule ever prevailed. The idea is novel in
theory, and would be as dangerous in practice as it is repugnant to the general
principles of criminal law. Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as
inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not intitled to
credit. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit,
because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt. . .but a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a shape... that no credit ought to be given to
it; and therefore it is rejected. This principle respecting confessions has no
application whatever as to the admission or rejection of facs, whether the
knowledge of them be obtained in consequence of an extorted confession, or
whether it arise from any other source .... 295
Warickshall is the clearest indication that an involuntary confession is
inadmissible, for Warickshall's confession was in fact excluded from evidence.
The basis for exclusion is said to be the putative unreliability of an involuntary
confession rather than "public faith," which, I suppose, refers to the public's
faith or hope that persons in authority will keep the promises by which they
induce confessions. The opinion contains no reference to the nemo tenetur
maxim and there is assuredly no indication that involuntary confessions are
excluded because they offend the maxim, even in a case involving force or the
threat of force. Indeed, the court's intimation that unreliability is the sole basis
for excluding any confession, whether obtained by threats or promises, might
be regarded as contradicting that notion. On the other hand, as was true in
Rudd and White, the court does not address the relationship between the
exclusion of confessions and nemo, and the opinion certainly does not state that
nemo is inherently inapplicable to confessions that are made outside the trial
court. Moreover, as in Rudd, we would not necessarily expect to find a
reference to nemo in a case that involved promises rather than force or threat of
force. Consequently, none of the cases answers the question whether there is a
relationship between the exclusion of involuntary confessions and the nemo
tenetur doctrine.
Warickshall was decided in 1783. During the next two years, the courts
occasionally confronted similar issues, resolving them as they had been
resolved in Warickshall.296 In none of the cases did the court discuss the
29 4 Id.
295 Id. at 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234-35.
296 In chronological order, the cases are Rex v. Thompson, 1 Leach 291, 168 Eng.
Rep. 248 (1783) (interrogator implied that suspect would not be prosecuted if he gave a
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relationship between nemo and the inadmissibility of involuntary confessions.
Nor did the court discuss whether nemo is applicable to interrogations
occurring outside the trial court. Indeed, in none of the cases did the court
even mention nemo. These cases, too, leave unsettled the applicability of nemo
to pretrial interrogation and the relationship between nemo and the exclusion of
involuntary confessions.
The English cases from 1785 to the mid-19th century shed little light on
these issues. 297 The nemo tenetur doctrine prospered, and courts refused to
compel incriminating answers in both civil and criminal matters. 298 If an
incriminating statement was made, objection to its admissibility in a criminal
proceeding on the ground that it was involuntary was virtually a matter of
routine,299 and the objection was often sustained. 3°° In only a few of the
satisfactory exculpatory explanation); Rex v. Mosey, 1 Leach at 265 n.(a), 168 Eng. Rep.
235 n.(a) (1784) (promise of favor invalidated confession; derivative evidence admissible);
Rex v. Cass, 1 Leach 293 n.(a), 168 Eng. Rep. 249 n.(a) (1784) (promise of favor
invalidated confession); Rex v. Lockhart, 1 Leach 386, 168 Eng. Rep. 295 (1785) (promise
of favor invalidated confession; testimony of derivative witness admissible). All of the cited
cases were tried at London's Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey).
297 My principal concerns in writing this Article are to ascertain whether there is a
relationship between the rule barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions and the
protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and to determine whether the latter should
be applicable to police interrogations. I am particularly interested in whether the
inadmissibility of involuntary confessions is based, even in part, on the protection against
compulsory self-incrimination. In the United States, both doctrines are customarily thought
of as constitutional law doctrines, although both originated in the common law. One may
wonder why, in exploring the relationship between these two doctrines of American
constitutional law, I am referring to English legal materials that arose long after the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment. The answer is that those materials may illuminate the
thinking of earlier generations on both sides of the Atlantic.
298 See, e.g., Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. Jun. 405, 32 Eng. Rep. 412 (Ch. 1802-
1803) (demurrer to petition for discovery sustained on ground that respondent's answer
would be self-incriminating with reference to criminal conversion of mislaid money);
Maloney v. Bartley, 3 Camp. 210, 212, 170 Eng. Rep. 1357, 1385 (Oxford Cir. 1812)
(magistrate's sub-clerk cannot be compelled to state whether he wrote a libelous affidavit;
answer would "tend to criminate the witness"); The King v. England, 2 Leach 767, 168
Eng. Rep. 483 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1796) (second in duel was not compelled to testify for
prosecution).
299 A large collection of the cases may be found in 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80,
§§ 817-50pasim.
300 The following chronological list is not exhaustive: Rex v. Wilson 597, 1 Holt, 171
Eng. Rep. 353 (C.P. 1817) (magistrate's examination-as opposed to magistrate merely
asking whether the suspect has anything to say-implies an obligation to answer); Rex v.
Kingston, 4 Car. & P. 387, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (Norfolk Cir. 1830) (statement that it would
be "better" for the suspect to confess, i.e., that the suspect could obtain some advantage by
confessing); Rex v. Dunn, 4 Car. & P. 543, 172 Eng. Rep. 817 (Oxford Cir. 1831) (same);
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confession cases, however, did the defense lawyer even refer to nemo
tenetur.301 In fewer still did he assert that nemo tenetur was the basis for
excluding an involuntary confession. 302 The cases do establish that nemo
tenetur is applicable to pretrial examinations conducted by magistrates, 303 but
they are otherwise unilluminating. One may infer from some of the cases that at
least some involuntary confessions were excluded at trial because they offended
nemo tenetur, but none of the cases contains a straightforward discussion of the
Rex v. Parratt, 4 Car. & P. 570, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (Oxford Cir. 1831) (threat by captain
to have crew member committed and executed if he did not confess); Rex v. Richards, 5
Car. & P. 318, 172 Eng. Rep. 993 (Oxford Cir. 1832) (threat that constable would take
suspect to a magistrate if the suspect did not confess; also construed as a promise of
forbearance); Rex v. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535, 172 Eng. Rep. 1087 (Oxford Cir. 1833)
(magistrate promised to do all he could for suspect); Rex v. Enoch, 5 Car. & P. 539, 172
Eng. Rep. 1089 (Oxford Cir. 1833) (suspect told it would be "better" to confess); Rex v.
Davis, 6 Car. & P. 177, 172 Eng. Rep. 1196 (Oxford Cir. 1833) (prisoner apparently
examined on oath); Rex v. Lewis, 6 Car. & P. 161, 172 :Eng. Rep. 1190 (Oxford Cir.
1833) (magistrate examined prisoner on oath); Rex v. Mills, 6 Car. & P. 146, 172 Eng.
Rep. 1183 (Oxford Cir. 1833) (officer refused to accept suspect's denial, told suspect there
were eye witnesses); Rex v. Thomas, 6 Car. & P. 353, 172 Eng. Rep. 1273 (Oxford Cir.
1834) ("better" to confess); Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. 410, 168 Eng. Rep. 1323 (Cr. Cas.
Res. 1834) (promise not to prosecute); Rex v. Upchurch, 1 Mood. 465, 168 Eng. Rep.
1346 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1836) (promise to spare suspect's life if he confessed); Queen v.
Garbett, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 448 (Ex. 1847) (witness in civil case was ordered to answer
incriminating questions, presumably on threat of jail).
301 See Queen v. Garbett, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. (Ex. 1847); Rex v. Gilham, 1 Mood.
186, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1828); Rex v. Enoch, 5 Car. & P. 539, 172 Eng.
Rep. 1089 (Oxford Cir. 1833).
302 See Reg. v. Scott, 1 Dears. & Bell 47, 51, 169 Bng. Rep. 909, 911 (Cr. Cas. Res.
1856) ("ITihe common law principle [is] that a man is not bound to criminate himself, and
that whatever he says in the nature of admission or confession must be voluntary to be
admissible."). This suggests that the involuntariness rule is nemo tenetur's exclusionary rule.
See infra notes 453-54 and accompanying text.
303 See Rex v. Gilham, 1 Mood. 186, 191-92, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1237 (Cr. Cas.
Res. 1828) (magistrate advised suspect that he did not have to make a statement); id. at 203,
Eng. Rep. at 1241 (concession by prosecution that examination of suspect on oath by
magistrate would violate nemo tenetur); Rex v. Walter, 7 Car. & P. 267, 173 Eng. Rep.
118 (Norfolk Cir. 1836) (suspect declined to testify at examination); Rex v. Haworth, 4
Car. & P. 254, 172 Eng. Rep. 693 (Northern Cir. 1830) (suspect made incriminating
statement at examination; statement held admissible on ground that suspect could have
objected at the examination, but did not); see also Reg. v. Sloggett, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139
(Eng. Crim. App. 1856) (same; statement made at bankruptcy examination); Queen v.
Garbett, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 448 (Ex. 1847) (statement unlawfully compelled at bankruptcy
examination inadmissible in subsequent criminal trial).
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issue.3 04 Nor does any case discuss whether nemo is applicable to questioning
by the police, an important issue which we must eventually confront.
The treatises of the late-18th to mid-19th centuries are only slightly more
illuminating than the cases. 305 All of the cited works discuss the rule excluding
involuntary confessions; most of them also have a separate discussion of the
nemo tenetur doctrine.306 Regarding involuntariness, all of the cited works are
concerned with confessions as opposed to guilty pleas, and with admissibility
as opposed to weight.307 Those that discuss the issue say that the exclusion of
304 The cases from which an inference may be drawn include all of the cases cited in
the preceding note except Rex v. Walter. Also included is Rex v. Wilson, 1 Holt 597, 171
Eng. Rep. 353 (C.P. 1817). Of the cases cited in the preceding note, Garbett most clearly
supports the inference that a compelled confession is inadmissible by virtue of the nemo
tenetur doctrine itself rather than by force of some independent requirement of
voluntariness.
305 Among the sources I consulted, are the following, listed in chronological order: 1
RICHARD BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (London, A. Strahan, John Burn ed., 1797)
[hereinafter BURN 1]; 2 EDWARD H. EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London, A. Strahan
1803); 1 LEONARD MACNALLY, EVIDENCE (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1804); 1 CHIrrTY,
supra note 128; S. M. PHILLIPS, EVIDENCE (New York, Gould, Banks & Gould 1816)
[hereinafter PHILLIPS 1]; 1 & 2 THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE (London, I & W.T. Clarke
1824); 2 WILLAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London, Sweet; Pheney; Maxwell;
and Stevens & Sons, 8th ed. 1824); 1 S. MARCH PHILLIPS, EVIDENCE (London, A.
Strahan, 7th ed. 1829) [hereinafter PHILLIPS I]; HENRY H. JOY, ADMISSBMILIY OF
CONFESSIONS (Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1843); 1 & 2 RICHARD BURN, JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE (London, Sweet; Maxwell & Son; and Stevens & Norton, 29th ed. 1845)
[hereinafter BURN 11]; 2 SIR WI!LLAM 0. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS (Philadelphia, T. & I.W. Johnson, 5th Am. ed. 1845); 1 JOHN P.
TAYLOR, EVIDENCE (London, A. Maxwell & Son 1848). I also consulted a few sources
published during the second half of the 19th century: JAMES F. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, MacMillan 1876) [hereinafter STEPHEN, DIGEST]; 1
STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81.
306 1 BURN I, supra note 305, at 451 (involuntary confessions), 654 (nene tenetur); 1
BURN If, supra note 305, at 868-76 (involuntary confessions); 2 id. at 454-56 (neno
tenetur); 1 CHrrrY, supra note 128, at 570-72 (involuntary confessions), 620-21 (nen
tenetur); 2 HAWKINS, supra note 305, at 594-95 (involuntary confessions), 604 (neno
tenetur); MACNALLY, supra note 305, at 37-52 (imvoluntary confessions), 256-61 (neno
tenetur); PHILLIPS I, supra note 305, at 80-83 (involuntary confessions), 205-08 (nen
tenetur); 1 PHILLIPS II, supra note 305, at 110-19 (involuntary confessions), 276-84 (nen
tenetur); 2 RUSSELL, supra note 305, at 824-71 (involuntary confessions), 925-31 (nene
tenetur); 1 STARKIE, supra note 305, at 105-06 (nemo tenetur); 2 id. at 48-54 (involuntary
confessions); STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 305, at 28-31, 145-46 (involuntary
confessions), 117-18 (neno tenetur); 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 446-47
(involuntary confessions), 342, 440 (nemo tenetur); 1 TAYLOR, supra note 305, at 579-98
(involuntary confessions), 969-77 (neno tenetur).
307 See, e.g., 1 BURNI, supra note 305, at 451; 2 STARKIE, supra note 305, at 48, 51;
1 TAYLOR, supra note 305, at 582, 586.
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putatively unreliable evidence is the reason for excluding involuntary
confessions.3 08
Regarding nemo tenetur, those that discuss the issue treat the doctrine as
applicable to examinations by magistrates. 3°9 However, none of the cited
works discusses whether nemo tenetur is applicable to questioning by the
police.
Only one work directly addresses the crucial question of whether the rule
that makes involuntary confessions inadmissible comes from the nemo tenetur
doctrine or is independent of it. Taylor's treatise on evidence states:
Though torture was thus formally abolished before the middle of the
seventeenth century, it was not till after the lapse of many years that the
common law doctrine, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, was duly recognised, or
at least was interpreted to mean, as it does in the present day, that all
confessions should be strictly voluntary .... 310
Taylor quite clearly does not see the two doctrines as distinct. Rather, nemo
tenetur is the source of the involuntariness rule. However, Taylor cites no
authority for his position, ignoring the support that Gilbert's treatise might
have provided.
None of the remaining works directly addresses the question of whether
there is a relationship between the two doctrines. A few, however, suggest by
indirection that there is a relationship. MacNally states that a purpose of nemo
tenetur is to outlaw torture;3 "1 that the stricture against torture serves the goal
of reliability;312 and that the exclusion of involuntary confessions serves the
same goal. 3 13 Thus, he perceives the doctrines as functionally equivalent.
Chitty's treatise discusses the doctrines in the same breath, as though they were
parts of the same whole.314 Finally, Starkie's treatise, in the course of a
discussion of the involuntariness rule, states that "[t]he prisoner is not to be
examined [by the magistrate] upon oath for this would be a species of duress,
and a violation of the maxim, that no one is bound to criminate himself." 3 15
None of these sources, it should be noted, cites any authority for suggesting a
relationship between the two doctrines.
30 8 See, e.g., 1 CH=rY, supra note 128, at 85; 2 RUSSELL, supra note 305, at 824.
309 See, e.g., 1 CHi, supra note 128, at 84-85; 1 TAYLOR, supra note 305, at
598-99, 607.
310 1 TAYLOR, supra note 305, at 599.
311 MACNALLY, supra note 305, at 275.
3 12 Id.
313 Id. at42, 44, 47.
314 1 CHrrY, supra note 128, at 84.
315 2 STARKiE, supra note 305, at 52.
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Taken as a whole, the cases and treatises up to 1850 do not settle the
question of whether the involuntariness rule and nemo tenetur are separate and
distinct doctrines in English law.3 16 Nor do they even address the question of
whether nemo tenetur is applicable to police interrogation. These questions,
therefore, remain open for speculation and debate.
H. America
1. Compelled Self-Incrimination
In the colonies and states, the story of the right against compulsory self-
incrimination and the rule barring involuntary confessions is not the story of a
single jurisdiction, as in England, but of many. However, relatively little is
known about legal history in any colony, a phenomenon caused in part by the
fact that colonial cases were not published and other printed materials were
sparse. 317
The earliest recorded suggestion that compulsory self-incrimination might
be improper occurred in 1637 in Massachusetts, "where Puritan statecraft,
religion, and intolerance could be practiced in a way never possible in
England."3 18 As a result of his unorthodox religious views, minister John
Wheelwright was called for examination by the General Court, a colonial
legislature which also exercised judicial authority. Having created a stir by
loosely using the words "ex officio," the Court hastened to assure Wheelwright
that he would not be examined "by any compulsory means, as by oath,
imprisonment, or the like."319 Later, Deputy-Governor John Winthrop told a
recalcitrant Wheelwright that a particular question was not intended "to draw
matter from himselfe whereupon to proceed against him." 320 The reactions of
the Court and Winthrop show an awareness of the English struggle for a right
against compulsory self-incrimination.
316 The same is true of later materials. Judge Stephen sees the involuntariness doctrine
as beginning with a stricture against torture. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 447.
He also says that the nemo tenetur maxim "condemned the practice of torture." Id. at 440.
Thus, he sees a link between the two doctrines, but he does not explore it. In his Digest of
the Law of Evidence, Stephen treats the case of Queen v. Garbett, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 448
(Ex. 1847), as involving an involuntary confession. STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 305, at
31. By contrast, Wigmore treats the same case as involving a violation of the nemo tenetur
maxim. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 850, at 519. This suggests that, at the very least, the
two doctrines have overlapping coverage, even if they are separate.3 17 LEVY, supra note 13, at 334-35.
318 Id. at 339-40.
319 Id. at 342.
320 Id.
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The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere was used as early as 1642 in
Massachusetts and a bit later in other colonies. 321 As in England, it was used
more in connection with the proceedings of prerogative courts than of common
law courts, 322 and its invocation served a variety of functions. It was used to
ward off perceived religious oppression,323 was a response to efforts to conduct
on-oath examinations, 324 and was a way of insisting that a person should not be
subjected to the bother of an examination unless charged by a known
accuser.325 It was also a way of saying that torture was unlawful; 326 thus, the
maxim served the additional function of avoiding unreliable evidence.327
Although the maxim was known in the colonies, its assertion was honored
as often in the breach as in the observance.328 "As the seventeenth century
closed, the right against self-incrimination was uncertainly founded in
America," 329 but the eighteenth century brought changes. In 1735, Benjamin
Franklin characterized it as one of the "common Rights of Mankind." 330 As
time passed, English law books touting the wisdom of the right became
available in some of the colonies. 331 Although "[t]he record remains
incomplete... there is now sufficient evidence to establish the claim that the
right was well known to the average colonist by the early 1770s. Indeed,
colonies and motherland differed little if at all on the right by 1776. "332
After the Revolution, the protection against compulsory self-incrimination
took on a new dimension. Previously a common law right, it became
321 See id at 346-47 (Massachusetts), 357 (New York), 359 (Pennsylvania).
3 2 2 See id at 367, 377, 379-80.
323 See id. at 351, 357.
324 See id. at 346, 347, 353, 358, 378, 381-82.
325 See id at 341,360-61.
326 See id. at 345, 354-55.
327 See id. at 347; see also State v. Hobbs, 2 Tyl. *382, *382-*83 (Vt. 1803) (dictum
that state constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination prohibits torture and
makes a torture-induced confession inadmissible because of its doubtful reliability).
328 The details are spelled out in LEVY, supra note 13, at 333-67.
329 Id. at 367.
3 30 Id. at 383. Franklin's characterization was in a losing cause. See id.
331 See id. at 371-72. Professor Levy's reference is to Baron Gilbert's treatise on
evidence, which was in the possession of a New York lawyer in 1753. That treatise, it will
be remembered, regarded nemo tenetur as the source of the inadmissibility of involuntary
confessions. See supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text. The availability of Gilbert's
treatise on this side of the Atlantic meant that at least some colonial lawyers had to have an
inkling of the inadmissibility of involuntary confessions decades before prohibitions against
compulsory self-incrimination were put into state constitutions and the Federal Bill of
Rights.
332 Milton Cantor, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 498, 506 (1969) (reviewing
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINs OF THE Furm AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION (1968)). See LEVY, supra note 13, at 404.
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constitutionalized. "[E]very state having a separate bill of rights protected the
right against self-incrimination." 333 On September 15, 1791, ratification of the
federal bill of rights was completed and a prohibition of compulsory self-
incrimination became a part of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Patrick Henry made one of the arguments in favor of
constitutionalization: without a constitutional protection, Congress might
introduce the practice of torture to obtain confessions. 334
Early on, self-incrimination issues arose in both federal and state cases. As
in England during the same period, the protection was held applicable to
magistrates' examinations, 335 and in any setting it was given a generous
interpretation. 336 It is interesting to note that the cases did not involve
333 LEVY, supra note 13, at 412.
334 See id. at 418; see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 188
(1956).
335 See Trial of Northampton Insurgents (Fries' Case) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799), in FRANCIS
WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
WASHINGTON AND ADAMs 458, 535 (Philadelphia, Carey & Hart 1849) (magistate
testified that it was his constant practice to advise prisoner "that he is not bound to be
evidence against himself"); State v. Harman, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 567 (1839-42) (suspect has
the option of declining to sign a confession at magistrate's examination); State v. Eaton, 3
Del. (3 Harr.) 554 (Oyer & Term. 1840) (suspect refused to sign confession at magistrate's
hearing); William Goldsby's Case, 1 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 81, 82 (N.Y. Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1816) (dictum that accused, examined by a police magistrate, has right to remain
silent); JOHN C.B. DAVIS, THE MASSACHUSEmS JUSTICE 243 (Worcester, Warren Lazell
1847) (magistrate should advise prisoner "that he is not bound either to accuse himself, or
confess his guilt"); WILLIAM W. HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 188 (Richmond,
Johnson, 2d ed. 1810) (neither common law nor Virginia statutory law justifies examining a
prisoner "in order to convict him"); RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF
A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE EXPLAINED AND DIGESTED 146 (Williamsburg 1774) (P should
not ask "any questions the answering to which might oblige [the prisoner] to accuse himself
of a crime"); see also HUGH RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL
COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 77 (1965) (prisoner was "allowed" to make a statement at
preliminary examination); Kauper, supra note 122, at 1235-36 (attributes the waning of the
magistrate's examination of the accused to the acceptance of the nemo principle).
336 ee United States v. Goosley, 25 F. Cas. 1363 (C.C.D. Va. circa 1790) (No.
15,230) (court gratuitously protected witness against incriminating question); Starr v. Tracy,
2 Root 528 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1797) (impermissible to compel witness to testify against his
civil interest); Simons v. Payne, 2 Root 406 (Conn. 1796) (same); Vaughn v. Perrine, 3
NJ.L. 299 (1811) (right protects against disclosure of matters that would dishonor or
disgrace the witness); State v. Bailly, 2 N.J.L. 396 (Oyer & Term. 1807) (same); Bellinger
v. People, 8 Wend. 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (gratuitous protection of witness by trial
court); Hagerman's Case, 3 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 73 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1818)
(same); Galbreath v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates 515 (Pa. 1803) (privilege protects against
disclosure that would dishonor or disgrace the witness); Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429
(Pa. 1802) (same).
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jurisdictional disputes with prerogative courts, religious persecution, religious
aversion to swearing, or secret accusation by unknown accusers. Rather,
compulsory self-incrimination, unglossed by any collateral concern, was
regarded as "cruel and unjust." 337
2. Admissibility of Confessions
Tracing the development of the rule barring the admissibility of involuntary
confessions is complicated by the paucity of materials relating to colonial
America. 338 It is reasonably clear, however, that colonial lawyers were aware
of some of the antecedents of the English rule and some of the strands in the
immediate development of that rule. The requirement that a plea of guilty be
voluntary in order to displace the two-witness requirement as proof of treason
was referred to in Pennsylvania cases in 1778 and 1781. 339 Even before that
era, however, colonial lawyers were using English treatises such as Hale and
Gilbert that discussed a requirement of voluntariness. 34° The first uniquely
American reference I have found is Starke's manual for justices of the peace in
Virginia. Published in 1774, it states, "And this examination being voluntary
and sworn by the justice to be truly taken, may be given in evidence against the
party confessing but not against others." 341
Notwithstanding statements in treatises, however, the earliest reported
American cases show more concern for weight than for admissibility. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Dillon,342 the suspect's confession had been
induced by promises and threats. Friends promised to help the suspect obtain a
pardon if he confessed. Other persons, referred to in the opinion as "jail
inspectors," threatened to confine him in a dungeon without food. The court
submitted the confession to the jury with an instruction regarding weight.
Apparently disbelieving the confession, the jury acquitted the defendant. 343 A
few years later, in State v. Long,344 the Superior Court of North Carolina took
33 7 Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 437 (Pa. 1802).
338 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
339 Respublica v. Roberts, 1 Dall. *39 (Pa. 1778); Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86
(Pa. 1781).
3 40 See JUIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND McNAUGHTON, LAw ENFORCEMENT
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 284, 628 n.79, 642, 647-48 (1944); LEVY, supra note 13, at
370-72.
341 STARKE, supra note 335, at 115.
3 42 4 Dall. 116 (Pa. 1792).
343 See also State v. Moore, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) *482 (Super. Ct. 1797). Private
persons used force to obtain the defendant's confession which led to tangible evidence.
Although the opinion is not clear, it appears that the court submitted the confession to the
jury.
344 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) *456 (Super. Ct. 1797).
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a small step in the direction of inadmissibility. Three days after a horse
disappeared, two men brought the horse and Long to the owner. The men had
apparently tried Long. In their presence, Long admitted stealing the horse. The
men were not called as witnesses, a circumstance suspiciously suggesting that
they had used force or threat to induce his confession. Although Long's
confession was partially corroborated by the fact of the horse's absence, the
court told the jury that the confession was uncorroborated and recommended an
acquittal.
Although no American case had as yet squarely held an involuntary
confession to be inadmissible, an 1803 manual for justices of the peace in New
York, relying on Hale's treatise and Warickshall, flatly stated that a confession,
"whether made upon an official examination, or in discourse with private
persons, which is obtained from a defendant, either by the promise offavor or
by threats, is not admissible evidence." 345 Within a year came the first
American case, Commonwealth v. Chabbock,346 holding inadmissible a
confession that had been induced by the victim's "promise of favor."347 Three
years after Chabbock, a New York court, in People v. Rankin,348 excluded a
confession that had been induced by a police officer who said, "[I]f you do not
tell all you know about the [poisoning], you will be put in the dark room and
hanged." Chabbock and Rankin mark the case-law origin of the involuntary
confession rule in the United States. By 1810, writers in Virginia and
Connecticut regarded it as settled that a confession was inadmissible if obtained
by promises or threats. 349 Although a few courts occasionally submitted
questionable confessions to juries,350 after 1810 it was a firmly accepted
345 ANONYMOUS, A NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 152-53 (Albany, P. & S.
Whiting 1803) [hereinafter CONDUCTOR GENERAUIS].
346 1 Mass. *144 (1804).
347 Id. Chabbock is the first American case I have found in which a confession was
held inadmissible for any reason. Chabbock was preceded in Massachusetts by
Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. *95 (1804), in which the court, before accepting a plea
of guilty to capital rape, asked whether the plea had been induced by "promises,
persuasions, or hopes of pardon." Id. at *96. Thus, the development of the involuntariness
rule in Massachusetts mirrored the English development in that antecedent to both was a
concern for the voluntariness of guilty pleas.
348 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 467, 469 (N.Y. Oyer & Term. 1807). Rankin is the first
American case I have found in which the involuntariness rule was applied to a confession
obtained by a police officer.
349 WHLLIAM W. HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 188-89 (Richmond, Johnson
1810); ZEPHANIAH Swir, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE 131-32 (Hartford, Oliver
D. Cooke 1810). Swift was a judge of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Both works cite only
English authorities.
350 See Stage's Case, 5 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 177 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1820)
(threat by victim to have suspect jailed if he did not confess); Bowerhan's Case, 4 City Hall
Recorder (Rogers) 136 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1819) (victim promised to intercede with
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common law rule of evidence in the United States that a confession was
inadmissible if obtained by a promise or threat.351 Courts then began to refine
the rule by resolving a variety of closer issues such as whether the
grand jury if suspect confessed); Williams' Case, 1 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 149 (N.Y.
Ct. Gen. Sess. 1816) (unspecified person threatened to jail suspect if he did not confess). In
Williams, the jury acquitted the suspect. In the other two cases, the suspect was convicted,
but it is impossible to tell whether the jury relied on the confession. These three cases may
be the origin of the so-called "New York rule" which was held unconstitutional in Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), on the ground that the jury could not be trusted to exclude
from its consideration an involuntary, but believable, confession.
351 In chronological order, the inadmissibility cases from 1810 through 1850 are
Jackson's Case, 1 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 28 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1816) (victim
promised not to prosecute; confession inadmissible, but tangible property to which
confession led, admissible); State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. *231 (1818) (saying to suspect that it
would be better to tell the truth construed as a promise of benefit); Thorn's Case, 4 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) 81 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Seass. 1819) (bank president promised embezzler
that he would be allowed to turn state's evidence if he confessed); Milligan's Case, 6 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) 64 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1821) (victim promised not to prosecute);
United States v. Pocklington, 27 F. Cas. 580 (C.C.D.C. 1822) (No. 16,060) (magistrate
promised to try to get a light sentence for the suspect); People v. Robertson, 1 Wheeler
Crim. Cas. 66 (N.Y. Recorder's Ct. 1822) (constable told suspect's wife it would be better
if he confessed); United States v. Richard, 27 F. Cas. 798 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 16,154)
(unspecified promise; tangible evidence admissible); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.)
*259 (1827) (promise that confession would be inadmissible); State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163,
167 (1828) (promise that suspect "would probably get clear" and that it would be "better"
to confess); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166 (1829) (torture by persons unconnected with case);
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477 (1830) (dictum regarding confession
made in hope of becoming state's witness); State v. Brick, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 530 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1835) (suspect told it would be better if he confessed; confession inadmissible, but
tangible evidence admissible); People v. Ward, 15 Wend. 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)
(magistrate said it would be better for suspect to confess); State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116 (1839)
(shareholder of bank promised suspect favorable treatment); Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. (2
Hum.) 39 (1840) (promise to try to induce victim to drop prosecution); Peter v. State, 7
Miss. (4 S. & M.) *31 (1844) (persons unconnected with case threatened to hang suspect);
State v. Bostick, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (1845) (suspect's mistress promised that there would
be no prosecution); Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269 (1846) (magistrate threatened to
commit suspect and told her it would be better to tell the truth); State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala.
*57 (1847) (slave whipped by owner); State v. Nelson, 22, 3 La. Ann. *497 (1848) (son of
suspect's employer said it would be better to confess); Couley v. State, 12 Mo. *462 (1849)
(police officer said that it would be better for the suspect to confess and that the officer
would not divulge the confession); Spence v. State, 17 Ala. *192 (1850) (slave who had
invariably been whipped for misconduct confessed after being tied and left with third
person; held that trial court should have permitted defendant to prove that he had been
whipped on prior occasions); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 60 Mass. (5 Cush.) 605 (1850)
(police officer said he would try to help suspect).
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administration of an oath was coercive; 352 whether an inducement made much
earlier was still effective when the suspect confessed;353 whether, assuming the
inadmissibility of the suspect's confession, a subsequent confession was also
inadmissible;354 whether the promise emanated from a person in authority;355
and whether tangible evidence was admissible if discovered as a result of an
inadmissible confession.356
The involuntariness rule was not narrow. As the cases synopsized in note
351 indicate, it applied to confessions obtained by magistrates, police officers,
and even nongovernmental actors.357 Why were confessions excluded under
this rule? Although many of the early cases ignored this question, it is clear
that the overriding concern, as under the English rule, was that a confession
might be false if induced by promises or threats.358
Whether the nemo tenetur doctrine also plays a part in the rationale of
exclusion was indirectly addressed by two of the American cases. In
Commonwealth v. Drake,359 the defendant confessed to fellow church members
that he had committed an act of gross lewdness. Then he sought to exclude the
confession from criminal proceedings on the ground that church discipline
352 State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) *96 (1846) (administration of oath not
coercive because witness had right to refuse to answer incriminating questions).
353 State v. Potter, 18 Conn. *166 (1846) (effect of inducement dissipated after several
days).
354 State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 167 (1828) (admissible); Milligan's Case, 6 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) 64 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1821) (admissible); State v. Roberts, 12
N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827) inadmissible).
355 State v. Harman, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 567 (circa 1840).
356 The answer was invariably yes. See United States v. Richard, 27 F. Cas. 798
(C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 16,154); State v. Brick, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 530 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1835);
Jackson's Case, 1 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 28 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1816).
357 The cases synopsized in note 351, supra, also indicate that the phenomenon of
examination by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing was as established on this side of the
Atlantic as in England. See also 3 HENING'S VA. STATS. AT LARGE 389-92 (New York,
R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823) (1705 statute directed that justice of the peace should examine
suspects); CONDUCrOR GENERALIS, supra note 345, at 152; SrARKE, supra note 335, at
114; GEORGE H.F. WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHoRIrY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
109 (1969 reprint) (1736). In early colonial times, long before the firm recognition of the
nemo tenetur doctrine and the creation of the involuntariness rule, magistrates apparently
used considerable pressure to induce suspects to confess, as they did in England. See LEVY,
supra note 13, at 346-47, 355; Kauper, supra note 122, at 1224, 1235-36 (1932). By 1850,
the practice of judicial examination had waned on both sides of the Atlantic. See Kauper,
supra note 122, at 1233-34, 1236.
358 See, e.g., State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171 (1842). This concern also appears in
decisions holding that tangible evidence is admissible even though derived from an
involuntary confession. See also cases cited supra note 356; CONDUCrOR GENERALis,
supra note 345, at 152-53; DAVIS, supra note 335, at 242, 244, 245.
359 15 Mass. *161 (1818).
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enjoined upon him the obligation of confessing. The court held the confession
voluntary and admissible, apparently accepting the Solicitor-General's
argument which equated the absence of compulsion under nemo tenetur with
voluntariness: "[No legal or constitutional principle was violated by the
admission of the evidence objected to. The declaration of rights has provided
that no subject shall be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself.
Here was no compulsion. The confession was purely voluntary." 360 A similar
equation appears in State v. Broughton.361 Broughton testified under oath at a
grand jury inquiry that another person had committed murder. Broughton's
testimony also incriminated himself, and he was indicted. When the prosecutor
tried to use his grand jury testimony against him at trial, Broughton objected on
the ground that being placed under oath made his testimony involuntary. The
court held that Broughton's answers were voluntary. He had a right not to
answer incriminating questions even though he had been placed under oath.
Consequently, the oath did not impair the voluntariness of his answers. 362
Notwithstanding the equation in Drake and Broughton of the absence of
compulsion under the nemo tenetur doctrine with voluntariness, in the
confession-rule sense, it would be wrong to conclude that American courts saw
a relationship between the two. Of the nearly forty reported cases involving the
admissibility of confessions decided by American courts through 1850, Drake
and Broughton are the only ones in which the equation is made. The remaining
cases say nothing about whether nemo tenetur is the doctrinal basis for
excluding involuntary confessions or whether exclusion is independently
based.363 However, just as it would be inappropriate to base an argument
solely on Drake and Broughton, so also would it be unwise to infer from the
silence of most courts that a relationship was denied. Similarly, mere silence
cannot suffice to establish that nemo tenetur was regarded as inapplicable to
police interrogation. With reference to both questions, therefore, the American
360 Id. at *162.
36129 N.C. (7 Ired.) *96 (1846).
3 62 Broughton is similar both factually and in result to two English cases of the same
era, Rex v. Haworth, 4 Car. & P. 253, 172 Eng. Rep. 694 (Northern Cir. 1830), and Rex
v. Sloggett, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856). The English cases are
synopsized supra in the text accompanying note 303. The linkage in Broughton is also
reminiscent of the statement in Gilbert's treatise. See supra text accompanying note 277.
363 In addition to the cases cited supra in notes 347, 348, 351, 354-55 and 357 see
Johnson's Trial, 2 Am. St. Tr. 512 (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Term. 1824) (suspect was made to
touch deceased's body; subsequent confession held uncoerced); State v. Cowan, 29 N. C. (7
Ired.) *239 (1847) (magistrate truthfully said that he would have to commit suspect unless
suspect could satisfactorily account for his possession of recently stolen property; held that
the statement was not a threat); State v. Moore, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) *482 (Super. Ct. 1797)
(confession obtained by force exerted by private persons; confession led to tangible
evidence; confession submitted to jury).
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cases through 1850 are like their English counterparts. They settle nothing and
leave the crucial issues open to speculation and debate.
III. HISTORY AND BEYOND: Is THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
COMMON LAW EXCLUSION OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS AND THE
COMMON LAW PROTECTION AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-
INCRVIMNATION?
A. Introduction: Wigmore's Position
Dean Wigmore has made the strongest argument that the involuntary
confession rule and nemo tenetur are distinct doctrines. Although recognizing
some similarity between the two, he states in his discussion of confessions:
[A] confession is not rejected because of any connection with the privilege
against self-crimination. The circumstances that this privilege protects against a
disclosure which is compulsory, and that one of the tests for a confession is
whether it is voluntary or not, have naturally led to the occasional use of both
arguments at once by counsel in opposing the use of such a confession; but the
Courts have properly kept the two principles distinctly apart. Thus where a
compulsory disclosure is offered, it may be admissible so far as the privilege
against self-incrimination is concerned, and yet the question of its propriety as
a confession may be raised [citing R. v. Sloggett. .. ]; while it may be
inadmissible on both grounds [citing R. v. Garbett... ]. Moreover, where the
privilege has been violated, there is no need of resorting to confessional
principles to exclude it, since the theory of the privilege itself suffices to
prevent the use of evidence obtained in consequence of such a violation.
Finally, that the theory of confessions has no connection with the theory of this
privilege is shown by the prevailing doctrine that testimony obtained by
violation of the privilege cannot be objected to as such unless it is being used
against the person thus disclosing. The sum and substance of the difference is
that the confession rule aims to exclude self-criminating statements which are
false, while the privilege-rule gives the option of excluding those which are
true. The two are complementary to each other in that respect, and therefore
cannot be coincident ....
That the two rules should be supposed to have something of a common
spirit or principle is a not unnatural error. But that history should be rashly
tampered with by asserting any common origin is inexcusable .... The
history of the two rules . . . shows that there never was any historical
connection or association between the constitutional clause and the confession-
doctrine.3 64
364 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 337 n.2 (brackets and italics in original;
some citations and textual cross-references omitted). The quoted passage, which appears in
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Wigmore expands the attack in his discussion of compulsory self-incrimination:
The nile excluding confessions and the rule giving a privilege against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination are sometimes not kept plainly apart.
This is natural enough, for . . . they [have] the common feature of an
acknowledgement of guilty facts ....
That the history of the two principles is wide apart, differing by one
hundred years in origin, and derived through separate lines of precedents,
appears sufficiently from a survey of the two histories as already set forth. If
the privilege, fully established in 1680, had sufficed for both classes of cases,
there would have been no need in 1780 for creating the distinct rule about
confessions.
So fir as concerns practice, the two doctrines have not the same
boundaries. The privilege covers only disclosures made under legal
compulsion; the confessions rule covers statements made anywhere, including
statements made in court. The confessions rule is broader, because it may
exclude statements which are obtained by promises as well as by compulsion.
Where the privilege is waived or not claimed, the confession rule may still
operate to exclude. Where the privilege is nullified by statute (as it has been by
the English Bankruptcy Act), the confession rule may still operate. Where the
testimony, though given under oath, does not violate the confession rule, it
may still involve a violation of the privilege. The privilege applies to witnesses
as such, in civil and criminal cases, but the confession rule is concerned only
with party defendants in criminal cases. A party defendant is protected by the
confession rule against the use of his own statements only; but the privilege is
applicable also to witnesses during his trial .... 365
Wigmore's revisers have tempered his position in light of relatively recent
developments, but even they maintain that Wigmore was historically correct.
Thus, Professor Chadbourn, who revised the chapter on confessions, states that
Wigrnore's view, "while accurate as a summary of common-law theories, does
not suffice as a synthesis of doctrines current today." 366 Wigmore, Chadbourn
continues, accurately concluded that there was no historical connection between
the exclusion of confessions and nemo tenetur, but, as a result of Miranda, "it
can no longer be said that a confession is not rejected because of any
connection with the privilege against self-crimination."367 Professor
a footnote in the current edition, revised by Professor Chadboum, is from Wigmore's third
edition, 1940. The words are, therefore, Wigmore's, not Chadboum's.
365 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 400-01 (footnotes and textual cross-
references omitted). The quoted passage is a slight revision by Professor McNaughton of
what Dean Wigmore said in the third edition of his treatise. C. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2266, at 387-88 (3d ed. 1940).
366 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 338.
367 Id. at 340.
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McNaughton, who revised the chapter on self-incrimination, states that the
constitutionalization of the confession rule has spawned theories of exclusion
that have nothing to do with putative unreliability. These theories "are quite
similar to those underlying the privilege against self-incrimination," 368
and it is therefore understandable that the privilege has been invoked as a basis
for excluding confessions. McNaughton, however, rues this development.
Rather than using the privilege, he urges courts to exclude trustworthy
confessions, if at all, only when the conduct that produced them is so egregious
as to shock the conscience of the court and thus violate due process of law.369
I shall later discuss the constitutionalization of the confession rule in the
United States and the effect of recent decisions. 370 For the moment, however, I
am interested only in whether Wigmore correctly concluded that the two
common law doctrines have "no connection" 371 and that they should be kept
"plainly"372 and "distinctly apart." 373 Although Wigmore compares the
histories, operations, and objectives of the common law protections, his
analysis is dominated by a comparison of operations. However, his emphasis is
misplaced. That the protections operate differently does not necessarily
establish that they have no connection. After all, even closely related rules may
function in different ways. Because Wigmore's operational concerns are not
necessarily crucial, I shall deal briefly with them at the outset and then turn my
attention to Wigmore's rather stinted comparison of the histories and objectives
of the common law protections.
B. Wignore's Position Evaluated
1. Operations
"The privilege covers only disclosures made under legal compulsion; the
confessions rule covers statements made anywhere, including statements made
in court." 374
Wigmore is really saying that the privilege does not apply to police
interrogation, but the confession rule does. As he elsewhere puts the point,
"Since police have no legal right to compel answers [by citing for contempt],
there is no legal obligation to which a privilege in the technical sense can
368 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 402.
369 Id. See also id. § 2184a, at 48-51 para. 2.
370 See infra Part IV.
371 3 WiGmoRE, supra note 80, § 823, at 338 n.2.
372 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 400.
373 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 337 n.2.
374 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
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apply." 375 Whether there is anything in the common law privilege that would
make it inapplicable to police interrogation is an important question which I
want to reserve for discussion later in this Article. 376 Hence, I shall put it aside
for the moment.
Wigmore may also be saying that the privilege protects only against official
or governmental action, but the common law confession rule protects against
the actions of private parties. This dichotomy implicates the objectives of both
protections, a matter which I shall also discuss later in some detail. 377
The privilege applies to witnesses as such, in civil and criminal cases, but the
confession rule is concerned only with party defendants in criminal cases. A
party defendant is protected by the confession rule against the use of his own
statements only; but the privilege is applicable also to witnesses during his
trial .... 378
This argument is a sleight-of-hand trick that misrepresents the operations of
both the privilege and the confession rule. The privilege is, in the first instance,
a tool in the hands of a witness to fend off an interrogator (i.e., to keep from
answering a question or to avoid a punishment for not answering). Excluding
evidence is but a secondary function of the privilege. On the other hand, the
confession rule, in its primary operation, assumes the existence of a confession
and inquires only into admissibility. Another way of putting the point is that
the confession rule is primarily an exclusionary rule, but the privilege is not.
From what I have just said, it follows that the principal effect of the privilege is
to protect witnesses from compulsory self-incrimination in a variety of settings,
both civil and criminal, when they reasonably fear that they will become
defendants in criminal cases and their words will be used against them. Thus,
the privilege protects potential, criminal defendants. The secondary effect of
the privilege is to exclude evidence. Thus, the privilege protects actual
defendants. The privilege additionally protects actual defendants by barring the
prosecution from calling them as witnesses in their own criminal trials.379 The
confession rule also protects potential and actual criminal defendants. To the
extent that the confession rule influences and softens the tactics of interrogators
in dealing with suspects, it protects potential defendants. This is a secondary
effect. To the extent that it excludes confessions, it protects actual defendants.
This is the primary effect of the rule. Although their primary and secondary
effects are reversed, both the privilege and the confession rule protect potential
and actual criminal defendants. Neither the privilege nor the confession rule
375 I. § 2252, at 329 n.27.376 See infra Part V.
377 See infra notes 608-39 and accompanying text.
378 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
379 See id. § 2268, at 406-08.
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protects anyone else. Thus, although their operations are not identical, there is
considerably more similarity than Wigmore's misleading argument suggests.
Mhat the theory of confessions has no connection with the theory of this
privilege is shown by the prevailing doctrine that testimony obtained by
violation of the privilege cannot be objected to as such unless it is being used
against the person thus disclosing .... 380
On its face, this point is mystifyingly incomplete. The complete argument
would have to add, "But an involuntary confession can be objected to by
anyone against whom it is offered." The problem with the addendum is that it
is false. Wigmore himself states, and approves of, the rule that a confession by
a nonparty witness is not inadmissible on the ground of coercion.381 Indeed, he
makes the very point in his discussion of compulsory self-incrimination when
he tries to persuade the reader that the two common law protections are
different. As noted in connection with Wigmore's preceding argument,
Wigmore says, "A party defendant is protected by the confession rule against
the use of his own statements only. . ... "382 Hence, Wigmore's present
argument is footless. 383 Instead of discovering a difference, he has
inadvertently discovered a similarity and thereby subverted his own position.
Where the privilege is waived or not claimed, the confession rule may still
operate to exclude. Where the privilege is nullified by statute (as it has been by
the English Bankruptcy Act), the confession rule may still operate. Where the
testimony, though given under oath, does not violate the confession rule, it
may still involve a violation of the privilege.384
The first two illustrations of differences are true, but not relevant. The
third is relevant, but not true. In the first, Wigmore compares a case in which
the privilege has been waived with a case in which the confession rule has not
been waived. In the second, he compares a case in which the common law
privilege has been nullified by statute with a case in which the confession rule
remains unimpaired. Thus, Wigmore has stacked the deck. Given his scenarios,
380 3 WiGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 338 n.2 (textual cross-reference omitted).
381 See id. § 815, at 289-90. The cases are not unanimous. Compare People v.
Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (1965) (credibility of witness' testimony against defendant
properly submitted to jury even though witness had been beaten by police eight months
earlier) with Bradford v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curian,
476 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1973) (due process violated by the use against defendant of testimony
of witness who had been tortured by police three months before testifying).
382 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
383 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 495-97 & n.43. Professor Levy has carefully
analyzed a variety of Wigmore's arguments and finds them wanting.
384 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
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the protections will necessarily operate differently. The differences, however,
are caused by factors that are wholly extrinsic to the protections. These factors
say nothing about the protections themselves, and the illustrations are therefore
irrelevant to our discussion.
In connection with the third illustration (on-oath examination), it is
important to note that the oath to which Wigmore refers is not the oath ex
officio, which obligated the witness to answer. That oath was abolished almost
two hundred years before the cases on which Wigmore relies. Rather,
Wigmore is referring to the ordinary oath which obligates the witness to tell the
truth if he chooses to answer. During the early 1800s a few English courts did
exclude on-oath testimony that had been taken in preliminary or collateral
proceedings. However, in none of these cases was exclusion based explicitly on
the privilege. Rather, it was based either on an interpretation of the Marian
examination statutes or on some vaguely stated notion of involuntariness. 385
Thus, one of the premises of Wigrnore's third illustration (that on-oath
examination is violative of the privilege) is simply incorrect. "Thus where a
compulsory disclosure is offered, it may be admissible so far as the privilege
against self-incrimination is concerned, and yet the question of its propriety as
a confession may be raised [citing R. v. Sloggett... ] ... "386
Regina v. Sloggett387 involved an English bankruptcy statute that abrogated
nemo tenetur in certain bankruptcy examinations but did not purport to affect
the involuntary confession rule. Wigmore's present point, therefore, is merely
a more generalized statement of the second irrelevancy discussed immediately
above. It too is irrelevant. "[W]here the privilege has been violated, there is no
need of resorting to confessional principles to exclude it, since the theory of the
privilege itself suffices to prevent the use of evidence obtained in consequence
of such a violation." 388
Although true, this point actually disserves Wigmore's argument. All it
really says is that the privilege has the effect of excluding evidence that was
obtained in violation of the privilege. It says nothing about the confession rule
and does not compare the two protections in any way. If we supply the missing
links, we find that both the privilege and the confession rule operate to exclude
evidence. This is a similarity rather than a difference, and therefore undercuts
Wigmore's position, even though, as noted above, the exclusionary function is
385 The cases are discussed in 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, §§ 849-50 at 514-22.
Illustrative of the cases cited by Wigmore are Reg. v. Wheeley, 8 Car. & P. 250, 173 Eng.
Rep. 482 (Worces. Assizes 1838); Rex v. Rivers, 7 Car. & P. 177, 173 Eng. Rep. 78
(Oxford Cir. 1835); and Rex v. Lewis, 6 Car. & P. 161, 172 Eng. Rep. 1190 (Hereford
Assizes 1833). In each case the excluded confession had been made on oath by a suspect in
a preliminary proceeding. In none of the cases was exclusion based on the privilege.
386 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 337 n.2 (brackets in original).
387 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856).
388 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 337 n.2.
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secondary in the operation of the privilege and primary in the operation of the
confession rule.
Wigmore's operational analysis is unpersuasive. To a much greater extent
than he allows, the common law privilege and the confession rule operate in
similar fashion. Although there are differences, they are slight and do not
support his conclusion that the protections are distinct. Whether that conclusion
is supported by other considerations remains to be seen.
2. Histories
Although Wigmore separately discusses the histories of the privilege and
the confession rule in great detail, his comparison of the histories is rather
slight.
That the history of the two principles is wide apart, differing by one
hundred years in origin, and derived through separate lines of precedents,
appears sufficiently from a survey of the two histories as already set forth. If
the privilege, fully established in 1680, had sufficed for both classes of cases,
there would have been no need in 1780 for creating the distinct rule about
confessions. 3 89
The history of the two rules... shows that there never was any historical
connection or association between the constitutional clause and the confession-
doctrine.390
The historical difference that Wigmore perceived is illusory. In concluding
that "the history of the two principles is wide apart," Wigmore regarded
Warickshall (1783) as the origin of the confession rule ("there would have been
no need in 1780 for creating the distinct rule about confessions"). Warickshall,
however, was not the origin of the rule. Rather, it was the culmination of all of
the direct and collateral antecedents in the development of the rule. The direct
antecedents were Rudd's Case (1775), 391 Gilbert's treatise (1754),392 Lord
Carteret's statement in the House of Lords (1742), 393 the recorder's statement
in the Trial of Charles White (1741), 3 94 and Emlyn's revision of Hale's treatise
(1736).395 The collateral antecedents were the defense lawyer's argument in
Mico (1658),396 Hudson's treatise on the Star Chamber (ante 1635),397
389 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
390 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 338 n.2.
391 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775).
3 92 Supra note 276.
393 Supra note 275.
394 17 Howell's State Trials 1079 (1741).
395 Supra note 262.
396 -ardres 137, 139-40, 145 Eng. Rep. 419, 420-21 (Ex. 1658).
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Staundiford's treatise (1607),398 various trials between 1551 and 1645,3 99 and
the Edwardian treason statute (1547). 4m Although all of the direct antecedents
occurred after the emergence of the privilege, Mico and Hudson are of the era
that produced the privilege, and all of the earlier antecedents of the confession
rule coincided with various events in the development of the privilege. By
focussing on Warickshall and ignoring its antecedents, Wigmore was able to
paint a picture of two protections the histories of which were "wide apart."
Had he not ignored the antecedents, however, he would have discovered
overlapping histories.
Nor did Wigmore correctly conclude that there is no "historical
connection" between the privilege and the confession rule. Wigmore ignored
the fact that some of Warickshall's antecedents (Gilbert's treatise, Mico,
Hudson's treatise, and, perhaps, Carteret) claim that the requirement of
voluntariness, whatever it may mean, derived from the nemo tenetur
doctrine.40 1 Of equal, if not greater, importance, Wigmore also ignored the fact
that the historical backdrop against which both the privilege and the confession
rule developed contained the common ground of torture.
Our earlier foray into the history of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination leaves no doubt that torture was a part of the backdrop against
which the privilege developed. During Mary's reign, people were burned
merely for refusal to take the oath ex officio.40 2 Efforts to assert a privilege
began to gather momentum during the Elizabethan era.403 This was the very
period in which torture was at its peak.4 4 Indeed, one of the important cases in
the development of privilege-Thomas Tresham's Case-arose as a result of the
torture of an accomplice.40 5 The threatened torture of Felton preceded the
Lilburne saga by only nine years. 40 6 Lilburne himself was whipped and
3 97 Supra note 243.
398 Supra note 182.
399 Trial of Lord Macguire, 6 Cobbett's State Trials 654 (1645); Trial of Sir
Christopher Blunt, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1409 (1600); Duke of Norfolk's Trial, 1
Cobbett's State Trials 957 (1571); Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 515
(1551).
400 An Act for the Repeal of Certain Statutes Concerning Treason and Felonies, 1547,
1 Edw. 6, ch. 12 (Eng.); 5 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 259 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
401 See supra notes 240-43,275, 276 and accompanying text.
402 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
403 See supra notes 85-117 and accompanying text.
404 See LANGBEIN, TORTURE, supra note 33, at 134. The emergence of the privilege
and the decline of torture also occurred during roughly the same period-the era of the
Commonwealth. See id. at 135. Whether the former caused the latter is a matter of dispute.
Id. It is possible that both derived from the same libertarian impulses. See LEVY, supra note
13, at 326-27.
40 5 The case is discussed supra at notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
406 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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pilloried for refusing to take the oath.407 Finally, the very statute that abolished
the oath and the prerogative court of High Commission also prohibited
ecclesiastical courts from inflicting various penalties, including "pain" and
"corporal punishment," for contempt.40 8
Torture was also a part of the backdrop against which the confession rule
developed. The earliest antecedent of the confession rule was the Edwardian
statute under which the two-witness requirement in treason cases could be
displaced by a confession that was made "willingly and without violence."409
The reference to violence is surely a reference to torture.410 Similarly, there
was a concern about torture in the cases in which the claim of voluntariness
was intended to bolster credibility. In the Duke of Somerset's Trial, the
confession of a prosecution witness was said to have been made "without any
kind of compulsion [or] force," 411 and in the Trial of Sir Christopher Blunt,
the defendants' own confessions were said to have been voluntary, "no man
being racked or tormented." 412 A concern about torture also underlies
Staundiford's statement that a guilty plea should not be accepted in any case if
it was procured by "fear, menace, or duress;" 413 the statement in Emlyn's
edition of Hale that a confession is inadmissible if made under "menace, or
undue terror;" 414 and the statement in Gilbert that confessions are inadmissible
if obtained by "pain and force." 415
That the history of both protections contains a concern about, and an
aversion to, torture is well recognized. In 1730, Emlyn stated in his preface to
the second edition of the State Trials, "In other countries, Racks and
Instruments of Torture are applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession,
sometimes of more than is true; but this is a practice which Englishmen are
happily unacquainted with, enjoying the benefit of that just and reasonable
Maxim, Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum ... ."416 A century and a half later,
Judge Stephen repeated Emlyn's point:
407 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
408 A Repeal of the Branch of a Statute primo Elizabethae, concerning Commissioners
for Causes Ecclesiastical, 1640, 16 Charles 1, ch. 11, § 4 (Eng.), 7 STAT. AT LARGE
(Eng.) 343, 344 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
409 An Act for the Repeal of Certain Statutes Concerning Treasons and Felonies,
1547, 1 Edw. 6, Ch. 12 (Eng.) 5 STAT AT LARGE (Eng.) 259 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763)
(emphasis added). The statute is discussed supra at notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
410 See Tong's Case, Kelyng's Rep. 20, 23 (1664) (a "confession puts it out of the
statute which requires two witnesses to prove the treason, unless the party shall without
torture confess the same").
411 1 Cobbett's State Trials 515, 517 (1551).
412 1 Cobbett's State Trials 1409, 1419 (1600).
413 Staundiford is discussed supra at note 182 and accompanying text.
414 2 HALE, supra note 262, at 284-85.
415 GILBERT, supra note 276, at 140 (1769).
416 1 Cobbett's State Trials xxv (footnote omitted).
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[l]he extreme unpopularity of the e officio oath, and of the Star Chamber
procedure founded upon it, had led to the assertion that the maxim, "Nemo
tenetur accusare seipswn," was part of the law of God and of nature (to use the
language of the day), an assertion which was all the more popular because it
condemned the practice of torture for purposes of evidence, then in full use
both on the Continent and in Scotland. 417
Going beyond Emlyn, however, Stephen also addressed the confession rule.
"The general maxim, that confessions ought to be voluntary is historically the
old rule that torture for the purpose of obtaining confessions is, and long has
been, illegal in England." 418 Thus, Stephen perceived that the privilege and
the confession rule were linked by their common condemnation of torture.
Although citing neither Emlyn nor Stephen, Charles McCormick, an
American scholar, came to the same conclusion. He recognized that "[t]he
disappearance of torture and the recognition of the privilege were victories in
the same political struggle." 419 He also saw that a concern about torture
underlay the Edwardian statute and that the statute was one of the antecedents
of the confession rule.420 These perceptions led him to conclude that the two
protections had a "kinship... too apparent for denial. It is significant that the
shadow of the rack and thumbscrew was part of the background from which
each emerged." 421
Wigmore himself discussed the phenomenon of torture in setting out the
history of the privilege.422 He did the same in his separate discussion of the
history of the confession rule.423 Then he blithely proceeded to ignore the
lessons of history. What is worse, he trivialized the history by saying, "That
the two rules should be supposed to have something of a common principle or
spirit is a not unnatural error." 424 The error, however, was Wigmore's. The
417 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 440. See also CHAFES, supra note 334, at
188; ERWIN N. GRIswOLD, THE FurH AMENDMENT TODAY 2, 7, 75 (1955); LEVY,
supra note 13, at 418; 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 118 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1 MCCOPMIK]; Charles T. McCormick, Law and the Future:
Evidence, 51 NW. U.L. REV. 218, 221 (1956); Roy Moreland, Historical Background and
Irplications of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44 KY. L.J 267, 274 (1956); R.
Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-
lncrimanation in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 783 (1935).
418 1 SrEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 447.
4 19 Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege'in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX.
L. REV. 447,453 n.24 (1938).420 See McCormick, supra note 419.
421 Id at 453.
422 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 287 n.89.
423 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 818, at 294-95 n.7.
424 Id. § 823, at 538 n.2.
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history of the two protections does not show that they have "no connection." It
does not show that they are "widely separated." Nor does it show that they
should be kept "plainly" and "distinctly apart." Rather, it shows that the
privilege and the confession rule had overlapping developments and the
"common principle or spirit" of condemning torture.
3. Objectives
Although Wigmore went into great detail in his separate discussions of the
objectives of the privilege and the confession rule, his comparison of objectives
is skimpy.
The sum and substance of the difference is that the confession-rule aims to
exclude self-criminating statements which are false, while the privilege-rule
gives the option of excluding those which are true. The two are complementary
in that respect, and therefore cannot be coincident. 425
On its face, this argument is problematic because it compares an asserted
aim or objective of the confession rule with what is merely an "option" under
the privilege. However, even on its own terms, the argument is misleading.
Wigmore correctly asserts that the common law confession rule aimed to
exclude putatively false statements. Excluding putatively true statements
because of the way in which they were obtained was not one of its objectives.
It is also correct that the privilege empowers a witness to refuse to give a true,
but incriminating, answer, and empowers a court to exclude a party's true, but
compelled, answer. However, Wigmore did not mention the fact that, by
prohibiting torture, the privilege necessarily "gives the option" of excluding
putatively false statements as well as true.426 To that extent, the two protections
are coincident rather than complementary, and Wigmore's argument is
misleading.
There is, however, an even greater flaw in Wigmore's comparison. To say
that the "sum and substance of the difference" between the protections can be
seen in the exclusion of evidence is to treat an operation as though it were an
objective. The exclusion of evidence is simply an aspect of how the protections
operate. The objectives of the protections are a wholly different matter. Not
until we have identified and compared the objectives can we know whether the
privilege and the confession rule are distinct.
The common law privilege establishes that self-incriminatory information
"is not owed the state," 427 and that one may just say "no" if asked to divulge
it. The privilege tells agents of government that they must take "no" for an
425 Id. § 823, at 338 n.2.
426 See discussion of torture supra at notes 130, 402-08 and accompanying text.
4 27 BERGER, supra note 85, at 31.
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answer by barring them from using compulsion to obtain confessions. The
privilege also excludes the fruits of compulsion. The history of the privilege
demonstrates that compulsion includes force and the threat of force, jail and the
threat of jail, and other browbeating or bullying tactics. Why would anyone
want to create a privilege of silence? Why would anyone want to deny
government these effective methods of inducing incrimination?428
The reasons for creating a privilege and denying government the authority
to compel incrimination are illuminated by the diverse occasions in the
development of the privilege when people resisted or attacked compulsory self-
incrimination. Some of the claims of privilege429 are collateral or instrumental,
part of a not-so-hidden agenda to achieve results that are not directly related to
the objectives of the privilege; others are more direct. Some have stood the test
of time; others have been supplanted and have simply faded from the scene.
We may immediately put aside the fact that the privilege was used in the
struggle of the common law courts to contain the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical
and prerogative courts. This collateral use tells us something about the courts,
but nothing about the objectives of the privilege. We may also put aside the fact
that the privilege was conscripted as a surrogate for freedom of conscience in
the battle against state control of religious and political beliefs and speech.
Although it was very important in its own time (and to a lesser extent in
modem American history) this collateral use of the privilege says nothing about
the intrinsic or general value of prohibiting compulsion and excluding its fruits.
Moreover, it was eventually supplanted by more direct protections. Finally, we
may disregard the "anti-fishing" argument, which recurred throughout the
development of the privilege. Here, the claim of privilege was a claim of
entitlement, in the interest of fair trial, to notice of the charges and to
confrontation of accusers. This too was a collateral use of the privilege which
says nothing about the value of prohibiting compulsion and which has been
supplanted by other protections. 430
Although the history of the privilege is replete with collateral uses, none of
them limited the eventual scope of the privilege. Instead, a broad privilege
428 In asking these questions, I am seeking only to identify the objectives commonly
attributed to the privilege or those that may be fairly inferred. My purpose is to compare the
objectives with the objectives of the confession rule. I am not seeking justifications for the
privilege. Thus, I am not concerned that some objective may not suffice to explain all of the
uses to which the privilege has been put or all of the prohibitions that it embodies.
429 I am using "claims of privilege" in the present context to mean the claim that
compulsory self-incrimination is wrong. Whether the claim succeeded or failed in a
particular instance is not important. What is important is discovering why the claim was
made.
430 The "anti-fishing" argument is more complicated than I have portrayed it in the
text above. It does have a facet that addresses the value of not compelling a person to make
incriminating statements. See discussion infra at notes 435-437 and accompanying text.
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emerged as part of a larger package of libertarian reforms.431 As Professor
John McNaughton put it:
That not only the fishing expedition incident to the bated oath ex officio
but all authority to compel self-incriminatory disclosures was extinguished in
the final decades of the seventeenth century may be attributable to the
revolution in political thought which was occuring at the time. The sovereign
king was being supplanted by the sovereign individual. 432
If the privilege finally gained full recognition in the name of individual
sovereignty, it is in that concept that we must seek the objectives of the
privilege, Le., the reasons for permitting silence and prohibiting compulsion.
In current discussions of individual liberties, three values prominently
appear: autonomy, privacy, and dignity.433 The overarching purpose of the
privilege is to preserve these values and the interests that underlie them. As
sovereign individuals, we have an interest in the integrity of our bodies-in
avoiding death, physical injury, and pain; in deciding whether we will let
anyone touch our bodies, and, if so, who, when, and under what
circumstances. The importance of this interest is demonstrated by the fact that
it is one of the major concerns of, and protected by, both the law of torts and
the law of crimes. Bodily integrity is a part of the larger values of autonomy
and dignity. By condemning and prohibiting torture and excluding its
evidentiary fruits, the privilege protects the interest in bodily integrity and the
values of autonomy and dignity.434
Just as we have an interest in not having others invade our bodies, so we,
as sovereign individuals, also have an interest in not having others invade our
minds. This interest was asserted early in the history of the privilege and has
remained an important part of it. When various recalcitrants made the "anti-
fishing" argument, they were claiming more than merely a fair-trial interest in
notice and confrontation. They were saying, "I am a human being and I have
rights which you must respect. It is wrong for you to disturb me by trying to
compel me to incriminate myself unless you have the substantial justification
that comes when a known accuser, whom you are willing to identify, makes a
431 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
432 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 317-18. This section was totally revised by
Professor McNaughton; the words are therefore his, not Wigmiore's. For a similar view of
the privilege as a manifestation of individual sovereignty, see Abe Fortas, The Fifth
Amendment: Nemo TeneturProdere Seipswn, 25 CLEv. B. ASS'N . 91, 98-99 (1954).
433 See, e.g, 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD H. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROcEDURE
49-51 (1984); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1419,
1420, 1425, 1430 (1974).
434 That the privilege protects a dignity value is well recognized and not controversial.
See GRISWOLD, supra note 417, at 7; Benner, supra note 246, at 64; lack B. Weinstein,
The Law's Attempt to Obtain Useful Tesatmony, 13 J. SOC. ISSUES 6, 9 (1957).
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specific accusation, which you are willing to disclose." 435 Although this
argument does not clearly articulate the interests that underlie the prohibition of
compulsion, there may be three: repose, peace of mind, and controlling what
others learn about one's self. These interests are, of course, constituents of the
values of autonomy and privacy.436
It is true that this aspect of the "anti-fishing" argument asserts no absolute
bar to compulsory self-incrimination and no absolute entitlement to repose,
peace of mind, and control of information. To the contrary, it implicitly
concedes that repose and peace of mind may be disturbed and that answers to
self-incriminating questions may be demanded after .the interrogee receives
notice of the charges and an opportunity to confront accusers. However, in the
actual development of the common law privilege, when government came to
respond to the "anti-fishing" argument by providing notice and identifying the
accusers, witnesses still declined to answer,437 and their refusals were
eventually sustained. Thus, as the privilege has evolved, these interests and the
values of autonomy and privacy play a much more prominent part than the
"anti-fishing" argument suggests.
Repose, peace of mind, and one's ability to control information are
trenched by all forms of compulsion to incriminate. Torture and the threat of
torture engender fear. Browbeating, jail, and the threat of jail create stress. The
stress is exacerbated by the fact that the very purpose of compulsion is self-
435 Trial of John Lilbume, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 1315 (1637). See supra notes 193-
202 and accompanying text for discussion of the various statements made by John Lilburne
in connection with his 1637 trial for shipping seditious books into England.
436 That the values of the "anti-fishing" argument are autonomy and privacy is
recognized in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 314. For a discussion of privacy as a
value of the modem privilege, see BERGER, supra note 85, at 41-44; Robert S. Gerstein,
Privacy and Self-ncrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970). Professor Fried has observed:
An excellent, very different sort of example of a contingent, symbolic recognition
of an area of privacy as an expression of respect for personal integrity is the privilege
against self-incrimination... By according the privilege as fully as it does, our society
affirms the extreme value of the individual's control over information about himself. To
be sure, prying into a man's personal affairs by asking questions of others or by
observing him is not prevented by the privilege. Rather it is the point of the privilege
that a man cannot be forced to make public information about himself. Thereby his
sense of control of what others know of him is significantly enhanced ....
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.. 475, 488 (1968). A concern about privacy and its
underlying interests may have been at the root of the outraged complaints that were made
when Bishop Grosseteste attempted to inquire into the sexual conduct of those who lived in
the diocese of Lincoln. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
437 See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussion relating to Thomas
Cartwright).
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incriminatory disclosure. The person's natural instinct is to protect himself.
But, instead of being permitted to act in accordance with instinct, he is
pressured to engage in the unnatural act of disclosing intimate information
which may humiliate or even destroy him.438 By prohibiting compulsion to
incriminate and excluding its evidentiary fruits, the privilege protects our
interests in repose and peace of mind and enables us to control information
about ourselves. Thus, it serves the larger values of autonomy and privacy.
There is yet another way in which the privilege and its prohibition of
compulsion serve individual sovereignty and its underlying values. Earlier in
this article, I said that deterring or excluding unreliable confessions was one of
the effects or operations of the privilege. Now, I want to make the point that
deterring or excluding unreliable confessions is one of the objectives of the
privilege.
The privilege condemns and prohibits torture and the threat of torture. One
of the evils of torture is that it violates the interest in bodily integrity. Another
is that it results in putatively unreliable confessions. In 1628, Felton, the
admitted murderer of the Duke of Buckingham, was threatened with torture by
the Bishop of London after he denied having accomplices. Felton replied that if
he had to reveal imaginary accomplices, then, "in the extremity of torture, and
if what he should say then must go for the truth" he might accuse the Bishop
and other members of the privy counsel. The questioning ceased. 439 Almost a
century later, the Council of Rome abolished the oath de veritate dicenda. One
of its reasons was that the oath procedure produced unreliable confessions. 440
In 1730, Emlyn, while touting the English privilege, unfavorably compared
countries without the privilege in which "[racks and Instruments of Torture
are applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession, sometimes of more than is
true." 441 If any point in the history of the privilege is uncontroversial, it is that
torture or the threat of torture may produce false confessions. 442
Other forms of compulsion are also suspect. If threatened with contempt or
otherwise browbeaten for refusal to answer questions, an innocent interrogee
may well decide to avoid the imminent prospect of jail or the stress of the
438 Throughout the history of the privilege there were complaints that compulsory self-
incrimination was unnatural and cruel, see supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussion
relating to Giles Wiggenton), or contrary to the law of nature. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text (discussions relating to Thomas Tresham) and note 201 (discussion
relating to John Lilbume).
439 3 Cobbett's State Trials 367, 371 (1628). The case is discussed supra notes 188-90
and accompanying text.
440 LEvY, supra note 13, at 24.
441 Emlyn's entire statement is set out supra note 416 and accompanying text.
442 See State v. Hobbs, 2 Tyl. 380 (Vt. 1803) (dictum that state constitutional
provision prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination prohibits torture and therefore seeks to
bar confessions of doubtful reliability).
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moment by giving his interrogator what he believes the interrogator wants-a
confession-and take his chances with the more remote prospect of conviction
and punishment. The likelihood of a false confession here is certainly less than
in a case of torture, but the risk should not be ignored. As one commentator
has observed:
The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just
limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If
there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected
answer,-that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into
the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments
of a bad system. Such seems to have been the course of experience in those
legal systems where the privilege was not recognized.
... [I]t is difficult to know how much allowance is to be made [for the fact
that, in the Anglo-American system, unlike the Continental system, the judicial
and prosecuting functions are sharply separated]; and it is wiser to accept the
warnings of experience, even at the risk of overstraining their import. It may
be conceded that the Continental practice is efficacious in detecting guilt. But it
must also be conceded that it leads to or is found united with a spirit of petty
judicial license and browbeating, dangerous to innocence, and certain to lead to
great abuses in our own community, if it once obtained a sanction.
This statement, you may be surprised to learn, was written by Dean
Wigmore. 443 As well as anything in the literature, it captures the essence and
importance of the point that various forms of compulsion may produce
unreliable confessions. 444 It also tells us why we should be concerned. Any
lawyer who has tried even a few criminal cases knows that a confession will
powerfully influence the outcome of a case.445 If the prosecution uses an
unreliable confession, there is a substantial risk that an innocent person will be
443 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). See also
1 McCoRMICK, supra note 417, § 118, at 430-31. I hasten to add that, although Wigmore
rejected the notion that the privilege should be abolished, he favored a narrow interpretation
of the privilege lest there be "justice tampered with mercy." 8 WIGMORE, supra at 318
(quotation attributed to "a wit").
444 The same point was made almost two centuries earlier in Gilbert's treatise on
evidence. GILBERT, supra note 276, at 121-47; see supra notes 276-83 and accompanying
text.
445 1 both prosecuted and defended felony cases as a young lawyer in the Army Judge
Advocate General's Corps. The defendant had confessed in many of the contested cases. In
only one of those cases did the military jury acquit the defendant. The outcome-
determinative role of confessions has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382 (1964).
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convicted and punished. 44 6 The conviction is likely to be stigmatizing. The
punishment may be liberty-depriving or, what is worse, fatal. Surely, there can
be no greater offense to bodily integrity, repose, and peace of mind than the
conviction and punishment (perhaps the execution) of the innocent; surely,
there can be no greater impingement upon autonomy, privacy, and dignity; just
as surely, convicting and punishing the innocent are the ultimate affronts to
individual sovereignty.
Compulsion to incriminate intrinsically offends the calculus of individual
sovereignty. Consequently, the privilege prohibits it even though it may serve
societal interests by producing a true confession. When compulsion produces a
false confession, however, when it results in the conviction and punishment of
the innocent, there is a second level at which individual sovereignty is
offended. At this level, the offense is exacerbated by the additional effects of
conviction and punishment. What is worse, there is no legitimate societal
interest in obtaining an unreliable confession. If it is an objective of the
privilege to protect individual sovereignty against the intrinsic effects of
compulsion, it should also be an objective of the privilege to deter and exclude
putatively unreliable confessions obtained by compulsion.447
Having identified the objectives of the privilege, we must now identify the
objectives of the involuntary confession rule. Most of the antecedents of
Warickshall imply that the sole purpose of the confession rule is to exclude
putatively unreliable confessions. 448 This implication comes to full bloom in
Warickshall. As a result of the victim's promise not to prosecute, Warickshall
confessed to receiving stolen property and led the authorities to it.
4 46 A person may be "innocent" in the sense that he committed no crime at all or in
the sense that he committed a less serious crime than the one to which he confessed. See
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 01HO
Sr. L.I 449, 454 n.25 (1964).
447 In justifying and defending the privilege, some scholars have gone to great lengths
to imagine situations in which the privilege is properly invoked by an innocent person. See,
e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 417, at 9-19. These examples miss the point. It is not very
likely that an innocent person would invoke the privilege in a public inquiry, although it is
possible. The real bite of the privilege in protecting the innocent is in its very creation.
Without the privilege or some other guarantee against compulsion, governments might
obtain false confessions by resorting to oppressive tactics. To this extent, the privilege is
prophylactic. Partly to guard against unreliable confessions, we create a privilege which
even the guilty may invoke. We do so, however, to insure that the innocent will be
protected.
As will appear from a later discussion, however, see infra notes 462-63 and
accompanying text, the concern for innocence does not lie at the core of the privilege.
Rather, it is contingent on the existence of compulsion or its equivalent. If neither
compulsion nor its equivalent is present, the privilege should not operate to exclude a
putatively unreliable confession.
448 See supra notes 257-69, 275-76 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the promise, there was a prosecution. After the court excluded
Warickshall's confession, the prosecutor offered the derivative evidence-the
property and the fact that it had been found in Warickshall's bed. Since the
evidence was perfectly reliable, it could not be excluded on the ground of
putative unreliability. Instead, the defense lawyer argued that the evidence had
to be excluded in order to make good on the promise not to prosecute. If the
evidence were admitted, "the faith which the prosecutor had pledged would be
violated, and the prisoner made the deluded instrument of her own
conviction. 449 The court flatly rejected the argument: "It is a mistaken notion,
that the evidence of confessions and facts which have been obtained from
prisoners by promises or threats, is to be rejected from a regard to public
faith.... "450 Instead of a "public faith" test, the court used a reliability-based
approach:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a
consideration whether they are or are not intitled to credit. A free and
voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed
to flow from the strongest sense of guilt... but a confession forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable
a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought
to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected. This principle respecting
confessions has no application whatever as to the admission or rejection of
facts, whether the knowledge of them be obtained in consequence of an
extorted confession, or whether it arises from any other source .... 451
Although the court clearly stated that the sole purpose of the confession rule is
to exclude putatively unreliable evidence, it did not go beneath the surface of
its holding to ask why an unreliable confession should be excluded. Had it
asked that question, it would have discovered the obvious: that unreliable
confessions intolerably increase the risk of convicting and punishing the
innocent. Had it then asked why there should be a concern about convicting the
innocent, it would have discovered what is only slightly less obvious: that
convicting and punishing the innocent offends the interests in bodily integrity,
repose, and peace of mind, and the values of autonomy, privacy, and dignity,
all of which underlie the concept of individual sovereignty.
Thus, the real objective of excluding involuntary confessions is to preserve
important human values by protecting the innocent from being convicted and
punished. This is also an objective of the privilege. Surely Wigmore grossly
449 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
450 Id.
451 Id. at 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234-35.
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overstated his case in asserting that the two protections are "complementary"
and not "coincident." 452
When we closely compare the privilege and the confession rule, we find a
picture that is quite different from Wigmore's. The most prominent difference
is operational. The privilege operates primarily at the examination stage,
empowering the interrogee to say "no," and requiring the examiner to respect
the answer by refraining from compulsion. The confession rule, by contrast,
operates primarily at the trial to exclude involuntary confessions. As noted
earlier, however, both protections have secondary operations. The privilege
operates at trial to exclude the fruits of compulsion, and the confession rule
operates at the examination to soften the tactics of the examiner. 453 Thus, each
protection operates both at examination and at trial and each has an
exclusionary effect. In other respects, the two protections are also remarkably
similar. Their histories overlap and were written against the common backdrop
of torture. Moreover, the primary objective of the confession rule-avoiding
the baleful effects of unreliability-is one of the objectives of the privilege.
Given their similarities, one is hard-pressed to find any value in the
confession rule that is independent of the privilege. Indeed, the confession rule
appears to be nothing more than the exclusionary rule of the privilege, and we
would do well to give up the confession rule and think of exclusion solely in
terms of the privilege.
Yet, even as I write these words, I am troubled. If what I have just said is
correct-if the confession rule is merely the exclusionary part of the privilege-
why, in determining the admissibility of confessions, have generations of
judges ignored the privilege and used only the language of the confessions rule,
as did the court in Warickshall, and why have generations of treatise writers
discussed the two protections in separate chapters? Is there some difference
between the two that we have not yet discovered? And if a difference exists, is
it broad or narrow, important or slight? Wigmore gives us a clue. "The
confessions rule is broader because it may exclude statements which are
obtained by promises as well as compulsion." 454
Although couched as an operational point, this argument actually relates to
the objectives of the two protections. It asserts, in essence, that a promise never
constitutes compulsion, that the confession rule protects against promises as
well as compulsion, but that the privilege protects only against compulsion and
not against promises. Wigmore did not define his terms, but we must do so in
order to gauge the validity of his argument. A "promise" is "a declaration that
something will or will not be done" or "an express assurance on which
452 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 338 n.2.
453 See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
454 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 401.
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expectation is to be based." 455 "Compel" means "to force or drive, especially
to a course of action." 456 To these definitions, we must add the definition of
"threat": "a declaration of an intention or determination to inflict punishment,
injury, death, or loss on someone in retaliation for, or conditionally upon,
some action or course." 457 From these definitions, it is clear that every
conditional threat is either actual or attempted compulsion; that some, but not
all, promises are threats; and that some, but not all, promises are therefore
either actual or attempted compulsion.
Let us now consider a case in order to test Wigmore's point. At a
preliminary examination, the magistrate says to the suspect, "Did you commit
the crime? If you do not answer my question, I promise you that I will have
you thrown in jail and beaten." The suspect then confesses. Has the magistrate
violated the privilege? Is the confession admissible at a subsequent criminal
trial? On these facts, the answers are beyond doubt. The magistrate's promise
was also a threat. As such, it compelled the suspect to speak. Consequently, the
magistrate's "promise" violated the privilege, and the resulting statement is
inadmissible by virtue of the privilege. This illustration shows that the privilege
does protect against some promises and that Wigmore was wrong when he
implied the contrary. 458
If Wigmore were alive, however, he would undoubtedly reply, "Unfair.
You are playing with my words. Of course, some promises are threats and are
therefore within the coverage of the privilege. I never meant to say otherwise.
All I meant was that the privilege does not protect against promises that are not
threats, that is, against 'benign' promises." To test this position, let us consider
a case involving a "benign" promise. At a preliminary examination, the
magistrate says to the suspect, "Did you commit the crime? If you do not
answer my question, nothing bad will happen to you. No one will beat you or
455 RANoM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1151 (1983).456 Id. at 300.
457 Id. at 1478.
458 The facts of the hypothetical case are similar to the facts of John Lilburne's first
trial, except that Lilburne did not confess and there was thus no occasion to decide whether
a confession was admissible. The facts are also similar to Queen v. Garbett, 2 Cox Crim.
Cas. 448 (Ex. 1847), except that the witness, who made self-incriminating statements under
threat of jail, was not threatened with a beating. In Garbett, the incriminating statements
were held inadmissible, apparently on the theory that they had been obtained in violation of
the privilege.
In some of its involuntary confession cases, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized
that some promises are threats. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 509, 514
(1963) (promise that defendant would be allowed to call his wife after he "made a statement
and cooperated," characterized as an "express threat of continued incommunicado
detention"); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 532, 533, 534 (1963) (statements that
defendant would lose custody of her young children, but police "would go light on her" if
she cooperated, characterized as "threats").
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threaten you with force; no one will put or threaten to put you in jail for not
answering; and no one will bully or browbeat you. If you decline to answer, as
is your right, your choice will be respected. However, if you admit your guilt,
I will dismiss all the charges against you." Thus assured, the suspect confesses
that he committed the crime. The charges, however, are not dismissed. Perhaps
the magistrate never intended to dismiss them; perhaps his promise was
disavowed by a higher authority. Whatever the case, the suspect is tried. Has
the privilege been violated? Should the privilege make the suspect's confession
inadmissible?
These questions are quite hard, and there are good arguments on both
sides. The argument in favor of admissibility is that the magistrate fully
respected both the privilege of silence and the protection against compulsion.
He explicitly respected the privilege of silence by promising to honor the
suspect's choice. He implicitly respected it by bargaining with the suspect. His
offer implicitly recognized that the government had no right to obtain the
information and that the suspect was entitled to withhold it. Indeed, the very
purpose of the promise was to induce the suspect to relinquish his privilege.
The magistrate also respected the protection against compulsion. There was no
force or threat of force, no jail or threat of jail, and no other bullying or
browbeating. By not using any traditional form of compulsion to obtain
evidence, the magistrate fully preserved the suspect's autonomy, privacy, and
dignity. The suspect might have been tempted, but he was not forced or driven
to accept the offer. He could have declined to confess and taken his chances
with the ordinary processes of law. Since the magistrate respected the privilege
of silence and did not use compulsion, the privilege was not violated and the
confession should be admissible as far as the privilege is concerned. That the
suspect did not receive the benefit he was promised has nothing to do with
either a privilege of silence or a protection against compulsion.
The argument against admissibility is that the government dishonored the
privilege of silence and trenched the values protected by it. It was the suspect's
privilege to control the flow of information about himself. He could choose to
speak or to withhold information. Although the magistrate initally respected the
privilege both explicitly and implicitly, it was dishonored when the government
broke its promise. The broken promise is of crucial concern to the privilege.
Had the suspect known that he would not receive the benefit of his bargain, he
would have chosen to withhold information. The government's deception thus
directly persuaded him to give up his autonomy and privacy. Moreover, the
very fact that the government resorted to deception shows contempt not only
for the suspect's privilege of silence, but also for his reliance on justifiable
expectations in connection with the privilege. This flouts the suspect's dignity.
In no other situation would the government be allowed to create and defeat
expectations with impunity. In civil cases, the law of torts would redress
misrepresentation, and the law of contracts would either give compensation for
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breach of an agreement or perhaps grant specific performance. In criminal
cases, the government would be held to its plea agreement or the defendant
would be allowed to withdraw his plea. The result should be the same here.
Moreover, guarding against unreliable confessions is a purpose of the privilege.
Any confession obtained by a promise of no prosecution is putatively
unreliable. That the magistrate did not use any common form of compulsion
should not be controlling. The privilege comprises two parts: a privilege of
silence and a stricture against compulsion. If either is infringed, the privilege
has been violated.
Although the arguments on both sides are plausible and the issue is very
close, I am marginally persuaded by the defendant's argument and I would, by
virtue of the privilege, exclude the confession. To permit the government to
induce a confession by a misrepresentation "sound[s] a word of promise [about
the privilege] to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope."459 Moreover,
the situation of our hypothetical suspect is close to the situation of a suspect
who has been promised immunity. Under the modem privilege, the immunized
suspect is entitled to insist on the exclusion of his confession and any evidence
derived from his confession. Anything less is a breach of the immunity
agreement and the privilege itself.460 Just as the government is obligated by the
privilege to the terms of its immunity agreement, so should it be obligated by
the privilege to refrain from using a confession that it has induced by a no-
prosecution promise.46 1
If we accept the defendant's argument, we have discovered a situation in
which, contrary to Wigmore, the privilege protects against even a "benign"
promise.462 However, I frankly admit that the case is too close for comfort and
459 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
460 See New Iersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (state's use of immunized
testimony to impeach defendant held violative of constitutional privilege). Although the
situation of the hypothetical suspect in the text above is close to that of the immunized
suspect, it is not identical. In the immunity situation, the immunized witness always knows
that he will be punished for contempt if he refuses to answer. Thus, there is "compulsion"
in the traditional sense. In the hypothetical situation, however, the suspect knows that he
will not be punished. That difference is precisely what makes the hypothetical situation so
close.
4611 am not concerned with the appropriate remedy for breach of the privilege. Thus,
I am not concerned with whether the suspect may be entitled to insist that the charges be
dismissed.
462 The position I take in the text asserts that conduct falling short of compulsion may
violate the common law privilege. Although compulsion was always a factual component of
the situations that gave rise to the common law privilege, see LEVY, supra note 13 passim,
it seems to me that the values protected by the privilege are broader. If government induces
a confession by action that flouts the values of the privilege, the privilege should be
applicable. I confess, however (no pun intended), that generations of commentators have
asswned that compulsion was part and parcel of the privilege. See 4 WILIAM
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my resolution of it may be wrong. Consequently, it may be wise to pursue the
inquiry a bit further. The essence of the situation just discussed is that a
"benign" promise was broken. Suppose, however, that it had been kept. Let us
consider another case. A suspect and his minor son have been charged with the
same crime. At their preliminary examination, the magistrate says to the
suspect, "Did you commit the crime? If you do not answer my question,
nothing bad will happen to you or your son as a result of your refusal to
answer. No one will beat you or threaten you with force; no one will put or
threaten to put you in jail for not answering; and no one will bully or browbeat
you. If you decline to answer, as is your right, your choice will be respected.
However, if you admit your guilt, I will dismiss all the charges against your
son." Thus assured, the suspect confesses that he committed the crime. In
exchange for his confession, the magistrate does dismiss the charges against the
son. Has the privilege been violated? At a subsequent trial, should the privilege
make the suspect's confession inadmissible?
The argument in favor of admissibility is essentially the same as the one
above: the magistrate respected not only the privilege of silence but also the
protection against compulsion. Indeed, the argument is stronger, for the
defendant received precisely what he expected. Thus, there is no need to
consider the effect of a broken promise. The argument against admissibility,
however, is considerably weaker. The government neither deceived the suspect
nor broke a promise. Thus, it did not impinge upon the autonomy and privacy
that underlie the suspect's privilege to choose whether to divulge information
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 296 (1900); BURNS, supra note 305, at 454; CHUrTY,
supra note 128, at 620; LEVY, supra note 13, at 328; MAcNALLY, supra note 305, at 258;
PHILUPS, supra note 305, at 276, 283; 1 THOMAS STARRIE, EVIDENCE 105 (London, I. &
W.T. Clarke 1824); STEPEN, DIGEST, supra note 305, at 117; TAYLOR, supra note 305,
at 969-77. None of these sources, however, defines compulsion or discusses whether a
broken promise is within the protection of the privilege. It is quite possible that the authors
assumed that a recurring fact was a part of the rule.
The commentators are not unanimous. Professor Benner has observed that:
a proper understanding of the historical forces that gave rise to the privilege against self-
incrimination reveals that the essence of freedom from self-incrimination lies in its
conception of the relationship between the state and the individual as one characterized
by fairness. The absence of coercion is therefore a necessary, but never a sufficient,
basis for that relationship.
Benner, supra note 246, at 130. It should be kept in mind that I am now discussing only the
contan law privilege. The constitutional privilege prohibits only compulsion, and "a
necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination [under the constitutional privilege] is
some kind of compulsion." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966) (no




about himself. Nor did it flout the suspect's dignity by defeating his justifiable
expectations. Rather, the government acted as it would be required to act in
comparable situations. It kept its word. The only argument left to the suspect,
therefore, is that the promise induced a putatively unreliable confession and for
that reason alone jeopardized the values of autonomy, privacy, and dignity.
The question emanating from this argument is whether, in .the absence of both
compulsion and any flouting of the privilege to remain silent, the privilege has
any concern for reliability and its underlying values. The argument that the
privilege does have such a "free-standing" concern for reliability takes the
privilege far from its historical context and dramatically reshapes it. If
government recognizes that it has no right to information and that the suspect
has a right to withhold it, and if government eschews both compulsion and
broken promises, it should not be said that the privilege has been violated.
Thus, although an objective of the privilege is to deter and exclude unreliable
confessions, the objective is contingent or secondary; that is, it is always
dependent upon either compulsion or some other flouting of the privilege to
remain silent.
However, to say that the privilege has not been violated is quite different
from saying that the suspect's confession should be admissible. Promising to
dismiss the charges against the child is a powerful inducement, and even an
innocent parent might confess. The parent's confession is therefore putatively
unreliable. 463 If a reliability-based exclusionary rule did not exist apart from
the privilege, one might want to create it.
One might also want to create a non-privilege exclusionary rule in another
situation. Suppose a suspect is arrested by a group of private citizens who have
no connection with government. The vigilantes threaten to kill the suspect
unless he confesses, and confess he does. Have the vigilantes violated the
suspect's privilege? Should the privilege bar the prosecution from using the
confession as evidence at a subsequent trial? The privilege developed out of a
struggle for individual rights at a time when church and state were one. The
protagonists were individuals, on the one hand, and religious and secular
government, on the other.
To apply the privilege to protect against wholly private action would, as with
kept promises, take the privilege far from its historical context and dramatically
reshape it. As long as government has not encouraged or tolerated the private
action, We should not say that the privilege has been violated even by
governmental use of the evidence. Once again, however, the confession is
463 See Commissioners of Customs & Excise v. Harz, 1967 App. Cas. 760, 821
(appeal taken from Eng.) (dictum). For a useful discussion of reliability, see Yale Kamisar,
What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Cridnal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 753-55 (1963).
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putatively unreliable. If a reliability-based exclusionary rule did not exist apart
from the privilege, one might want to create it.
4. Conclusion
Wigmore had a point, after all. But the point is much narrower than he
made it seem. In only two situations is there clearly any need for a reliability-
based exclusionary rule apart from the privilege: confessions induced by
"benign," kept promises and confessions induced by private action. In these
situations the privilege is inapplicable and the interest in reliability can be
vindicated only by a separate rule.464 However, if a confession has been
obtained by conduct that violates the privilege, it is inadmissible by virtue of
the privilege. Even Wigmore concedes this point, although grudgingly. 46 5 The
privilege fully vindicates all relevant interests, including the interest in
reliability. Nothing remains to be served by any independent rule. As I stated
earlier, to the extent that the confession rule mandates inadmissibility in this
situation, it is the exclusionary rule of the privilege and should not be given
any independent significance. 46 6
Having closely compared the operations, histories, and objectives of the
privilege and the confession nile, having discovered that the confession rule is
for most purposes a part of the privilege, and having delineated only a narrow
area for the independent operation of the confession rule, we may now use the
fruits of our inquiry to evaluate and perhaps explain the English and American
materials sketched earlier which deal with the development of the confession
rule. In turn, we may ask whether, and to what extent, these materials support
the thesis that, for the most part, the confession rule serves no purpose
independent of the privilege.
464 If, in the case of the benign, broken promise, discussed supra notes 458-62 and
accompanying text, we hold that the privilege was not violated, we would still want to
vindicate the interest in reliability by excluding the confession.
465 See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 823, at 337 n.1; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3,
§ 2270, at 416-17.
466 1 reject the position taken some years ago by Judge Henry Friendly that the
involuntariness rule was created by courts as a remedy for abuses of suspects by magistrates
at the examination stage of the process. Henry 1. Friendly, The Fifth Amen&nent Tomorrow:
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 709 (1968). Judge Friendly
cites nothing of direct relevance to support his assertion nor does he explain why the
privilege would have been inapplicable in such a case. Neither Rudd nor Warickshall
involved the admissibility of a confession obtained by abusive examination practices.
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C. Evaluating and Explaining English and American Materials
1. English Materials
The remote antecedents of the confession rule are the Edwardian treason
statute (1547), 467 a group of cases involving the credibility of confessions
(1551-1645), 468 Staundiford's treatise (16O7), 469 Hudson's treatise on the Star
Chamber (ante 1635),470 and defense counsel's argument in Mico (1658).471
None of these sources deals with the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions,
so none is directly in point. The first three sources antedate the acceptance of
the nemo tenetur doctrine into English law, so it is not surprising or significant
that they do not refer to it.
However, the privilege had started to gain a foothold when Hudson wrote,
and had already been recognized by the time of Mico. Thus, under the thesis I
have just advanced, if either Hudson or Mico's lawyer was concerned with
compelled confessions, we might expect to find a reference to nemo. Hudson's
concern was that a confession be "voluntary." 472 Mico's lawyer insisted that a
guilty plea not "proceed from dread" or "be extorted by any compulsion." 473
These concerns do relate to compelled confessions, and both Hudson and Mico
do refer to nemo. Indeed, each cites nemo as the source of the stricture against
compelling confessions, thus supporting the thesis of this Article. However,
since neither Hudson nor Mico was discussing the admissibility of extrajudicial
confessions, the support is indirect.
The strands in the direct development of the confession rule are Emlyn's
edition of Hale (1736), 474 the Trial of Charles White (1741), 475 Lord Carteret's
statement in the House of Lords (1742),476 Gilbert's treatise (1764), 477 and the
cases of Rudd (1775)478 and Warickshall (1783). 479 Since the privilege was
467 An Act for the Repeal of Certain Statutes Concerning Treasons and Felonies, 1547
1 Edw. 6, ch. 12 (Eng.); 5 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 259 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763).
468 Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 515 (1551); Duke of Norfolk's
Trial, 1 Cobbett's State Trials 957 (1571); Trial of Sir Christopher Blunt, 1 Cobbett's State
Trials 1409 (1600); Trial of Common Lord Macguire, 4 Cobbett's State Trials 654 (1645).
469 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
470 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
471 Hardres 137, 139-40, 145 Eng. Rep. 419, 420-21 (Ex. 1658).
47 2 HUDsON, supra note 243, at 64.
473 Mico, Hardres at 139, 145 Eng. Rep. at 420.
47 4 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
475 17 Howell's State Trials 1079 (1741).
476 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
47 7 GILBERT, supra note 276 and accompanying text.
478 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775).
479 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
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firmly in place, we might expect that references to nemo would inform any
discussion of compelled confessions.
Emlyn's edition of Hale does discuss confessions obtained by compulsion
("menace or undue terror"). Although the context is not clear, it is reasonable
to infer that Emlyn is concerned with admissibility rather than weight. It is also
reasonable to infer that he regards unreliability as the reason for
inadmissibility. 480 There is no reference to nemo. It is neither cited nor rejected
as a basis for inadmissibility. The reason for this may lie in the fact that Hale's
work was a description of the law that had been developed in crown cases, that
is, in "suits in the [monarch's] name for criminal offenses against his crown
and dignity." 481 As of 1736, there was no reported case in which a confession
had been held inadmissible on the explicit ground that it had been obtained in
violation of nemo. Thus, there was no occasion for referring to it in the
treatise, and the omission should not be thought significant.
In the Trial of Charles White, the defense counsel argued, and the recorder
conceded, that a confession is inadmissible if "extorted by threats." Once
again, there is no reference to nemo. However, neither the lawyer nor the
recorder tendered any rationale for exclusion. That the confession was actually
admitted does not contradict the thesis of this Article. In view of the fact that a
timely objection to the confession had not been made, the recorder simply
refused to let the defense lawyer inquire into whether the confession had been
compelled.482
In his remarks on an immunity proposal in the House of Lords, Lord
Carteret saw the nemo tenetur doctrine as the source of a requirement that a
"confession" be voluntary. However, it is not clear whether he was referring to
an extrajudicial confession or to a guilty plea. Thus, I cannot claim that
Carteret's statement gives more than indirect support to the position I have
taken in this article. In general, however, Carteret's statement is consistent with
Hudson's treatise and with the defense lawyer's argument in Mico. Thus, as of
1742, when Carteret spoke, the doctrine was slowly emerging that, as a result
ofnemo tenetur, confessions had to be voluntary.
Twelve years later, Gilbert's treatise on evidence gave much sharper
definition to the emerging rule by asserting that an extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible if obtained by "compulsion." Under the most reasonable
interpretation of the ambiguous text, nemo appears to be a reason for
exclusion.483 Gilbert's statement, which supports the thesis of this article, is the
earliest statement I have found that nemo requires the exclusion of compelled,
extrajudicial confessions.
4 80 See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
481 P.CHARD BURN, A NEw LAW DICrONARY 213 (London, T. Cadell 1792).
482 See 17 Howell's State Trials 1079 (1741); see also supra notes 270-74 and
accompanying text.
483 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
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The development portended by Gilbert's treatise did not receive
nourishment from the courts. Rudd's Case makes no reference to nemo, even
though it contains a dictum that a confession is inadmissible if induced by
threats or promises. Notwithstanding this omission, we should not infer that
England's judges regarded nemo as irrelevant to exclusion. Far from rejecting
nemo, the court never addresses any rationale for exclusion. What is more
important, the fact situation would not have called the nemo tenetur doctrine to
the court's attention. In order to take advantage of a discretionary practice in
which an accomplice might receive a pardon after making a full confession that
led to the conviction of the principal, Ms. Rudd filed a complaint charging the
brothers Perreau with forcing her to forge a bond. After receiving a justice's
promise that she would not be prosecuted if she made a full confession relating
to all forgeries, she submitted to an examination and subsequently testified at
the trial of the Perreaus. In seeming breach of the justice's promise, she was
then prosecuted for forgery. On its face, the case appears to involve an unkept
promise and consequent breach of the nemo tenetur doctrine. In fact, however,
Ms. Rudd did not testify fully and truthfully at the examination. Hence, she did
not fulfill the condition upon which the promise was made, and the promise
was extinguished.484 Since she was not compelled to speak and the prosecution
did not otherwise derogate from her privilege of silence, there was no occasion
for the court even to think about nemo tenetur, much less apply it.
Rex v. Warickshall, which is the culmination of the confession-rule
developments, similarly ignored what Gilbert adumbrated. 485 At issue was the
admissibility of tangible evidence to which the defendant's confession had led
the authorities. The confession was made only after the defendant was
apparently promised that she would not be prosecuted if she confessed. In
derogation of the promise, however, a prosecution took place. Her confession
was excluded, but the tangible evidence was admitted against her, and the court
regarding as irrelevant the fact that the tangible evidence was the fruit of a
broken promise held:
It is a mistaken notion, that the evidence of confessions and facts which
have been obtained from prisoners by promises or threats, is to be rejected
from a regard to publicfaith .... Confessions are received in evidence, or
rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not
intitled to credit .... [A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of
hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected. 486
484 See upra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
485 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
486 1 Leach 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234-35 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1783); see supra notes
292-96 and accompanying text.
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It is hard to know what to make of this ambiguous passage. It may be read to
say that reliability is the sole test for determining the admissibility of a
confession. Although the court does not explicitly reject the nemo tenetur
doctrine as a basis for exclusion, the passage may be read as implicitly
rejecting it even when the confession was "forced from the mind... by the
torture of fear." So read, the passage would accord no exclusionary effect
whatsoever to the nemo tenetur doctrine and would contradict both Gilbert and
the thesis of this article.
There are, however, two strong reasons for not reading the passage as a
rejection of nemo. The first reason is that the court could hardly have been
thinking about the doctrine. The defense lawyer did not call it to the court's
attention. Instead, he spoke vaguely about "public faith." Moreover, the facts
of the case did not alert the court to the potential applicability of nemo tenetur.
The case involved a promise, rather than compulsion, and it would have taken
an astute court to see that a broken promise could ever be within the coverage
of nemo tenetur. The second reason is that even if the court had been alerted to
nemo, the court could not properly have applied it. Although the confession
and derivative evidence were obtained by means of a broken promise, the
promise was made by a private person, not by a governmental actor, and the
nemo tenetur doctrine was inapplicable. Thus, had the court thought about
nemo, it would not have been able to use it, and it would have been forced to
search for some other exclusionary doctrine.
It follows that although we are justified in extracting from Warickshall a
reliability-based exclusionary rule and applying it to promises and private
actions, we should not read Warickshall as contradicting Gilbert and rejecting a
nemo-based exclusionary rule for confessions obtained by governmental
compulsion. Rather, we should read it as giving firm expression to a relatively
narrow, supplementary rule excluding putatively unreliable confessions that are
obtained in conformity with the nemo tenetur doctrine. So read, Warickshall is
fully consistent with the thesis of this Article.
Within two years after Warickshall, the courts decided four cases in which
confessions were held inadmissible. In none of the cases was the nemo tenetur
doctrine even referred to. However, for reasons similar to those discussed in
connection with Rudd and Warickshall, we should not infer that the courts were
rejecting the doctrine as a basis for exclusion. In Rex v. Thompson,487 a bill
had been stolen from Thompson's employer. Thompson was subsequently
apprehended by the Receiver-General, an official who was charged with the
receipt of tax monies.488 Thompson admitted that he had possessed and
487 1 Leach 291, 168 Eng. Rep. 248 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1783).
488 2 BENJAMIN V. ABBoTr, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 386 (Cambridge, University Press: John Wilson
& Son 1879). The opinion does not explain why the apprehension was made by the
Receiver-General.
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endorsed the bill, and offered a highly dubious explanation. The Receiver-
General said, "[U]nless you give me a more satisfactory account I shall take
you before a Magistrate." 489 Thompson then confessed to stealing the bill. In
holding the confession inadmissible, the court did not refer to nemo. However,
it offered no rationale of any sort. Moreover, the facts hardly suggest a
situation for applying nemo. The Receiver-General's statement was neither a
threat nor a promise of benefit. Rather, he was saying that on the evidence
already adduced, it was clear that Thompson had possessed a recently stolen
bill, that Thompson's possession implied that he was the thief, and that if he
could not give an innocent explanation, the Receiver-General would have to
infer his guilt and charge him. This is simply a legally correct statement of
what would happen if Thompson remained silent. Its purpose was not to obtain
a confession, but to give Thompson an opportunity to exculpate himself. As
such, it should not be barred by nemo, and no significance should be attributed
to the court's failure to refer to nemo. Indeed, one wonders why the confession
was excluded on any ground.
In Rex v. Mosey, the defendant's induced confession was excluded, but
derivative evidence was admitted, as in Warickshall.490 However, the report
does not disclose who induced the defendant to speak or what the inducement
was. Thus, we do not know whether nemo could have applied, and we should
not infer from the court's silence that nemo was believed to be irrelevant. In
Rex v. Cass,491 the court held inadmissible a confession induced by the victim's
promise of favor. That the court did not refer to nemo as a basis for exclusion
may be explained by the fact that private action is not governed by the doctrine.
Finally, in Rex v. Lockhart,492 the court, without referring to nemo, excluded a
confession that had been induced by a promise of favor, but admitted the
testimony of a derivative witness. However, the report does not disclose who
made the promise. Thus, as in Mosey, we do not know whether nemo could
have applied, and we should not infer from the court's silence that nemo was
believed to be irrelevant.
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the situation in England was that
secondary authorities gave some support to the proposition that a
governmentally compelled confession was inadmissible by virtue of the nemo
tenetur doctrine. The cases in which confessions were actually excluded neither
accepted nor rejected that proposition. Indeed, they did not mention it.
However, in none of these cases was the confession obtained as a result of a
violation of nemo tenetur. Hence, none of the cases called for a consideration
of the doctrine.
489 Thompson, 1 Leach at 292, 168 Eng. Rep. at 249.
490 1 Leach 265 n.(a), 168 Eng. Rep. at 235 n.(a) (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1784).
491 1 Leach at 293-94 n.(a), 168 Eng. Rep. at 249 n.(a) (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1784).
492 1 Leach 386, 168 Eng. Rep. 295 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1785).
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The English cases decided during the first half of the nineteenth century
present a roughly similar picture. English courts held confessions inadmissible
in no fewer than twenty-eight cases. 49s Fourteen of the cases involved threats
or unkept promises made by nongovernmental actors to whom the nemo tenetur
doctrine was inapplicable.494 That the doctrine was not referred to as the basis
for exclusion is therefore understandable. In two other cases, the report does
not disclose whether the person whose unkept promise induced the confession
was governmental or private.495 In the remaining 12 cases, the confession was
induced by a governmental actor. In eight of the cases, however, the
inducement did not violate nemo tenetur, being neither an unkept promise or
493 In chronological order the cases are Rex v. Jones, Russ. & Ry. *152, 168 Eng.
Rep. 733 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1809); Rex v. Wilson, Holt's Rep. 597, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (C.P.
1817); Rex v. Kingston, 4 Car. & P. 387, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (Norfolk Cir. 1830); Rex v.
Dunn, 4 Car. & P. 543, 172 Eng. Rep. 817 (Oxford Cir. 1831); Rex v. Parratt, 4 Car. &
P. 570, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (Oxford Cir. 1831); Rex v. Richards, 5 Car. & P. 318, 172
Eng. Rep. 993 (Oxford Cir. 1832); Rex v. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535, 172 Eng. Rep. 1087
(Oxford Cir. 1833); Rex v. Enoch, 5 Car. & P. 539, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Oxford Cir.
1833); Rex v. Mills, 6 Car. & P. 146, 172 Eng. Rep. 1183 (Oxford Cir. 1833); Rex v.
Lewis, 6 Car. & P. 161, 172 Eng. Rep. 1190 (Oxford Cir. 1833); Rex v. Walkley, 6 Car.
& P. 175, 172 Eng. Rep. 1196 (Oxford Cir. 1833); Rex v. Davis, 6 Car. & P. 177, 172
Eng. Rep. 1196 (Oxford Cir. 1833); Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. 410, 168 Eng. Rep. 1323
(Cr. Cas. Res. 1834); Rex v. Thomas, 6 Car. & P. 353, 172 Eng. Rep. 1273 (Oxford Cir.
1834); Rex v. Partridge, 7 Car. & P. 551, 173 Eng. Rep. 243 (Oxford Cir. 1836); Rex v.
Shepherd, 7 Car. & P. 579, 173 Eng. Rep. 255 (Home Cir. 1836); Rex v. Upchurch, 1
Mood. 465, 168 Eng. Rep. 1346 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1836); Reg. v. Drew, 8 Car. & P. 140,
173 Eng. Rep. 433 (Oxford Cir. 1837); Reg. v. Taylor, 8 Car. & P. 726, 173 Eng. Rep.
691 (Oxford Cir. 1839); Reg. v. Hearn, Car. & M. 109, 174 Eng. Rep. 431 (Oxford Cir.
1841); Reg. v. Horabrook, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 54 (Western Cir. 1843); Reg. v. Furley, 1
Cox Crim. Cas. 76 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1844); Reg. v. Harris, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 106 (So.
Wales Cir. 1844); Reg. v. Croydon, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 67 (Western Cir. 1846); Reg. v.
Laugher, 2 Car. & K. 225, 175 Eng. Rep. 93 (Oxford Cir. 1846); Queen v. Garbett, 2 Cox
Crim. Cas. 448 (Ex. 1847); Reg. v. Collier, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 57 (Wiltshire Assizes 1848);
Reg. v. Garner, 1 Denison Cr. Cas. Res. 329, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1848).
4 94 In chronological order, the cases are Jones, Russ. & Ry. at *152, 168 Eng. Rep. at
733; Kingston, 4 Car. & P. at 387, 172 Eng. Rep. at 752; Dunn, 4 Car. & P. at 543, 172
Eng. Rep. at 817; Parratt, 4 Car. & P. at 570, 172 Eng. Rep. at 829; Richards, 5 Car. &
P. at 318, 172 Eng. Rep. at 993; Enoch, 5 Car. & P. at 539, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1089;
Simpson, 1 Mood. at 410, 168 Eng. Rep. at 1323; Partridge, 7 Car. & P. at 551, 173 Eng.
Rep. at 243; Upchurch, 1 Mood. at 465, 168 Eng. Rep. at 1346; Taylor, 8 Car. & P. at
726, 173 Eng. Rep. at 691; Hearn, Car. & M. at 109, 174 Eng. Rep. at 431; Croydon, 2
Cox Crim. Cas. at 67; Collier, 3 Cox. Crim. Cas. at 57; Garner, 1 Denison Cr. Cas. Res.
at 329, 169 Eng. Rep. at 267.
495 Walkley, 6 Car. & P. at 161, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1190; Thomas, 6 Car. & P. at 353,
172 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
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any form of compulsion. 496 Thus, there was no occasion for the courts to
discuss the doctrine, and their failure to do so is not significant. In another
case, the report does not disclose whether a magistrate did or did not keep his
benign promise to help the suspect. 497 Three cases remain. In Rex v. Wilson, 498
a confession was held inadmissible on the ground that a magistrate's
examination implies an obligation to answer. The report does not indicate,
however, whether the obligation was regarded as inconsistent with nemo
tenetur or with some independent doctrine. In Regina v. Laugher,499 a
confession was excluded because the defendant's husband, under whose
influence she was presumed to be, urged her, in the presence of a constable, to
tell the truth. Again, the report does not mention the rationale for exclusion.
Finally, in Queen v. Garbett,5°° a confession was excluded because the
defendant, in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding, had been judicially ordered to
confess. Although the report does not clearly state the rationale for exclusion,
the reasonable inference is that the confession was excluded because it had been
obtained in violation of nemo tenetur. The defense counsel called the court's
attention to the doctrine, relying on it as a basis for saying that the defendant's
answers had been obtained improperly. 501 The prosecutor did not deny the
relevance of nemo. Rather, his argument was that the defendant had waived his
privilege by answering some of the questions without objection.502 Most of the
court's questions during the oral argument related to waiver of the privilege.50 3
The report concludes:
The learned Judges afterwards deliberated upon the case, and nine of them
were of opinion that the witness, under the circumstances, was not compellable
to answer the questions put; and that, having answered them under
compulsion, such answers could not be given in evidence against him on a
496 Mills, 6 Car. & P. at 146, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1183 (police officer said that a certain
person would testify against the defendant); Lewis, 6 Car. & P. at 161, 172 Eng. Rep. at
1190 (magistrate examined a suspect on oath in violation of settled practice); Davis, 6 Car.
& P. at 177, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1196 (same); Shepherd, 7 Car. & P. at 579, 173 Eng. Rep.
at 255 (constable told suspect not to add a lie to his misdeeds); Drew, 8 Car. & P. at 140,
173 Eng. Rep. at 433 (magistrate's clerk said that suspect's confession could be used for or
against him); Hornbrook, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. at 54, (constable said the he would be willing to
hear what suspect had to say); Fudey, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. at 76 (constable said that suspect's
confession would be used against him at his trial); Hanis, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. at 106 (same).
497 Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535, 172 Eng. Rep. 1087 (Oxford Cir. 1833).
498 Holt's Rep. 597, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (C.P. 1817).
499 2 Car. & P. 225, 175 Eng. Rep. 93 (Oxford Cir. 1846).
500 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 448 (Ex. 1847).
501 Id. at 453.
502 Id. at 457-59.
503 Id. at 454-62.
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criminal charge. The remaining six thought the evidence receivable, and the
prisoner properly convicted. 504
Although the words "nemo tenetur" are not used in the quoted passage, the
words "compellable" and "compulsion," in the context of the oral argument,
strongly imply that the defendant's answers were excluded by virtue of the
nemo tenetur doctrine.505 So read, Garbett appears to be the first English case
giving nemo an exclusionary effect.
Of the twenty-eight cases in which confessions were held inadmissible
during the first half of the nineteenth century, none contradicts the thesis of this
article and Garbett appears to support it. Further support may be derived from
some of the many cases of roughly the same period in which confessions were
held admissible. The earliest of these cases is Smith v. Beadnell.5°6 A witness
at a bankruptcy proceeding answered incriminating questions although he might
have invoked nemo tenetur. At a subsequent civil proceeding the answers were
held admissible, the court implying that they would have been inadmissible had
they been obtained in violation of nemo. Similar holdings, with similar
implications, were made in Rex v. Haworth507 and Regina v. Sloggett.50 8
The only case of this era that merits extended discussion is Regina v.
Scott.50 9 Scott was a bankrupt who, at a bankruptcy examination, was asked
incriminating questions relating to his estate and business dealings, the nemo
tenetur protection having been partially abrogated by the bankruptcy law. His
answers were deemed unsatisfactory by the examiner, and he was threatened
with jail. Thereafter, he gave incriminating answers which the prosecution used
against him in a subsequent criminal case. On appeal, Scott's lawyer referred to
both nemo tenetur and the voluntariness rule as bases for inadmissibility,
apparently perceiving them to be separate, and the court discussed them
separately. Its discussion of nemo tenetur makes clear that confessions obtained
5 4Id. at462.
505 Garbett has been read as basing exclusion on nemo tenetur; see Reg. v. Scott, 1
Dears. & Bell 47, 169 Eng. Rep. 909 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1856); 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80,
§ 850, at 519.
506 1 Camp. 30, 170 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1807).
507 4 Car. & P. 254, 172 Eng. Rep. 693 (Northern Cir. 1830). Haworth, a witness at
the preliminary examination of another person, answered incriminating questions without
asserting his nemo tenetur objection. His answers were held admissible against him at a
subsequent criminal trial.
508 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856). Under English bankruptcy law,
which partially abrogated the nemo tenetur protection, Sloggett, a bankrupt, was required to
answer questions about his estate and his business dealings. Although the abrogation of the
privilege did not extend further, Sloggett also answered other incriminating questions
without asserting his nemo tenetur protection. The answers to these questions were held
admissible at a subsequent criminal proceeding.
509 1 Dears. & Bell 47, 169 Eng. Rep. 909 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1856).
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in violation of the protection are inadmissible by virtue of the protection. 510
Nevertheless, the court easily dispatched Scott's nemo argument by noting that
as a result of the abrogation of the nemo protection, Scott's incriminating
answers had not been obtained in violation of the protection. 511 The court also
dispatched Scott's involuntariness argument.
It is a trite maxim that the confession of a crime, to be admissible against the
party confessing, must be voluntary; but this only means that it shall not be
induced by improper threats or promises, because, under such circumstances,
the party may have been influenced to say what is not true, and the supposed
confession cannot be safely acted upon. Such an objection cannot apply to a
lawful examination in the course ofa judicial proceding. Then the defendant's
counsel objects that, in the course of this examination, threats were used; the
alleged threats, however, were merely an explanation of the enactment of the
Legislature upon the subject, and a warning to the defendant of the
consequences which, in point of law, would arise from his refusing to give a
true answer to the questions put to him.5 12
The court's handling of the involuntariness issue is unsatisfactory. If, as the
court seems to accept, there is a reliability-based voluntariness rule that is
separate from nemo, the only question should be whether there is a real risk
that the inducement will produce a false confession. In fact, incriminating
answers obtained by the threat of jail may be unreliable. In Scott, the bankrupt
knew that his interrogators were dissatisfied with his answers and that he would
be committed unless he changed them. As noted earlier in this Article, a person
in Scott's situation might seek to avoid immediate confinement by giving a
desired, but false, answer and taking his chances with the more remote risk of
conviction and consequent confinement. 513 But the court never even discussed
the matter. Instead of considering the content of the threat in determining
whether Scott's answers were putatively unreliable, the court simply asked
whether the threat was authorized by the legislature. Authorization, however,
is irrelevant to reliability. After all, if the legislature had authorized torture to
obtain information from recalcitrant bankrupts, their torture-induced statements
could hardly be deemed reliable. Thus, it makes no sense for the court to insist
that reliability is determined by authorization.
Why did the Scott court take such a patently weak position? The answer is,
I suspect, that the court knew the result it wanted to reach, but did not know
how to get there. It did not want to hold the statements inadmissible under the
involuntariness rule if they were admissible under nemo by virtue of the
5 10 Id. at 57, 59.
511 Id. at 59-60.
5 12 Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
513 See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy statute. The statements were admissible under nemo because the
compulsion was "authorized by the legislature." Not perceiving any easier way
to avoid the involuntariness rule, the court took the nemo-related factor of
authorization and used it to parry Scott's involuntariness argument.
There was, however, a simpler and more direct way to avoid the
involuntariness argument. The thesis of this Article is that the involuntariness
rule should be applied only if the nemo protection is inherently inapplicable. If
a confession is obtained by governmental compulsion, nemo tenetur supplies
full protection, including exclusion, and there is no need for an involuntariness
rule. If, for whatever reason, the legislature is willing to authorize
governmental compulsion, it is then willing to forgo all the values underlying
the nemo tenetur doctrine, including reliability. In Scott, therefore, the court
should have said that the defendant's involuntariness argument was irrelevant
because nemo would have been applicable but for the legislative abrogation.514
To the extent that Scott recognizes separate nemo and involuntariness
protections in a case of governmental compulsion, it implicitly denies the thesis
of this Article. To the extent that it avoids the involuntariness argument by
using a factor that is relevant to nemo analysis only, it absorbs involuntariness
into nemo and implicitly supports the thesis of this Article.
2. American Materials
Through 1850, American courts excluded confessions in twenty-four
reported cases. 515 In none of these cases was nemo tenetur said to be the basis
514 Bear in mind that I am discussing only the common law nemo protection at this
point. I do not intend to suggest that the constitutional protection could be trumped
legislatively.
515 In chronological order, the inadmissibility cases through 1850 are Commonwealth
v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. *144 (1804) (victim made promise of favor); Jackson's Case, 1 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) 28 (N.Y. Ct. Sess. 1816) (victim promised not to prosecute;
confession inadmissible, but tangible property to which confession led, admissible); Thorn's
Case, 4 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 81 (N.Y. Gen. Seas. 1819) (bank president promised
embezzler that he would be allowed to turn state's evidence if he confessed); Milligan's
Case, 6 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 64 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1821) (victim promised not to
prosecute); State v. Guild, 10 NJ.L. 163 (1828) (private promise that suspect "would
probably get clear" and that it would be "better" to confess); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166
(1829) (torture by persons unconnected with case); State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116 (1839)
(shareholder of bank promised defendant favorable treatment); Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. (2
Hum.) 39 (1840) (promise to try to induce victim to drop prosecution); Peter v. State, 7
Miss. (4 S. & M.) *31 (1844) (persons unconnected with case threatened to hang suspect);
State v. Bostick, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (Ct. Err. & App. 1845) (suspect's mistress promised
that there would be no prosecution); State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. *57 (1847) (slave whipped by
owner); State v. Nelson, 22 La. (3 La. Ann.) *497 (1848) (son of suspect's employer said it
would be better to confess); People v. Rankin, 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 467 (N.Y. Oyer &
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for the exclusion. However, in thirteen of the cases, threats or unkept promises
were made by nongovernmental actors to whom nemo is inapplicable.5 16 That
the doctrine was not mentioned in these cases is therefore understandable and
not significant. In three cases, the report does not disclose whether the
confession was induced by a governmental or nongovernmental actor.517 In the
remaining eight cases, the confession was induced by a governmental actor.518
In two of these cases, however, the report does not disclose whether a benign
promise was kept.5 19 Four of the remaining cases of governmental action
involve unkept promises.520 I stated earlier in this Article that the nemo tenetur
doctrine should be deemed violated when an incriminating statement is obtained
by a benign, unkept, governmental promise, and that the incriminating
Term. 1807) (officer threatened to put suspect in dark room and hang him); State v. Aaron,
4 NJ.L. *231 (1818) (grand jurors' statement to suspect that it would be better to tell the
truth construed as a promise of benefit); United States v. Pocklington, 27 F. Cas. 580
(C.C.D.C. 1822) (No. 16,060) (magistrate promised to try to get a light sentence for the
suspect); People v. Robertson, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cases 66 (N.Y. Rec. Ct. 1822) (constable
told suspect's wife it would be better if he confessed); United States v. Richard, 27 F. Cas.
798 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 16,154) (unspecified promise; tangible evidence admissible);
State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) *259 (1827) (promise that confession would
be inadmissible); State v. Brick, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 530 (Gen. Sess. 1835) (suspect told it
would be better if he confessed; confession inadmissible, but tangible evidence admissible);
People v. Ward, 15 Wend. 231 (N.Y. 1836) (magistrate said it would be better for suspect
to confess); Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269 (1846) (magistrate threatened to commit
suspect and told her it would be better to tell the truth); Couley v. State, 12 Mo. *462
(1849) (police officer said that it would be better for the suspect to confess and that the
officer would not divulge the confession); Spence v. State, 17 Ala. *192 (1850) (slave who
had invariably been whipped for misconduct confessed after being tied and left with third
person; held that trial court should have permitted defendant to prove that he had been
whipped on prior occasions); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 605 (1850)
(police officer said he would try to help suspect).
516 The cases in chronological order are C7abbock, 1 Mass. *144; Jackson, 1 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) at 28; Thorn, 4 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) at 81; MUlligan, 6 City
Hall Recorder (Rogers) at 64; Guild, 10 NJ.L. at 163; Hector, 2 Mo. at 166; Phelps, 11
Vt. at 116; Boyd, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 39; Peter, 7 Miss. (4 S. & M.) at *31; Bostick, 4
Del. (4 Harr.) at 563; Clarissa, 11 Ala. at *57; Nelson, 22 La. (3 La. Ann.) at *497;
Spence, 17 Ala. at *192.
517 The cases in chronological order are Richard, 27 F. Cas. at 798; Roberts, 12 N.C.
at *259; Brick, 2 Del. at 530.
518 The cases in chronological order are Rankin, 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. at 467; Aaron,
4 NJ.L. at *231; Pocklington, 27 F. Cas. at 580; Robertson, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cas. at 66;
Ward, 15 Wend. at 231; Harnan, 4 Pa. at 269; Couley, 12 Mo. at *462; Taylor, 6 Mass. at
605.
519 The cases in chronological order are Pockdington, 27 F. Cas. at 580; Taylor, 6
Mass. at 605.
520 The cases in chronological order are Aaron, 4 N..L. at *231; Robertson, 1
Wheeler Crim. Cas. at 66; Ward, 15 Wend. at 231; Couley, 12 Mo. at *462.
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statements should be inadmissible by virtue of nemo tenetur alone.521 At the
same time, I recognized that the issue was close and that there was a plausible
counter-argument that the nemo tenetur protection is never violated by a benign
promise.5 22 Whichever way one might resolve this matter, little significance
should be attributed to the fact that American courts did not rely on nemo
tenetur as a basis for excluding promise-induced statements. If one accepts the
counter-argument, nemo is irrelevant and judicial silence is therefore
insignificant. On the other hand, the basic position, which is quite sophisticated
and value-oriented, would not readily occur to most lawyers and judges.
Rather, they would simply assume that the nemo tenetur protection, which
grew out of conditions of torture and other abuse, was limited to those
conditions. Their silence, therefore, in cases of benign promises, may indicate
shortsightedness, but it does not contradict the thesis of this Article.
Of the twenty-four cases through 1850 in which American courts held
confessions inadmissible, in none was the confession obtained by governmental
force and in only two were the confessions obtained by threat. In People v.
Rankin, a police officer said to a suspect, "[i]f you do not tell all you know
about the business, you will be put in the dark room and hanged." 523 In
Commonwealth v. Harman, a magistrate placed a suspect under oath and then
threatened to commit her if she did not tell the truth.524 Although both
confessions were obviously obtained in violation of nemo tenetur, in neither
case was the doctrine even mentioned. In Rankin, the court excluded the
confession as involuntary. In Hannan, the court held that the threat made the
confession inadmissible, but it did not say why. In addition, the court held that
the oath made the confession inadmissible, but again the court gave no reason.
Harman is not inconsistent with the thesis of this Article, but Rankin is.
Although the American exclusionary cases fail to support the thesis of this
Article, a modicum of support comes from two of the cases in which
confessions were admitted. In Commonwealth v. Drake5 25 and State v.
Broughton,526 the defendant claimed that his confession was involuntary and
inadmissible. In both cases, the court equated involuntariness with compulsion
under nemo tenetur. Finding no compulsion in violation of nemo tenetur, the
court held that the statement was voluntary and admissible. In common with
their English counterparts-Beadnell, Haworth, and Sloggett527-the two
521 See supra notes 458-62 and accompanying text.
522 See Id.
523 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 467, 469 (N.Y. Oyer & Term. 1807).
524 4 Pa. 269 (1846).
525 15 Mass. 161 (1818).
526 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 96 (1846).
527 Smith v. Beadnell, 1 Camp. 30, 170 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1807); Rex v. Haworth,
4 Car. & P. 254, 172 Eng. Rep. 693 (Northern Cir. 1830); Reg. v. Sloggett, 7 Cox Crim.
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American cases imply that a confession is inadmissible if obtained by conduct
that violates the nemo tenetur protection.
3. Evaluating the English and American Exclusionary Materials
An interesting and revealing pattern emerges when we combine the English
and American cases in which confessions were excluded during the first half of
the nineteenth century. Confessions were excluded in fifty-two cases. Only one
of the cases-Garbett-can fairly be read as basing exclusion on the nemo
tenetur doctrine. In the remaining cases, either the rationale underlying
exclusion is unstated or the involuntariness doctrine is used. However, in over
half the cases (thirty-two), the confession was induced either by a
nongovernmental actor to whom nemo is inapplicable (twenty-seven) or by a
person whose identity is undisclosed (five). Moreover, twenty-five of the
thirty-two cases involve promises-the inducement least likely to be perceived
by a court as offending nemo.
In twenty of the English and American cases, the confession was obtained
by a governmental actor. In these cases, the nature of the inducement becomes
crucial in determining whether nemo could be used as a basis for exclusion. In
eight of the cases, the inducement was neither compulsion nor an unkept
promise and therefore was outside the scope of the nemo protection. Seven of
the remaining twelve cases involve promises-again, the inducement least
likely to be perceived by a court as offending nemo. In only five of the fifty-
two cases was the excluded confession obtained by a governmental threat. In
three of the opinions, the rationale for exclusion was unstated; in one-
Rankin-the court relied on the voluntariness rule; and in the remaining case-
Garbett-the court probably relied on nemo.
The cases of exclusion of confessions in England and America through
1850 are dominated by situations in which the nemo protection does not apply
(nongovernmental inducement) or in which the protection does not obviously
apply (promises, whether kept or unkept).528 At the head of, and clearly
Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856). The English cases are discussed supra at notes 506-08
and accompanying text.
528 The same is true of English and American cases in which the confession was
admitted. During the period under consideration, American courts admitted confessions in
15 reported cases. In chronological order, the cases are Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 Dall.
116 (Pa. 1792); State v. Moore, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 482 (Super. Ct. 1797); Trial of
Northampton Insurgents (Fries' Case) (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), in FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE
TRIALS OF THE UNrrED STATES 458 (Philadelphia, Carey & Hart 1799); Williams' Case, 1
City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 149 (N.Y. Ct. Sess. 1816); Commonwealth v. Drake, 15
Mass. 161 (1818); Bowerhan's Case, 4 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 136 (N.Y. Gen. Sess.
1819); Stage's Case, 5 City Hall Recorder (Rogers)177 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1820); State v.
Guild, 10 N.LL. 163 (1828); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477 (1830);
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influencing, the entire line of cases stands Warickshall. In that case, which
involved a nongovernmental promise to which nemo tenetur was not
applicable, the court had to use a reliability-based involuntariness doctrine as
the ground for exclusion. Its ambiguous dictum, however, might be read as
implying that involuntariness is the only basis for exclusion, even in a case of
governmental compulsion. This reading would leave the nemo tenetur
protection as a device for fending off interrogation, but with no exclusionary
force of its own, a position that has not been taken on either side of the
Atlantic.529 It is likely that lawyers and judges in the immediate post-
Warickshall era looked to Warickshall and took its dictum at face value because
it was the first reported case in which a confession was excluded from
evidence. It is also likely that they were misled by the facts of the post-
Warickshall cases which overwhelmingly fell outside the scope of nemo.530
These two factors combined to deflect them from considering nemo tenetur as a
basis for exclusion. Had they thought about it, they would have seen that nemo
must have an exclusionary effect; that one of the values underlying nemo
State v. Harman, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 567 (1839-42); Hawkins v. State, 7 Mo. 190 (1841);
State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171 (1842); State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. (7 fred.) 96 (1846); State
v. Cowan, 29 N.C. 139 (1847); State v. Kirby, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 378 (1847). Five of the
cases involve neither threats nor promises (Fries, Drake, Grant, Broughton, and Cowan).
Six of the cases involve promises (Bowerhan, Guild, Knapp, Harman, Hawkins, and Kirby).
Eight of the cases involve non-governmental actors (Moore, Bowerhan, Drake, Stage,
Guild, Haman, Grant, and Kirby), and two cases fail to disclose who induced the
confession (Williams and Hawkins). The American cases are thus dominated both by actors
to whom the nemo tenetur prohibition is not applicable and by actions that are not obviously
within the scope of the prohibition.
By contrast to the American cases, only one of the English admissibility cases involves
a non-governmental actor. Rex v. Gilham, 1 Mood. 186, 168 Eng. Rep. 1234 (Cr. Cas.
Res. 1828). All of the remaining 11 cases involve governmental actors. In 10 of these cases,
the confession was obtained by neither compulsion nor a promise. Smith v. Beadnell, 1
Camp. 30, 170 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1807); Rex v. Thornton, 1 Mood. 27, 168 Eng. Rep.
1171 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1824); Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432, 171 Eng. Rep. 1073 (N'isi
Prius 1826); Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221 (Oxford Cir. 1830); Wright's Case, 1 Lewin
48, 168 Eng. Rep. 954 (York Spl. Assizes 1830); Rex v. Haworth, 4 Car. & P. 254, 172
Eng. Rep. 693 (Northern Cir. 1830); Rex v. Fagg, 4 Car. & P. 566, 172 Eng. Rep. 828
(Home Cir. 1831); Reg. v. Kerr, 8 Car. & P. 176, 173 Eng. Rep. 449 (Centr. Crim. Ct.
1837); Reg. v. Sandys, Car. & M. 345, 174 Eng. Rep. 536 (Chester Assizes 1841); Reg. v.
Sloggett, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856). In the remaining case, the
confession was obtained by a threat of jail as permitted by the English bankruptcy law.
Wheater's Case, 2 Lewin 157, 168 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1838). The English
cases are therefor dominated by actions that clearly fall outside the scope of nemo.
529 See supra notes 378-79 and infra note 560 and accompanying text.
530 It is significant that the first reported American decision excluding a confession was
Commonwealth v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 144 (1804), the facts of which are similar to
Warickshall.
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exclusion, albeit a subsidiary value, is reliability; and that the exclusionary
effect of nemo in cases of governmental compulsion leaves no room for an
independent, reliability-based, exclusionary rule. But they did not think about
nemo, and, with few exceptions, neither urged it nor used it to exclude
confessions in the cases with which they were concerned. Instead, they used
Warickshall's reliability-based exclusionary rule as the theory of choice even in
cases in which it was clear that nemo had been violated.531 By following the
path of least resistance, they inadvertently created two lines of cases, one
involving the permissibility of sanctions for refusal to answer (the nemo line),
the other involving the exclusion of confessions (the involuntariness line).
These two lines in turn misled most of the early writers of treatises whose
works were intended to reflect the current state of the law rather than to
criticize and shape it. As a result, they described two separate and independent
protections,532 thus giving continued momentum to the dominance of the
confession rule over nemo as the device for exclusion. Unlike many of his
predecessors, however, Wigmore was not reluctant to criticize the law, and
sought to influence its development. Yet even he accepted Warickshall's
thoughtless dictum. What is more, he became its most vigorous advocate. One
does not lightly disagree with Wigmore, but the time has come to say that he
was largely wrong.
[Part H appears in Volume 53, Number 2 of
the Ohio State Law Journal]
531 People v. Rankin, 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 467 (N.Y. Oyer & Term. 807) is an
example.532 Treatises are discussed supra notes 305-15 and accompanying text.
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